STATE OF A NATION: THE QUEST FOR PAKISTAN

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

at

Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
August 2008

Canada

DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

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For my parents, for their love and encouragement.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the political history of the Indian subcontinent up to the creation of India and Pakistan. Relying on the distinction between 'space' and 'place', it argues that the root cause of Pakistan's chronic instability is that the modern state system, with political exigencies in India during the 1940s, forced the transformation of what was a call for a Muslim homeland, as distinct from a state, into an elite-dominated, modern state. Thus, the vision of Pakistan that most inspired the masses was never realized. The inability to coherently determine what Pakistan is or ought to be has fostered instability and violence as the country's rulers and various opposition groups have vied to cultivate a sense of place within Pakistan's borders, or, in the case of some pan-Islamist organizations, displace the notion of the territorial state in the subcontinent entirely.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A NOTE ON SPELLING

This thesis uses a small number of Arabic, Sanskrit, and Urdu words. I have chosen to use a simplified transcription system without diacritics to facilitate easier reading.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Sir, the disease with which we are dealing, is a chronic one. There are a good many physicians who have tried to diagnose it. Some have achieved a certain amount of success; others have failed signally in their undertaking. Different physicians have prescribed different remedies for the disease, but in the words of the poet: "Oh, my Dream has been confused due to so many interpretations!"

Muhammad Iqbal *Speech on the motion for adjournment regarding communal riots, delivered in the Punjab Legislative Council on 18 July 1927*[1]

Only one unity is dependable and that unity is the brotherhood of man, which is above race, nationality, colour or language. So long as this so-called democracy, this accursed nationalism and this degraded imperialism are not shattered, so long as men do not demonstrate by their actions that they believe that the whole world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationalities are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead a happy and contented life, and the beautiful ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will never materialize!

Muhammad Iqbal *New Year message broadcast from the Lahore station of All India Radio on 1 January 1938*[2]

In a world of nation-states, Pakistan is an unfinished, and therefore unstable, state. While a number of things make Pakistan unique, this is not one of them. Lots of states are unstable, for a variety of reasons. I am not principally concerned with whether or not Pakistan is an anomaly among states, though there are a number of anomalous things about Pakistan—like the fact it is the only modern state whose existence was premised exclusively on the need for Muslims, as a nation, to have their own homeland. Neither am I concerned with how Pakistan, as a state, can be encouraged to be a better or more reliable partner in the American-led struggle against non-state and so-called rogue state

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[1] Muhammad Iqbal, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, ed. Tariq Abdur-Rahman (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali, 1973) 62.
[2] Iqbal, *Speeches* 228.

violence (the so-called 'global war on terror' or 'terrorism'), though a more stable Pakistan might well be a better or more reliable partner—or reject partnership entirely. Nor am I concerned with whether or not the education system in Pakistan is somehow breeding terrorism, though perhaps parts of it are. I am primarily concerned with the wellbeing of ordinary Pakistanis, and with a very specific thing that I argue affects their wellbeing. While Pakistan's role in the so-called war on terrorism and the state of its education system, among many other pressing issues, certainly bear on the wellbeing of ordinary Pakistanis, such issues are at most tangential to this thesis.

Pakistan is currently the only known Muslim-majority nuclear power, it continues to nurse a bitter rivalry with nuclear-armed India, it occupies a vital strategic position in South Asia, and its cooperation is deemed essential to prosecuting the current war on terrorism. For these reasons, it has once again become a centre of world attention.[3] Probably the most urgent concern is Pakistan's apparently chronic instability. While Pakistan's instability is of both regional and global importance, only Pakistanis themselves can ultimately overcome it. Thus, when I say I am primarily concerned with the wellbeing of Pakistanis, what I mean is I am concerned with factors that contribute to the instability in Pakistan because of a concern for the wellbeing of ordinary Pakistanis. Thus, I will not be discussing ways to entice Pakistan to be a more cooperative player in the war on terrorism, or giving advice on how Pakistan's government can more effectively defeat terrorism. Rather, I will be exploring, from a theoretical perspective, the factors that I argue have most contributed to instability in Pakistan.

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[3] For a popular account, see Simon Robinson, "Why Pakistan Matters," *Time* 14 January 2008: 24+.

This thesis argues that the circumstances surrounding Pakistan's creation and the different ways Pakistan's rulers have responded to these have made Pakistan inherently unstable as a state. Thus, the circumstances surrounding Pakistan's creation continue to have a profound effect on the wellbeing of ordinary Pakistanis. Weak institutions, rampant corruption, terrorism, and so on, are symptoms, not causes, of Pakistan's inherent instability as a state. While this is not an entirely new argument, I hope to provide a fresh analysis of the history of the Indian subcontinent up to partition and the creation of the separate states of India and Pakistan in 1947 that will tell us more about what specific factors have led to the cyclical crises Pakistan has faced since its inception. Note that the issue is not that the political and security situation in Pakistan is getting worse, though it may indeed be,[4] but rather that Pakistan has faced similar crises throughout its history that can be explained, in part, by the circumstances surrounding the creation of the state to begin with. A better understanding of these root causes of Pakistan's instability may shed light on policy alternatives and challenges for the future.

Relying on the distinction in political geography between 'space' and 'place', I argue that the most significant root cause of Pakistan's chronic instability is the fact that the modern state system, which forces virtually every morsel of dry land on earth to be part of a modern state, in conjunction with political exigencies in British India during the 1940s, forced the transformation of what was initially a call for a Muslim homeland, "a

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[4] According to Hussain Haqqani, "At least 1,471 people were reported killed in terrorist incidents in Pakistan during 2006, up from 648 terrorism-related fatalities during the preceding year. Of these, 608 were civilians, 325 security personnel and 538 accused terrorists. The rising fatalities of security forces indicate the growing strength of armed non-state actors, especially extremists." See Hussain Haqqani, "Pakistan's Focus on Military Muscle Weakens Social Cohesion and Makes the State Increasingly Ungovernable," *New Pakistan* 1 June 2007, 1 August 2008 <http://www.new-pakistan.com/issue%2038/Pakistan's%20focus%20on%20military%20muscle %20 weakens %20social%20cohesion.html>.

moral order transcending the divisions among Muslims"[5]—Pakistan as a moral place, not necessarily a modern state—into an elite-dominated, modern territorial state—Pakistan as neutral space, as a geographic container devoid of moral content. Thus, the vision of Pakistan that most inspired the masses—Pakistan as a homeland for India's Muslims, a moral place, not simply a neutral space, in which the Muslims of South Asia could thrive—was never realized. In August 1947, as the euphoria of finally achieving independence from the British and apparently realizing the dream of Pakistan mixed with the horror of the massive communal violence that attended partition and the birth of the two states of India and Pakistan, a profound sense of confusion appears to have set in among many Pakistanis and Indians alike. What, precisely, was Pakistan supposed to be, and what was it now? As Pakistan's rulers sought to answer this question in a manner that would legitimate their rule, almost always relying on the ultimately non-territorial Islamic ideology said to have justified Pakistan, the situation only became more confused. This sense of confusion has lingered to the present day in Pakistan. This thesis offers an analysis of what led to this confusion and how this confusion has affected Pakistan since.

In political geography, the concepts of 'space' and 'place' can be used to discuss the ways humans experience the physical locations they find themselves in.[6] Every place is also a space, but not every space is a place. Different people may perceive or experience the same physical location as either space or place, or sometimes both. Since one person can experience a single location as both space and place, it would be incorrect

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[5] David Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative," *Journal of Asian Studies* 57.4 (November 1998): 1091.

[6] My discussion of the concepts of 'space' and 'place' relies heavily on Peter J. Taylor, "Places, Spaces and Macy's: Place-Space Tensions in the Political Geography of Modernities," *Progress in Human Geography* 23.1 (1999): 7–26. Other sources and influences are noted where appropriate.

to say that these concepts are used to distinguish between two mutually exclusive attitudes or attachments to a given location. The distinction between the concepts of space and place is critical to our discussion however, since this thesis argues that Pakistan's failure to transform its territorial space into place, despite many failed attempts by its rulers to effect such a change from the top down, is responsible for a number of the challenges it has faced and crises it has experienced throughout its short history.

The concept of place, as opposed to space, denotes a physical location—often, though not necessarily, localized—that sustains people in moral communion with one another through a complex network of personal, genealogical, familial, and status relationships.[7] Spaces imbued with moral content become places; people are intimate with places, not spaces. Places are not the product of some special feature of a given space as space, but rather the product of the social relations that develop and the consequent feeling of belonging one experiences in a given location.[8] Places are sites of experientially remarkable levels of social cohesion, like a "tight-knit rural community or urban neighbourhood,"[9] where relationships based on trust and other factors develop among community members. Such a community obviously occupies a physical space, but it is also a place by virtue of the bonds that 'knit' its members together.

States occupy spaces defined by fixed borders, but these spaces can also be places. Transforming state space into place is a symbiotic process whereby citizens recognize the state's territory as their mutual home, allowing the state to help facilitate,

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[7] Gilmartin, "Partition" 1084.

[8] This after the desacralization of the world, in the modern sense. See Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

[9] Jeff Dayton-Johnson, *Social Cohesion and Economic Prosperity* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 2001) 3.

encourage, or support, in cooperation with its citizens, the organic development of the social networks that will then further bind its citizens together in an extralegal fashion and thus confirm the status of the state's territorial space as a distinct place. To the extent that social networks maintain social cohesion throughout the territory a state occupies, social cohesion breaks down within that state when people do not also recognize its territory as a place. Paradoxically, however, it is almost impossible for a state's territory to acquire the status of a place without a sufficiently high degree of social cohesion to begin with. Thus, it is much more difficult for a state to cultivate a sense of place for its citizens within its borders after the fact from the top down. Social cohesion is almost always the result of social networks that are formed spontaneously by community members at the local level, or by networks formed by individuals, families and other associations across a larger area, but in either case it is impossible for a true sense of place to simply be imposed on a space; it must develop organically. Because Pakistan was never intended to be a modern state in the conventional sense, but rather a place, it is an artificial creation and it has proven exceedingly difficult for the networks necessary for social cohesion to develop organically. As a result, Pakistan today is made up of several semi-autonomous, localized places that knit members of specific communities together, at the expense of national unity. This simply makes the prospect of cultivating a true sense of place throughout Pakistan more daunting.[10]

While people supported the initial call for Pakistan for a variety of different reasons, Muslims in general seem to have been inspired by the idea of Pakistan as a

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[10] On disunity and lack of social cohesion in Pakistan, see Haqqani, "Pakistan's Focus"; *Human Rights and Democratic Development in Pakistan*, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, January 1998, 1 August 2008 <http://www.dd-rd.ca/site/publications/index.php?id=1324&subsection=catalogue&print=true&show_all=true>.

moral place they could identify with, a place where they might feel safe and at home (the positive feeling of warmth and belonging a person may experience in their own home is precisely what turns that person's house, which is otherwise simply a neutral space, into a place called home, with all of the pleasant connotations associated with the concept of home). Yet what they ended up with was Pakistan as a space devoid of moral content whose elite architects and their feudal successors (landlords were among the biggest financial supporters of the new Pakistani regime, as discussed in Chapter 5) sought simply to exert their authority over while simultaneously quashing all attempts by presumed pretenders to their power to cultivate an independent sense of place anywhere within the territory. Thus, from the beginning, Pakistan has lacked the social cohesion that comes from successfully transforming space into place, and thus the relationships among the analytically distinct concepts of state, nation, and regime in Pakistan, that would otherwise help sustain a sense of place in the space Pakistan occupies, have always been incoherent. Until Pakistan can become a place, these relationships will remain incoherent and Pakistan will continue to be an unstable space. For Pakistan to accomplish that, however, there needs to be consensus on what Pakistan is. As Hussain Haqqani, currently Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, remarked in 2007, "It is time the world set aside its immediate preoccupation with Musharraf's future to examine the fundamental conditions of the Pakistani state."[11] This is something I attempt to do in this thesis.

The vision of Pakistan as a moral place or a Muslim homeland was not realized for two interrelated reasons. First, the British had long privileged the geopolitical spatial

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[11] Haqqani, "Pakistan's Focus."

organizational concept of abstract, neutral space over the concept of intimate, moral place in the subcontinent by insisting on referring to and administering India as a single geopolitical whole—a space—however abstract, regardless of the extent of its internal social cohesion (Britain anyhow tried to frustrate what little social cohesion may have existed throughout the entire subcontinent, as distinct from social cohesion within particular places in the subcontinent, through its strategy of divide and rule, as discussed in Chapter 3). Second, the modern state system, which the British introduced to the subcontinent, was presumed by the early twentieth century, if not before, at least by those with the power to impose it on the rest of the world, to be the only viable system of geopolitical spatial organization (see Chapter 4). These two factors forced Indians calling for independence to privilege space over place, if not in their hearts and minds then at least in their political programs. Indians were forced to frame their demands for political independence using the foreign concept of the modern territorial state as neutral space, as opposed to the concept of place that had traditionally served to sustain individual communities and allow them to assert their independence in the subcontinent—not through reified geographic spaces or states but through moral places that provided a true home and a sense of belonging to their residents. Thus, the creation of Pakistan as a modern state was unexpected—an accident, even, for these and other reasons discussed throughout this thesis. Owing to the circumstances surrounding the creation of Pakistan and especially the ensuing confusion over the basis for and nature of Pakistan's existence as a territorial state, Pakistan has remained an elite-dominated, essentially feudal state, since its creation and has yet to cultivate a sense of place within its borders. Thus it lacks social cohesion and remains profoundly unstable. Moreover, since the need for Muslims

to have their own homeland in the subcontinent was the only argument ever consistently used for the creation of Pakistan, Pakistan's rulers have all tried to square the Islamic ideology used to justify Pakistan's creation with the concept of the modern territorial state. This has simply further destabilized the country, however, as it has become evident that the Islamic ideology used to justify Pakistan is ultimately incompatible with the concept of the modern territorial state, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Does this explain all the problems Pakistan has faced since its creation in 1947? No. But it does explain, or at least give us greater insight into, a number of them, such as why Pakistan is currently on its fifth constitution and why this constitution is still far from universally accepted in Pakistan; why every single government administration in Pakistan's history has been accused of rampant corruption; why no elected government in Pakistan has ever been able to complete its designated term in office; why certain regions of the country remain ungovernable; why Pakistan's dispute with India over the territory of Jammu and Kashmir persists with no end in sight; why Pakistan seems to be unusually susceptible to religious demagogues fomenting dissent or wreaking havoc within its borders; why the debate over the role of Islam and Islamic law in Pakistan shows no signs of being definitively resolved anytime soon; or why Iran and Saudi Arabia, among other state and non-state actors, seemingly feel it is legitimate to continue to fund rival Islamic movements in Pakistan that have been responsible for thousands of deaths in recurrent bouts of sectarian violence. An analogy may help clarify things here. When you enter a mosque, you take off your shoes as a sign that you respect the place you are in. You comport yourself in a respectful fashion. Though the Prophet Muhammad is reported to

have said that the entire earth was made a mosque for him,[12] Pakistan's rulers and other elements within Pakistan clearly have not behaved as if Pakistan was anything like a consecrated place. Thus, we see corruption and violence.

While Pakistan's existence as a spatial container devoid of moral meaning and thus absent a sense of place and lacking in social cohesion throughout its territory is not the only plausible explanation for many of these, and other ills, that afflict the country, I argue that it is a necessary ingredient in many of them and one that has so far gone undertheorized. Still, the question arises of whether anything could have been done to remedy this situation prior to the creation of Pakistan. Perhaps, though it is unlikely, for reasons discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. Can anything be done to remedy the situation now? Maybe, but the solution is not as simple as 'democratization', as discussed in Chapter 5. The first chapter lays the groundwork for many of the issues discussed throughout this thesis, and provides a critical overview of scholarship on Pakistan to date. Chapter 2 introduces the 'two-nations' theory that was used to justify the call for Pakistan and discusses the philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal, the leading intellectual inspiration for Pakistan. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the history of the Indian subcontinent up to partition, with a focus on how the British effectively constructed India and how relations between Muslims and Hindus developed during this period. Chapter 4 considers the relationship between Pakistan and the concept of the modern territorial state. Here we explore the concepts of 'space' and 'place' in more depth. Finally, in Chapter 5, we look at how and why successive Pakistani governments have tried and failed to answer the most fundamental question of all: what is Pakistan?

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[12] Muhammad Ali, *A Manual of Hadith*, Internet Sacred Texts Archive, 1944, 1 August 2008 <http://www.sacred-texts.com/isl/hadith/had08.htm>.

CHAPTER TWO

The Quest Begins

A persistent theme in scholarship on Pakistani politics is Pakistan's incessant quest for identity.[13] Pakistan is variously described as a state in search of a nation, an unfinished nation, an unfinished state, a nation in search of identity, a people in search of a state, or multiple nations itching to go their separate ways. But what does any of this mean? This thesis explores precisely that question. After a brief sketch of some of the broad themes discussed in this thesis, this chapter provides an overview of some of the issues facing Pakistan today and discusses how other scholars have conceived of the challenges Pakistan faces. It highlights some of the ambiguities in the language used to discuss Pakistan and argues that we take too many concepts, like 'nation' and 'state', for granted, and that this creates problems for analyses of the political situation in Pakistan. This chapter further emphasizes the need to come to a better understanding of the nature of Pakistan as a state and the relationship between this and the challenges it faces, not only for the sake of the people of Pakistan but also in view of its pivotal role in the current American-led so-called global war on terrorism. Finally, it suggests ways a better understanding of the history of Pakistan and its creation, and the nature of Pakistan as a state today, may illuminate challenges political theory must subsequently address.

The most intractable debate since Pakistan's creation has been over the relationship between Islam, or Islamic ideology, and Pakistan. Pakistan is either an Islamic state, or it is not. If it is, the question arises of what this means. If it is not, the

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[13] For a collection of essays on and related to this theme, see Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* (New York: Zed Books, 2002).

question arises of whether it should be and, if not, why it should exist at all. The perennial concern is what, exactly, Pakistan is, and what it should be. Evidently, saying that Pakistan is a state is insufficient. If, as some people assert, Pakistan is, and always has been, meant to be a home and a safe haven for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, who would otherwise face persecution in India, how is it that a larger absolute number of Muslims appear to be thriving in neighboring India than the total population of Pakistan? And if Pakistan was or is meant explicitly to be a home for the Muslims of South Asia, what, precisely, is a Muslim and is a South Asian Muslim different from a regular Muslim? What happens when there are disputes over who is or is not a Muslim? For that matter, what would it mean for a designated plot of land (a space) called Pakistan to be a home (a place) for Muslims, South Asian or otherwise? Many of the challenges Pakistan has faced since its inception can be attributed to these unresolved questions and ambiguities about its identity, its reason for being, who is entitled to Pakistani citizenship, and how various actors have sought to answer these questions. Much of the violence and political instability Pakistan has experienced over the years, this thesis seeks to demonstrate, can be attributed to disputes over what Pakistan is or should be; what the basis for Pakistani national identity is or should be; what territory Pakistan should include; and who, given the nature of its creation, has the authority to rule Pakistan, why they have this authority, and how they may wield this authority.

Many scholars simply assert that there is some question or ambiguity about Pakistan's identity; few seek to determine what, precisely, the source of this might be, apart from vague arguments that it was poorly conceived from the beginning, that there have always been a number of conflicting ethnic groups within Pakistan's borders, that

the proper relationship between Islam and the Pakistani state is unclear because Islamic slogans were used in an ambiguous, probably insincere, fashion to justify its creation in the first place, and so on. Still fewer have sought to interrogate what the identity of a state ultimately consists of and what it means for a state to lack a clear, unambiguous identity or purpose—and what the practical political implications of this might be. Almost all previous analyses take the Pakistani state, as a state, for granted. This is a common tendency in international relations and political science scholarship with respect to most, if not all, states. I argue that it is especially unwise in the case of Pakistan. This thesis aims to provide a new framework for thinking about the long-term political implications of partition and the creation of Pakistan as a modern territorial state—a new way of conceiving of the problem of Pakistan's identity, of the nature of Pakistan as a state.

Pakistan was carved out of the Indian subcontinent and its creation and continued existence are enmeshed with the political history of South Asia. Thus, we must consider the subcontinent and its political history as a whole. The most important things for us to consider are the nature of social, political and geopolitical organization and especially how people related to space and how they cultivated a sense of place for themselves in the subcontinent prior to the advent of British imperialism. We must also look at how the British sought to identify and thereby dominate and reorganize political space in the subcontinent—how the British effectively constructed India as a single political space, a political whole, however artificial. This process is discussed in some detail in Chapters 3 and 4. As will be seen, while the Himalayan Mountains clearly separate what we call the Indian subcontinent from the rest of Asia, 'India', as a single political space, did not exist until at least the eighteenth century. The historical, sociopolitical and intellectual

construction of what we know as the Indian subcontinent as a single political entity by the Mughals and then, to a greater extent, by the British, led to the reification of a foreign concept of geopolitical and spatial organization in South Asia—modern territorial statehood—that the discourse on freedom in British India was subsequently forced into. This resulted in the artificial, inorganic, practically unintentional creation of Pakistan, by fiat, at midnight on 14 August 1947. Pakistan, it turns out, may have been an accident.[14]

As a state, the definition of which will be discussed in what follows, Pakistan's borders have never been universally accepted[15]; the two-nations theory used to justify the partition of India and the demarcation of a separate territory called Pakistan in the Indian subcontinent has always been highly contentious[16]; the nature and content of Pakistani national identity, as distinct from any religious or other form of identity, has never been

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[14] Others have alluded to this idea. See, for instance, David Page, "Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920–1932," *The Partition Omnibus* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002); Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan* (New York: Cambridge, 1985).

[15] The ongoing dispute with India over Jammu and Kashmir—"probably the most volatile boundary conflict in the world" according to Ewen W. Anderson—is the most obvious example. See Ewen W. Anderson, *International Boundaries: A Geopolitical Atlas* (New York: Routledge, 2003) 622–27. According to Arvin Bahl, "Virtually every ethnic group, with the exception of Punjabis, has tried to secede" at one time or another. See Arvin Bahl, *From Jinnah to Jihad: Pakistan's Kashmir Quest and the Limits of Realism* (New Delhi: Atlantic, 2007) 51.

[16] This theory will be discussed and analyzed in the second chapter. Ashutosh Varshney suggests that the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir is a physical manifestation of the debate over the two-nations theory, a factor making the conflict all the more intractable. India needs to control Kashmir, which has a Muslim majority, to disprove the theory that Muslims, a minority in India, cannot prosper in a Hindu dominated, if nonetheless secular, India. Conversely, Pakistan needs to capture Kashmir (where Muslims are a majority) to demonstrate that Kashmiri Muslims would be better off in a Pakistan united on the basis of a single, religiously defined nation—the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, if not Muslims in general (a distinction pregnant with implications and complications, as we shall see). See Ashutosh Varshney, "India, Pakistan, and Kashmir," *Asian Survey* 31.11 (November 1991): 997–1019. Arvin Bahl makes the same argument. See Bahl, *Jinnah to Jihad*. On a related note, some people have argued that East Pakistan's secession and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, or simply the fact that a greater absolute number of Muslims are Indian, rather than Pakistani citizens, belie the two-nations theory, though because Bangladeshis did not opt to simply join India but rather to create their own separate state, some argue that the two-nations theory remains true.

firmly established; the status of religious and other minorities within Pakistan has always been uncertain; the relationship between Islam, howsoever understood, and law and order in Pakistan has always been the subject of heated debate; and the question of the relationship between Pakistani national identity and Islamic religious confession—and the political consequences of this—has never been definitively resolved.[17]

Each of these factors—disputes over Pakistan's borders, the ideology used to justify Pakistan's creation, the nature of Pakistani identity, the status of minorities in Pakistan, the relationship between Islam and Pakistan—constitutes a piece of the puzzle that is Pakistan. They each constitute an intervening cause and a symptom of Pakistan's chronic instability. In this way, they all partially explain why the territory known as Pakistan has been wracked by chronic violence, instability, poverty and illiteracy, among many other social, political and economic ills, since its inception. But the real question is why such disputes persist. I argue that it is related to the circumstances surrounding the creation of Pakistan in the first place.

Without correctly identifying the root causes of the crises Pakistan has faced over the years, they will continue and likely worsen. To begin with, we must critically examine the political theory that gave rise to, if not legitimated, calls for the creation of Pakistan and what, initially, 'Pakistan' likely meant to its most ardent supporters. How was the demand for Pakistan conceived? For this, we need to rethink the notions of 'nation' and 'state', their relationship and their relationship to the concepts of 'space' and 'place'. We specifically need to reassess how Pakistan's original supporters and

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[17] For an interesting discussion of the relationship between Pakistan and the concept of Islamic statehood, see Manzooruddin Ahmed, *Pakistan: The Emerging Islamic State* (Karachi: Allies Book Corp., 1966).

architects conceived of these concepts and their relationships. Moreover, in the Pakistani context, problematizing the relationship between Islam and these notions is critical, thus the theological dimension of political thinking at the time of and leading up to partition is of major importance as well.

A lot of scholarship on Pakistan to date takes certain critical concepts, like 'state' and 'nation', for granted. Some authors erroneously conflate the distinct concepts of 'state' and 'nation'. More than that, they wrongly assume that terms like 'state', 'nation', 'nationalism', 'religion', 'citizenship', 'secularism', and so on can be applied to discussions of Pakistan the same way they are applied to discussions of Western states like Canada, the United States, or France. A central claim of this thesis is that they cannot be so applied and that the insistence they can be produces unsound analysis of the political situation in Pakistan. The following passage will suffice as an example:

> At its founding Pakistan was a nation whose eastern and western wings ... were separated by more than 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Islam had given birth to Pakistan, and provided the ideological basis for a state that lacked any of the usual prerequisites for a nation state—territorial integrity, sense of national community, or linguistic unity. Instead, tribalism, regionalism and linguistic diversity ... abound. The early problems of nation building were compounded by Muslim-Hindu communal riots and mass migration ...[18]

This thesis presents a thorough analysis of all the issues raised in this passage—the geographic contours of Pakistan, the role of Islam in the creation of Pakistan and in Pakistani politics in general, the meanings of 'state' and 'nation' and the relationship between these concepts and the concepts of 'space' and 'place', and what it might mean for a state to succeed or fail. A brief discussion will suffice for the moment to highlight certain terminological, analytical and theoretical issues in it.

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[18] John L. Esposito, "Islamization: Religion and Politics in Pakistan," *Muslim World* 72.3–4 (October 1982): 197.

First, when Pakistan's borders were drawn and the partition of India became a reality, Pakistan became a state, as distinct from a nation. Pakistan was to be a home—a safe haven—for the 'nation' Muslims in the Indian subcontinent were said to constitute, as distinct from the 'nation' the Hindus of India were said to belong to.[19] Many had assumed that Pakistan would be some kind of Muslim or Islamic state, in the sense that Muslims, as a nation, required their own homeland (whether the words 'state' and 'homeland' are synonymous is discussed in Chapter 4). Yet after its borders were drawn, Pakistan's chief architect and first governor general and president of the Constituent Assembly, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), apparently declared that Pakistan would be a more or less neutral, secular state, where Muslims and non-Muslims could live side by side in peace and harmony, belying much of the rhetoric used to justify the state's creation.[20] Despite this, Pakistan itself is rarely referred to as a 'nation', at least insofar as a clear distinction is made between 'nation' and 'state'. If and when it is referred to as a nation, it is usually synonymous with the Muslim nation it was ostensibly created to protect. Using the terms 'nation' and 'state' interchangeably when discussing Pakistan— concepts we still have a shockingly poor understanding of, as this thesis illustrates— creates unnecessary problems and barriers to clear understanding.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, the assertion that the "early problems of

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[19] Muhammad Iqbal popularized and gave this theory its more or less final articulation, as discussed in Chapter 2. A number of people had argued long before Iqbal, however, that India consisted of a single Hindu and a single Muslim nation—separate and distinct, yet in themselves cohesive. See M. Rafique Afzal, ed, *The Case for Pakistan* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1979) Introduction.

[20] "There can be no doubt that Jinnah was a secularist and against theocracy," Muhammad Munir insists. While this is a widely accepted view, Saleena Karim takes issue with this claim. This will be discussed in Chapter 5. See Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia*, 2nd edition (Lahore: Vanguard, 1980); Saleena Karim, *Secular Jinnah: Munir's Big Hoax Exposed* (Cornwall, UK: Exposure, 2005).

nation building" in Pakistan "were compounded by Muslim-Hindu communal riots" contradicts itself. This is because it makes the common mistake of conflating 'nation' with 'state'. It might be more accurate to say the communal violence that welcomed partition (nearly a million dead—much more by some accounts, though no universally accepted figures for deaths and injuries at the time of partition exist) generated problems for state, not nation, building. Fighting between Muslims and Hindus, to the extent that such fighting was precipitated or fueled by the adversaries' religious confessions, suggests that 'nation building', to the extent one accepts the argument that the Muslims and Hindus of India constituted two separate 'nations' by sole virtue of their religious confessions, had already succeeded—the two nations were simply at war.

Today, Pakistan is frequently labeled a weak, failing, or even failed state.[21] The Brookings Institution's *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World*, however controversial such a metric may be,[22] ranks Pakistan as the 33rd weakest state out of 141

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[21] See Stephen Philip Cohen, "The Nation and the State of Pakistan," *Washington Quarterly* 15.3 (Summer 2002): 109–22; Isaac Kfir, "The Crisis of Pakistan: A Dangerously Weak State," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 11.3 (September 2007), 1 June 2008 <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue3/jv11no3a8.html>; Feisal Khan, "Corruption and the Decline of the State in Pakistan," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 15.2 (August 2007): 219–47; Juergen Kleiner, "Pakistan: An Unsettled Nation," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 18.1 (January 2007): 1–25; Ron Moreau, and Michael Hirsh, "Where the Jihad Lives Now," *Newsweek* 29 October 2007: 26+; Missy Ryan, "States of Failure," *Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences* May/June 2007: 50+, 1 June 2008 <http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/d488x8t81447u877/fulltext.pdf>.

[22] Some authors consider the concept of state failure problematic, for reasons discussed in more detail below. The "failed state thesis," writes Jonathan Hill, "posits that the ongoing presence of violent conflict within a state is an important indicator of the severe socio-political crisis it is enduring ... The process by which the existing state failure literature identifies so-called failed states is a comparative one which entails contrasting ... [all] states to a static, ahistorical definition of the state based on the European state." This, for a variety of reasons, is problematic for Hill. The usefulness of such critiques is questionable, however, since presumably Hill would not see violent conflict as a sign of success. Nevertheless, there may be something of value to be gleaned from such critiques, as discussed below. See Jonathan Hill, "Beyond the Other? A Postcolonial Critique of the Failed State Thesis," *African Identities* 3.2 (2005): 139–54. Dipesh Chakrabarty offers a related critique of the political uses and misuses of the concept of modernity,

so-called developing countries.[23] There is certainly a massive crisis within the borders enclosing the territory we call Pakistan, though whether it is a failed state depends on what we mean by a state, which obviously bears on whether or not it has failed—a problem of the utmost importance, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Pakistan has been embroiled in a protracted war with India since the very beginning over the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir (or at least the government, the military, and various militant groups within the territory known as Pakistan have been). Thousands of people have died in Pakistan over the years as the result of sectarian violence and ethnic conflict.[24] Almost all elections Pakistan has ever held have been rigged (notable exceptions appear to be the elections of 1970 and 2008) and no elected government has yet been able to complete its designated term in office. Nasir Islam reports that virtually all political parties in Pakistan have been suspected, at one time or another, of tampering with voter registration, the candidates themselves have been accused of electoral malpractice, and violence and intimidation of voters and election

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which may also have some relevance to our study, however tangential. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[23] Susan E. Rice, and Stewart Patrick, "Index of State Weakness in the Developing World," Brookings Institution, 2008, 1 June 2008 <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports /2008/02_weak_states_index/02_weak_states_index.pdf>.

[24] "Between 1989 and 2003, 1468 Pakistanis were killed, and 3370 injured, in some separate 1813 incidents of (mainly) Shia-Sunni violence." See Frédéric Grare, "The Evolution of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan and the Ever-Changing Face of Islamic Violence," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 30.1 (April 2007): 127. Christians and other religious minorities have also been the victims of attacks. Members of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (Army of Jhang, Jhang being a city in the Punjab province of Pakistan), a militant Islamist organization, "attacked a Sunday Mass service in the Dominican Church in Bahawalpur on 28 October 2001 and massacred twenty-nine worshippers," Rasul Bakhsh Rais reports. "On 5 August 2002," Rais continues, "militants attacked a Christian school in the Murree Hills, killing six teachers and students." See Rasul Bakhsh Rais, "Identity Politics and Minorities in Pakistan," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 30.1 (April 2007): 123.

workers are commonplace.[25] Meanwhile, government law enforcement does not extend into a number of regions (to call these regions lawless or even ungovernable is problematic, for reasons examined below) and various local and global Islamic militant organizations operate with seeming impunity throughout the country and with complete disregard for the modern concept of state sovereignty.[26] Nasir Islam suggests this is partly because the "rule of law remains an anathema to Pakistani culture"[27]—an interesting, if undoubtedly contentious assertion. Furthermore, states like Iran and Saudi Arabia fund a number of rival militant religious groups in Pakistan, promoting confrontational, politicized interpretations of Islam and fueling sectarian violence.[28] Compounding the problem—as if the forgoing were not bad enough—nearly two thirds of the population live on less than $2 a day, 64 per cent of women and 36 per cent of men are illiterate, rarely more than 50 per cent of eligible voters have ever voted in the few elections Pakistan has had, and corruption has been endemic in virtually every branch of the Pakistani government since the very beginning.[29] By all accounts, Pakistan has been in the throes of a devastating political, social, and economic crisis since its inception.

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[25] Nasir Islam, "Democracy and Governance in Pakistan's Fragmented Society," *International Journal of Public Administration* 24.12 (2001): 1337.

[26] For discussions of Islamic militant challenges to the Westphalian order of sovereign states and secularism, and work on related issues and themes, see Fiona B. Adamson, "Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frameworks in International Politics," *International Studies Review* 7 (2005): 547–69; Barak Mendelsohn, "Sovereignty Under Attack: The International Society Meets the Al Qaeda Network," *Review of International Studies* 31.1 (January 2005): 45–68; Mona Kanwal Sheikh, "Fearing Secularism: A Security Analysis of Religion and Radicalism in Radical Islamism," Paper prepared for Conference on Secularism and Beyond: Comparative Perspectives, May–June 2007, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 18 December 2007 <http://www.ku.dk/satsning/religion/sekularism_and_beyond/pdf/Paper_Sheik.pdf>.

[27] Islam, "Democracy" 1347.

[28] See S. V. R. Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," *Modern Asian Studies* 34.1 (2000): 139–80.

[29] "Pakistan," *CIA World Factbook*, 15 May 2008, 1 June 2008 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>. See also Khan, "Corruption."

Different authors have proffered all manner of explanations for this ongoing crisis, from the failure of Islamic political ideology to insufficient economic development. Of course, we also have a variety of recommendations to choose from, including providing better education and building stronger political institutions. Echoing the words of the poet in the first epigraph from Iqbal at the beginning of this thesis, the situation in Pakistan has become "confused due to so many interpretations!"

Many assert, as Anatol Lieven does, that the "survival of Pakistan in *its existing form* is a vital U.S. security interest"[30]—though surely Lieven, by Pakistan's "existing form," does not mean the recurrent violence, endemic poverty, and rampant corruption in Pakistan. Lieven is primarily concerned with the risk of Pakistan's imminent "collapse," its fall into "internal anarchy" or the advent of an "Islamist revolution" in Pakistan—in other words, state failure. What worries him most is that Pakistan's collapse, whatever that means, "would cripple the global campaign against Islamist terrorism." Accordingly, he argues, "Strengthening the Pakistani state and cementing its cooperation with the West have thus become immensely important to Washington."[31] But how do you "strengthen" the "Pakistani state?" Lieven argues that, in the short-to-medium term, "the army remains the best bulwark against chaos and revolution" in Pakistan. Thus, the United States and its allies must support the Pakistani army, Lieven argues, to prevent the collapse of the Pakistani state, conflating the military with the state (or, alternatively, casting the military in the role of state protector). Specifically, "this will require providing Pakistan"—meaning the Pakistani military—"with some of the new weaponry it seeks. But it will

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[30] Anatol Lieven, "The Pressures on Pakistan," *Foreign Affairs* 81.1 (January/February 2002): 106. Emphasis added.
[31] Lieven, "Pressures" 106.

also require a resumption of training programs and different forms of contact with Pakistani officers at all levels." Lieven concludes that, "If Pakistan's military is going to remain supportive of the United States and take the difficult steps necessary to defend the U.S. war against terrorism, these officers must be convinced that their actions are in Pakistan's national interest."[32] In the longer term, Lieven acknowledges, "only serious economic growth and the development of accountable political parties will stabilize Pakistan and end this threat" of terrorism,[33] though the time for that has apparently not yet come and Lieven offers no advice for accomplishing this. At any rate, Lieven's recommendations are bound to fail, or even backfire—certainly in the long term, if not also the short-to-medium term, as he puts it—for the simple reason that they do not actually focus on Pakistan as a state at all, but rather the Pakistani government and military. While 'regime' and 'state' are often conflated, the relationship between the regime and the concept of the state in Pakistan, as this thesis seeks to explain, is incoherent, and thus we must conceive of them separately in order to produce sound analysis. We still do not know for certain what Pakistan is, and much of the violence and instability in Pakistan is, in fact, the product of successive attempts by the government, the military, and various other actors, to answer that question.

The failed attempt to marry secular notions of modern statehood with a poorly understood, Islam-inspired, ideological conception of non-territorial nationhood created an ideological vacuum in Pakistan that successive religious, norm and political entrepreneurs have sought to fill since partition. "Pakistan," Arvin Bahl writes, "is an

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[32] Lieven, "Pressures" 106.
[33] Lieven, "Pressures" 106.

ideological state whose ideology has been discredited,"[34] though whether this is entirely accurate will be discussed in the second chapter. One might be tempted to say, rather, that Pakistan's ideology was never fully or properly understood—if it was fully developed at all. In any event, the challenge, Bahl aptly observes, is that in Pakistan, "unlike other ideological states, such as the USSR and Nazi Germany, simply an overthrow of a particular regime would not do away with the ideology"—or presumably the question of ideology—"as it was central to the founding of the state."[35] Thus, 'democratization' and other such initiatives will be no panacea for Pakistan in the absence of a consensus on what Pakistan is and ought to be.

The chronic violence and instability in Pakistan today and throughout its short history is mostly the product of this crisis of legitimacy, this ideological vacuum that has existed since Pakistan's creation, and how successive governments and other actors have sought to fill it. A recent empirical study of political legitimacy in 72 states, representing 83 per cent of the world's population in 2001, ranked Pakistan 71st.[36] This thesis argues that the ongoing crisis of legitimacy and ideological vacuum in Pakistan is the product of the religious rhetoric that was used to justify—to legitimate—its creation in the first place, and, crucially, the failed marriage of this rhetoric with secular notions of statehood. It is not a question of the legitimacy of any particular government, but of the state itself. This, in turn, hinges on the various competing understandings of the purpose and nature of Pakistan, both prior to and after its inception. Most such understandings relate somehow to Islam. Thus, until the relationship between Islam, and religious confession

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[34] Bahl, *Jinnah to Jihad* 51.

[35] Bahl, *Jinnah to Jihad* 51.

[36] Bruce Gilley, "The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries," *European Journal of Political Research* 45.3 (2006): 499–525. Original emphasis.

more generally, and political legitimacy, ideology, nation and statehood in Pakistan is resolved, there is no hope of lasting stability and security, let alone prosperity, for its inhabitants. Resolving this issue will require a new way of thinking about the problem and a reevaluation of thinking on Pakistan prior to partition. The combination of the rhetorical and ideological use of Islam with imported concepts like 'nation', 'secularism', 'citizenship', 'sovereignty', and 'state', or at least imported understandings of such concepts, seems to be what has proven so explosive.

In the next chapter, I introduce the two-nations theory and some of the leading figures in the call for Pakistan. I concentrate especially on the political theology of Muhammad Iqbal, who is often considered Pakistan's poet-philosopher and the leading intellectual inspiration for Pakistan. As it turns out, Iqbal's vision for the Muslims of South Asia was quite different from the state Pakistan has become. It will be useful for us to see how Iqbal understood the situation of Muslims in India and how he conceived of a separate Muslim state within India before exploring why his vision was never fully realized. This is because Iqbal's philosophy gives us a glimpse of how others may have conceived of Pakistan at the time and also of an alternative vision for Pakistan that was never realized. We can then proceed to analyze what went wrong and why.

CHAPTER THREE
Two Nations and a Theory

The call for Pakistan grew out of the communal riots between Muslims and Hindus that had raged throughout India since the 1920s. It was premised on the two-nations theory, which posited that India consisted of two separate and distinct, yet in themselves cohesive, 'nations'—Muslim and Hindu. Muslims and Hindus, as members of distinct nations, according to this theory, needed their own, separate homelands within the subcontinent. Yet the original call for a Muslim homeland in the Indian subcontinent was not necessarily a call for a completely separate, sovereign, territorial state the way this concept is commonly understood. Before we look at the nature of the actual call for Pakistan, however, what Pakistan's original supporters envisioned when they called for Pakistan, and what Pakistan ultimately became, it will be useful for us to analyze the two-nations theory as articulated by Muhammad Iqbal, who is widely considered the leading intellectual inspiration for Pakistan. As this chapter demonstrates, Iqbal's understanding of both nation and statehood differs markedly from most Western understandings of these concepts. Thus, when he argues that Muslims constitute a nation, he means something different than what most scholars mean by nation. Similarly, when he calls for the creation of a state for Muslims within the Indian subcontinent, he does not have in mind the same thing people usually think of when they hear the word 'state'. This is not only interesting from a theoretical perspective but foreshadows some of the challenges Pakistan faced as the new state's rulers were forced to square the reality of modern statehood with an ideology based on different understandings of the concepts of nation and state—concepts we too often take for granted.

That Pakistan was born of a peculiar theory of religious nationalism and statehood that remains imperfectly understood is not surprising, since nationalism in general continues to be a problematic concept and religious nationalism especially remains woefully undertheorized.[37] Pakistan, because of the curious circumstances surrounding and the Islamic ideology used to justify its creation, presents an excellent case study for developing a deeper understanding of the concepts of 'nation', 'nationalism', and 'state'—and the relationship among the three and between these and religion (or at least Islam[38]) and the concepts of 'space' and 'place' (as discussed in Chapter 4).

This chapter begins by introducing Muhammad Iqbal and the two-nations theory,

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[37] A number of attempts have been made to grapple with these concepts. See, for example, Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ?* [*What is a Nation?*] Based on a lecture given at the Sorbonne, Paris, 11 March 1882. Available from La Bibliotheque Electronique de Lisieux, 1 June 2008 <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/bib_lisieux/nation01.htm>; Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised ed. (New York: Verso, 1991); David Copp, "The Idea of a Legitimate State," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 28.1 (1999): 3–45; Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Boston: Beacon, 1960); Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York: Cambridge, 1990); David D. Laitin, *Nations, States, and Violence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). For work that deals specifically with religious nationalism and religion and politics more generally, see R. Scott Appleby, Emmanuel Sivan, and Gabriel Almond, *Strong Religion: The rise of fundamentalisms around the world* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, "Theorizing Religious Resurgence," *International Politics* 44.6 (November 2007): 647–65; Douglas Johnston, and Cynthia Sampson, eds, *Religion, The Missing Dimension in Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 3rd ed. (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2003); Mark Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993); Pippa Norris, and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Barbara-Ann Rieffer, "Religion and Nationalism," *Ethnicities* 3.2 (2003): 215–42; Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[38] This thesis focuses, whenever possible, on Islam exclusively, not religion in general, thus avoiding, for the most part, the problem of defining religion and the need to respond to criticisms that Islam is somehow different from other religions.

giving some intellectual context to the call for Pakistan. This is followed by a discussion of the challenges associated with defining what a nation is. In light of the way Western theorists have conceived of nationhood, we return to Iqbal's political theology to highlight where his understanding of the concepts of nation and statehood and their relationship differs from conventional views. We conclude with a discussion of how such differences may foreshadow some of the challenges Pakistan has since faced.

Muhammad Iqbal, variously known as the intellectual father, spiritual godfather, or poet-philosopher of Pakistan, was born in Sialkot, Punjab, British India, on 9 November 1877. The son of a tailor and embroiderer originally from the village of Looehar in Kashmir, Iqbal studied languages, poetry and philosophy in India, Germany, and Britain. In India, he studied first at Scotch Mission College (later Murray College) in Sialkot, then Government College in Lahore. He qualified as a barrister at Lincoln's Inn, London, in 1905 and was awarded a doctorate in philosophy from Munich University on 4 November 1907. He also studied at Cambridge University.[39] From reasonably modest beginnings, Iqbal, who, by the early 1910s, was fluent in at least five languages, including English, German, Persian, Urdu and Arabic—but who wrote mostly in Persian, Urdu and English—soon became a world-renowned poet and philosopher—or perhaps better, poet-philosopher[40]—not to mention one of the most prominent politicians in British India. Iqbal is a towering intellectual figure in the history of Pakistan. He was

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[39] Hafeez Malik, "Iqbal, Muhammad," *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 1, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 221–24.

[40] Mustansir Mir insists on hyphenating poet-philosopher since, he explains, "Iqbal's poetry and philosophy do not exist in isolation from each other, but are integrally related." See Mustansir Mir, trans., ed., *Tulip in the Desert: A Selection of the Poetry of Muhammad Iqbal* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000) 1 (this book will be cited indicating either Mir or Iqbal as the author depending on whose words are being referenced).

knighted in 1922 in recognition of his literary achievements and Fazlur Rahman, for one, describes him as "the most serious Muslim philosophical thinker of modern times."[41] His birthday is celebrated as 'Iqbal Day' throughout Pakistan. Unfortunately, his health deteriorated rapidly in the mid 1930s and he died on 21 April 1938, just shy of ten years before his dream of a "consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State"[42] would be realized, after a fashion, in Pakistan.

Iqbal first mooted the idea of a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent in a presidential address he gave to members of the All-India Muslim League in Allahabad on 29 December 1930. He neither suggested a name for this homeland nor limited any future political arrangement in the subcontinent to a single Muslim state or homeland; he focused mainly on describing the nature of the community, or nation, of Muslims in British India relative to other communities or nations. In his speech, he developed, or at least popularized, what came to be known as the two-nations theory, which posited that India consisted of two separate and distinct 'nations'—Muslim and Hindu—and which was later used to justify[43] the partition of India and the creation of

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[41] Quoted in Mustansir Mir, *Iqbal: Makers of Islamic Civilization* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007) 1, from Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) 225.

[42] Muhammad Iqbal, presidential address delivered at the annual session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad on 29 December 1930. In Iqbal, *Speeches* 12. For more information on Iqbal's life, work and philosophy, see, for example, Hafeez Malik, ed., *Iqbal: Poet-Philosopher of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); Mir, *Iqbal*; Iqbal, *Tulip*; Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, originally published in English in 1930, 1 August 2008 <http://www.2muslims.com/books/reconstruction.pdf>.

[43] The two-nations theory was used to justify partition, but it did not, in itself, justify partition. The theory posited that, without an effective political arrangement, the Hindu majority in the Indian subcontinent would oppress the Muslim minority. The theory did not, however, advocate a particular type of political settlement to resolve what was referred to as the 'communal problem'. There were many who, like Muhammad Ali Jinnah for a time, while maintaining that India consisted of two separate nations, also believed that some kind of federal arrangement might resolve the 'communal problem' in a newly independent, united India. Still others rejected the idea that India consisted of multiple nations, as such.

an independent Islamic state in the Indian subcontinent. Whether this is ultimately what Iqbal wanted or envisioned will be discussed in what follows.

Iqbal referred to the Muslims of India as a nation under siege (they were a minority in all but four provinces in British India). They were a nation by virtue of the fact that they shared a common religious heritage, had the same customs, held the same outlook on life, and therefore constituted a homogeneous community within India. If Muslims were divided among themselves, which Iqbal acknowledged they were oftentimes, it was only because they did not take the message of Islamic brotherhood to heart. Ultimately, for Iqbal, the Muslims of India belonged to the same nation all Muslims in the world were said to belong to, though his immediate concern was for the Muslims of India. This is an important point, since it highlights that Iqbal did not conceive of Muslims, as a nation, being confined to a single geographic territory.

Since Muslims in India could have little assurance that the majority Hindu population and their leaders in the Indian National Congress Party would respect their religious rights after independence from the British was achieved, no matter how secular any future Indian polity might be, Iqbal reasoned that a separate, autonomous Muslim state within India would be, needed—if not multiple states.[44] His chief aim was to promote the "free development" of the subcontinent's Muslims, which he argued would be "practically impossible under the type of unitary government contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politicians with a view to securing permanent [Hindu] communal

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[44] Iqbal's aim, as discussed below, was primarily to reassert the role of Islam in the lives of Muslims in India and protect the religious rights of his coreligionists. It was only distantly, if at all, to found an entirely new state.

dominance in the whole of India."[45] Yet curiously, though Iqbal called for "the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan" to be "amalgamated into a single State," he also assured the Hindus and the British that his idea need not alarm them, that "India is the greatest Muslim country in the world."[46] "The life of Islam, as a cultural force in this country," he continued,

> very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory. This centralisation of the most living portion of the Muslims of India ... will eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia. It will intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling [toward India]. Thus possessing full opportunity of development *within the body politic of India*, the North-West India Muslims will prove the best defenders of India ...[47]

What, then, did Iqbal mean by the creation of a new state within India? Clearly not the same thing most people imagine when they think of a modern, territorial state. We may find a clue to Iqbal's thinking in the way he conceived of Muslims as a nation, and what he understood a nation to be, as discussed in the second part of this chapter.

Iqbal was by no means the first to conceive of the Muslims and Hindus of British India as two separate and distinct nations, though he did more than anyone to popularize the idea, at least prior to Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Manzooruddin Ahmed traces the theory that the Muslims and Hindus of India constituted two separate, distinct and in themselves cohesive nations to Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) and the Aligarth Movement (1858–1898), discussed in Chapter 3.[48] Britain's divide and rule strategy, whereby they emphasized differences between Muslims and Hindus, undoubtedly made an impact as well. Certainly, a number of people made the case for an independent, autonomous or

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[45] Iqbal, *Speeches* 13.
[46] Iqbal, *Speeches* 11–12.
[47] Iqbal, *Speeches* 12.
[48] Ahmed, *Pakistan* 83.

semi-autonomous Muslim homeland, state or states in the Indian subcontinent over the years—almost always on the basis of India consisting of two, if not more, separate and distinct nations that could not coexist in a unitary political structure—though of course independence from the British would have to be won first. Despite this, Iqbal is almost universally credited with providing the most comprehensive, inspiring articulation of the two-nations theory, from which virtually all subsequent articulations draw. Then, on 28 January 1933, just over two years after Iqbal delivered his most famous speech, Choudhury Rahmat Ali (1897–1951), a student at Cambridge and founder of the Pakistan National Movement, coined the name 'Pakistan' in his pamphlet "Now or Never"—the first time the word ever appeared in print. He recommended the name for any future Muslim state in the Indian subcontinent. An Urdu and Persian word meaning "land of the pure," Pakistan was also an acronym for the "five Northern units of India" that Rahmat Ali felt the new state should comprise: Punjab, Afghan Province (North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Sind, and Baluchistan. "Our brave but voiceless nation," he lamented, "is being sacrificed on the altar of Hindu Nationalism, not [only] by the non-Muslims, but also, to their lasting shame, by our own so-called leaders[,] with a reckless disregard of our protests and in utter [contempt] of the warnings of history."[49]

It took a while for the idea to catch on, however. Jinnah, for one, was not entirely

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[49] Choudhary Rahmat Ali, "Now or Never: Are we to live or perish for ever?" website maintained by Professor Frances Pritchett, Columbia University, 28 January 1933, 1 June 2008 <http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_rahmatali_1933.html>. Original source: G. Allana, *Pakistan Movement Historical Documents* (Karachi: Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, nd [1969]) 103-10. Words and punctuation in brackets have been modified simply to correct typographical errors and make for smoother reading. The exact original meaning, sense and style remains intact—no intellectual content has been added or changed.

convinced at first that partition was a wise idea, though by all appearances[50] he accepted

the two-nations theory. "The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious

philosophies, social customs, literatures," he said in his presidential address to the Lahore

session of the Muslim League on 22 March 1940. "They neither intermarry nor interdine

together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on

conflicting ideas and conceptions."[51] Iqbal, as we have seen, did not actually call for

partition at all. At least until 1940, Jinnah, as leader of the Muslim League, championed

not a completely independent Muslim state, but rather some kind of federal arrangement

in a hopefully soon to be independent India. Starting with the Lahore Resolution,[52]

however, adopted by the All-India Muslim League on 23 March 1940 (often called the

Pakistan Resolution), the League, under Jinnah, began advocating the partition of the

subcontinent and the creation of a separate Muslim state as the most viable solution to the

'communal problem'—the problem of increasing levels of violence between Hindus and

Muslims throughout the country (possible causes and the political implications of which

are discussed in Chapter 3). This, of course, would have to come after the country was

freed of the yoke of British imperialism. Still, there is the question of what Pakistan's

supporters understood partition to mean and what they thought Pakistan would be. What

did they want this new state to be? I will be revisiting these questions throughout this

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[50] This caveat is important because, as discussed below, there is some question about how genuine Jinnah's belief in the two-nations theory really was.
[51] Muhammad Ali Jinnah, "Presidential Address at the Twenty-Seventh Annual Session of Muslim League, Lahore, 22–24 March, 1940 (Extracts)," *Muslim League and Its Ideology: The Making of India and Pakistan*, vol. 2, ed. S. R. Bakshi (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1998) 20–21.
[52] Pravin Pania, "Article on The Lahore Resolution," World Sindhi Institute, 17 June 2008 <http://www.worldsindhi.org/publishedreports/5July05.html>. Contains full text of original Lahore Resolution.

thesis. This chapter focuses primarily on Iqbal's vision for the Muslims of India.

A brief note about the Lahore Resolution is in order here. Although 23 March, the date the resolution was adopted, is celebrated in Pakistan as Pakistan Day, the resolution itself never once mentions 'Pakistan'. Moreover, the resolution calls not for a single, unified Muslim state (though it does not rule out such an eventuality), but for multiple "independent states" within a loosely federated India. It stipulates that, "geographically contiguous units" in the subcontinent where "Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North Western and Eastern Zones ... should be grouped to constitute 'independent states' in which the constituent units should be autonomous and sovereign."[53] Nevertheless, the adoption of this resolution marked a major turning point in Hindu-Muslim politics in British India and ultimately proved instrumental, along with the two-nations theory, in legitimating the creation of Pakistan.

Pakistan was conceived in some ways as a container, a fortress to protect the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent from the perceived threat of Hindu nationalism (since Hindus were a majority in most parts of the subcontinent, the issue was never, at least from the Muslim League's perspective, the protection of Hindus from Muslim violence, as the Muslims, as far as the League was concerned, were never the antagonists[54]). Though inter-communal, or perhaps international[55] violence had already risen to critical

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[53] Pravin, "Article on The Lahore Resolution."

[54] By contrast, a committee of the Indian Association, for instance, visited Calcutta on 2 April 1926 to investigate the riots that had recently broken out there and concluded that the Muslims, not the Hindus, were the main instigators. See Indian Association, *Annual Report of the Indian Association for the Year 1926* (Calcutta: Indian Association, 1927) Appendix H.

[55] "The problem in India was not inter-communal," Aziz Ahmad writes, explaining Iqbal's reasoning—"it was international." Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan: 1857–1964* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967) 166–67. This is also the way Jinnah characterized the situation.

levels in many parts of British India, the full weight of Hindu oppression of India's Muslims would not be felt, according to partition's advocates, until after the British left. And so, at midnight on 14 August 1947, Pakistan was created, by fiat, its final borders made public for the very first time on the same day it came into existence—or, in at least one instance, two days later.[56] Nearly a million people lost their lives in the ensuing violence (see Chapter 3).

When partition occurred, it not only tore the subcontinent asunder but also split Punjab and Bengal provinces in half (see Chapter 3). Confusion reigned. All of a sudden, Muslims who found themselves in the new Republic of India were considered Pakistani by default and encouraged to leave—even if they had lived in the same place all their lives. Conversely, Hindus who had gone to bed in India and woke up in Pakistan the next morning had some tough choices to make. The Indian Army was divided along religious lines, as virtually all branches of the Indian government were. "The religion into which a soldier was born," Yasmin Khan writes, "became the *sine qua non* of his new national identity. Now all Muslims were fundamentally equated by the state apparatus with Pakistan and all non-Muslims were assumed to have a natural allegiance to India, whether they expressed support for the creation of the new states or not."[57] Citizenship was thus conferred upon individuals by virtue of their religious confession alone, regardless of where in the subcontinent they lived or were born. This, in turn, resulted in massive population transfers and fueled communal violence. "Fuzzy thinking" on the "critical question" of population transfers was, Khan argues, "the fatal flaw of the

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[56] The Radcliffe Line, which partitioned not only the subcontinent but also the province of Punjab, was revealed to the public on 17 August 1947. See Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (New Haven: Yale, 2007) 125.
[57] Khan, *Great Partition* 114.

partition plan. Nobody had foreseen the risks of unprecedented population movements as a result of the plan and only feeble mechanisms had been put in place to reassure, protect or secure the position of the petrified communities living in the border regions of Bengal [part of which became East Pakistan, later Bangladesh] and Punjab [the western half of which joined West Pakistan]." Disentangling the 'two nations' of India proved more difficult and bloody than anyone appears to have expected. "In the event," Khan continues, "the resulting movement of people was so large that it changed the very nature of the newly independent states of Pakistan and India and altered the entire meaning of Partition."[58]

What if all this was a horrible mistake? What if Iqbal, to say nothing of the many others who came before or after him, was misunderstood? What, exactly, did he mean when he referred to the Muslims of India as a single nation? What did he understand a state to be? I want to unpack the concept of 'nation' in Iqbal's political theology, to be related to the concept of the 'state' as discussed in Chapter 4. I hope to demonstrate that Iqbal differed from many Western political theorists in his understanding of this concept and its relationship to the concept of the 'state', which he also seems to have conceived of in a fundamentally different way. Before we analyze Iqbal's thinking on the matter, however, we should consider how nationhood is commonly conceived in Western scholarship.

Analytically, the words 'nation' and 'state' are not conterminous, yet they are frequently and erroneously used interchangeably. 'Inter*national* relations', for instance, implies relations among *nations*, though in practice typically refers to interactions among

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[58] Khan, *Great Partition* 100.

states. 'Multi*national* corporations' are corporations that maintain production facilities in more than one *state*, not *nation*. A 'nation-state' is commonly considered a state that is identified with a specific nation. For example, the French state is often considered the home of the French nation, making France a nation-state in this sense. Appreciating the relationship and distinction between nation and state is becoming more important today in light of religious movements that challenge secular state authority; conflict within individual states among ethnic, religious and other groups that appeal to notions of nationhood and national identity; and intrastate conflicts over questions of national identity and the proper relationship between national and state identity. Unfortunately, reliable definitions of the concepts of 'state' and 'nation', to say nothing of theories about their relationship, have so far proven elusive.

About the only thing scholars seem to agree on is that nations are groups of people. The word 'nation' in modern English is a loan word from the Romance languages. It is derived from the classical Latin *natio*, itself derived from *nat*, the past participle stem of *nasci*, meaning to be born. The *Oxford English Dictionary Online (OED Online)* somewhat unhelpfully offers that a nation could be a "people," a "group of peoples," or a "political state."[59] The individuals that collectively constitute a nation, at least so far as this is understood to be a "people" or a "group of peoples," are "united by factors such as common descent, language, culture, history, or occupation of the same territory, so as to form a distinct people."[60] "In early examples" dating to 1330, "notions of race and common descent predominate. In later use notions of territory, political unity,

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[59] "nation, *n*," *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, June 2008, Oxford University Press, 19 June 2008 <http://dictionary.oed.com/>.
[60] "nation, *n*," *Oxford*.

and independence are more prominent, although some writers still make a pointed distinction between *nation* and *state*."[61]

According to Hachette's 1885 *Dictionnaire de la Langue Française*, a nation is a "Collection of men living in the same territory, subject or not to the same government [implying that multiple governments could rule over different, or perhaps the same, portions of a single territory], having long shared interests common enough that we can regard them as belonging to the same race."[62] This dictionary also suggests that people may belong to the same 'nation' even if they live in different, foreign countries. Thus it conceives of national diasporas and clearly differentiates between 'nation' and 'state', where 'state' implies being subject to a single government, or perhaps living within a specific territory, but never a group of people as such. We will return to this philological discussion of the concept of the 'nation', and especially the connection between birth (*nasci*) and nation, in our discussion of Iqbal's theory of nationhood.

Ernest Renan, one of the first modern European thinkers to attempt to develop a theory of nationhood, dismisses race, language, religion, common interests and territory as bases for considering groups of individuals nations. "A nation is a soul," for Renan, "a spiritual principle." Two mutually reinforcing things constitute the soul that is a nation, according to Renan: "the common possession of a rich legacy of memories or history" and "actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to honor the heritage that was received undivided." "A nation is thus a great solidarity," he continues, "constituted by the feeling of sacrifices made and of those its members are disposed to

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[61] "nation, *n*," *Oxford*.

[62] "nation, *n*," *Dictionnaire de la Langue Française*. Vol. 3. Librarie Hachette, 1885. Author's translation.

make again. It supposes a past; it continues in the present by a tangible fact: the consent, the clear, expressed desire to continue to live communally." A nation, in Renan's most famous aphorism, is "a daily plebiscite" or "referendum"—just as "the existence of the individual is a perpetual affirmation of life."[63]

Renan's is a subjective understanding of nationhood. Objective definitions, by contrast, are highly problematic. As E. J. Hobsbawm points out, objective definitions of 'nation' based on

> single criteria such as language or ethnicity or a combination of criteria such as language, common territory, common history, common history, cultural traits or whatever else … have failed, for the obvious reason that, since only some members of the large class of entities which fit such definitions can at any time be described as 'nations', exceptions can always be found. Either cases corresponding to the definition are patently not (or not yet) 'nations' or possessed of national aspirations, or undoubted 'nations' do not correspond to the criterion or combination of criteria.[64]

Of course, Hobsbawn continues, such objective definitions are "unusually convenient for propagandist and programmatic, as distinct from descriptive purposes."[65] They are easily mobilized for political objectives, he points out, such as demanding territorial autonomy or independence for a given national group, however questionable a group's status as a nation may be. And yet subjective definitions are not without their flaws. The most significant of these is simply, as Hobsbawn indicates, "that defining a nation by its members' consciousness of belonging to it is tautological and provides only an *a posteriori* guide to what a nation is."[66] Hobsbawn argues that "to insist on consciousness or choice as the criterion of nationhood is insensibly to subordinate the complex and

[63] Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ?* Author's translation.
[64] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms* 5–6.
[65] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms* 6.
[66] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms* 8.

multiple ways in which human beings define and redefine themselves as members of groups, to a single option: the choice of belonging to a 'nation' or 'nationality'."[67]

So how does Hobsbawn understand the concept of 'nation'? First, he distinguishes between 'nationalism' and 'nation'. Here he follows Ernest Gellner, who considers nationalism "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent."[68] In other words, the principle that groups of people defined somehow as 'nations' should be contained geographically in states, meaning state borders, although it is a bit unclear whether states and their borders are the same thing, though one suspects not (see Chapter 4). For Hobsbawm, building on Gellner, the nationalist principle implies that the political duty people have toward "the polity which encompasses and represents" their nation "overrides all other public obligations."[69] Note that in this formulation, allegiance is owed to the 'polity', not the 'nation'. Of course, the reason allegiance is owed to the polity is because that polity "encompasses and represents" the nation. This raises the question of what is meant by "encompasses and represents" and, specifically, how it would be determined if the polity were to fail in this responsibility, upon which its claim to its citizen's allegiance appears to rest. The idea of the nation, meanwhile, for Hobsbawm, "belongs to a particular, and historically recent period. It is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the 'nation-state', and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationalism except insofar as both relate to it."[70] As we shall see, Iqbal has no such trouble talking about the nation in the absence of a territorial state.

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[67] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms* 8.
[68] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* 1, quoted in Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms* 9.
[69] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms* 9.
[70] Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms* 9–10.

For Hobsbawm, nationalism precedes nations, in the sense that nationalisms create nations. National identity is constructed, not primordial. This echoes Gellner, who describes nationalism as "a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic [read: national] boundaries should not cut across political ones [read: state borders] and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a state ... should not separate the power holders from the rest."[71] He then offers two provisional definitions of 'nation'. First, an objective, cultural definition: "Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communication." Second, a subjective, voluntaristic definition: "Two men are of the same nation if and only if they *recognize* each other as belonging to the same nation ... A mere category of persons ... becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members."[72] Unlike Renan, what makes a nation here is not each member's individual choice to self-identify with a national group, but rather the fact of members of the group recognizing each other as members. Neither definition by itself is adequate, Gellner concedes, but together, he insists, they may help us in understanding this concept.

"Most persisting groups," Gellner writes, "are based on a mixture of loyalty and identification (on *willed* adherence), and of extraneous incentives, positive or negative, on hopes and fears."[73] "It is nationalism which engenders nations,"[74] he concludes.

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[71] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* 1.
[72] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* 7.
[73] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* 53.

'Nationalism', for Gellner, is a form of "openly avowed collective self-worship."[75] It is,

> essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society ... It means that generalized diffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal society, with mutually sustainable atomized individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in place of a previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves.[76]

In other words, nationalism is an attempt—by whom remains unclear—to simplify human relationships and sources of individual identity. Ultimately, neither Gellner nor Hobsbawm succeed at providing a universally applicable definition of 'nation', however, though perhaps they come close to defining 'nationalism'. Still, others persist in trying. Probably Benedict Anderson's is the most famous recent attempt. Anderson conceives of nations as 'imagined communities', which reminds us of Renan's definition. Nations, Anderson argues, "are cultural artefacts of a particular kind."[77] They are not primordial but rather come into being through a complex historical process. The study of nations is the study of this process. This entails considering not only what nations might 'be', but also what they 'become', and how, over time. A nation, in Anderson's working definition,

> is an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.
> It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion ...
> The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them ... has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which other nations lie. *No nation imagines itself as conterminous with mankind. The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation in*

[74] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* 55.
[75] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* 56.
[76] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* 57.
[77] Anderson, *Imagined Communities* 4.

the way that it was possible, in certain epochs, for, say, Christians to dream of a wholly Christian planet.[78]

Compare the last two lines of this quotation with the second epigraph from Iqbal at the beginning of this thesis. They are critical for our understanding of the differences between the way Western scholars have conceived of the concept of nationhood and the way Iqbal does. Iqbal does in fact dream of a day when all of humanity will belong to a single nation and, extrapolating from Islamic theology, it is fair to assume that, for Iqbal, this nation is Islam, albeit broadly conceived. This is because, according to Islamic theology, all humans are Muslim at the moment of birth. This fundamental difference between Islamic and Western notions of nationhood needs to be unpacked to make sense of Iqbal's ideas about nation and statehood.

The underlying principle here that all humans are Muslim at birth, according to almost universally accepted Islamic doctrine, is relatively easy to explain. Since there is no concept of original sin in Islam, humans are born innocent. Humans, at birth, do not have the capacity to willingly deviate from the laws God has prescribed for them (such as the need to eat and drink to survive and to protect oneself from harm). To the extent that it is impossible for any being, human or otherwise, to deviate from natural law, that being is considered Muslim—submissive to God—in the most basic sense.

Recall now that birth, as we saw in our philological discussion earlier, was one of the earliest ways scholars understood the concept of nationhood. It is reasonable to assume that Iqbal conceives of all of humanity, following Islamic teaching, as originally being a single community or nation in this earlier sense—of all humans being born into the same nation, the only true nation that exists. As the Qur'an stipulates, all of humanity

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[78] Anderson, *Imagined Communities* 7. Emphasis added.

was originally a single nation or *ummah* (2:213). Whereas Anderson insists it is impossible to conceive of nationalists today realistically dreaming "of a day when all the members of the human race will join their nation," Iqbal may indeed have dreamed as much. He likely thought not so much in terms of people joining *his* nation, however, but rather people recognizing the reality that there has only ever been one legitimate nation— "the brotherhood of man" or the whole world as "the family of God" as he put it in his final New Year's address (see second epigraph), four short months before his death. Ultimately, Iqbal was an anti-nationalist or universal nationalist.

But then what of his talk of Muslims being a nation and needing to have their own homeland in India? To answer this question, we need to combine Iqbal's notion of humanity as a whole ultimately constituting of a single nation by virtue of birth with his recognition of the fact that humans are divided into communities or societies, his concept of *khudi*, and his basic understanding of the nature of nationhood. For Iqbal, Mustansir Mir writes, "The single most important problem for any society is 'the problem of a continuous national life', for every society seeks to perpetuate itself—to achieve immortality."[79] Iqbal's most immediate concern for India's Muslims, then, was their ability to perpetuate their community, their way of life. "According to Iqbal," Mir continues,

> neither society nor the individual has absolute importance; society exists through and in the persons of individuals, but when individuals come together and form a society, they give rise to an entity that is larger than the aggregate of its members ... Ultimately, both society and the individual are supposed to submit to a higher ethical code—in Islamic terminology, this would be called submission to a revelation-based code. Instead of seeing society and the individual as rivals or competitors, this code seeks to streamline the efforts of individuals in order to create a unified social vision and, at the same time, to create a social environment

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[79] Mir, *Iqbal* 121.

that would allow its members to realize their potential in the most effective way.[80]

"A nation," meanwhile, for Iqbal, "is like a body / And the individuals in it the body's limbs."[81] By implication, all the individuals who make up a nation matter on some fundamental level. This relates to Iqbal's concept of *khudi*, usually translated as 'selfhood'. For Iqbal, both individuals and nations have the potential for well-developed *khudi*, though not all of them realize this potential. A failure to cultivate *khudi* indicates the failure of a being—whether an individual or a nation—to realize its full self, in effect to fully be what it might otherwise claim to be (an individual or a nation, for instance). Simply put, *khudi* represents the urge of a being to express itself.[82] Mir describes it as "one's essential and authentic potential," which "seeks actualisation."[83] "Self-understanding, self-growth and self-expression," Mir explains, "are the goals of *khudi*; self-esteem, self-reliance and independence of mind make up its ethos; and dynamism, creativity and adventure are its modes of operation."[84]

If, as Mir puts it, Iqbal believes "society exists through and in the persons of individuals," and that these individuals, by coming together, "give rise to an entity that is larger than the aggregate of its members"—a nation—then presumably the nation will be stronger to the extent that the individuals who compose it develop their *khudi* to the fullest possible extent. This, for Iqbal, requires that individuals submit to a "higher ethical code," enabling them to realize their full *khudi* in the context of belonging to a larger

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[80] Mir, *Iqbal* 122.
[81] Iqbal, *Tulip* 65. From Iqbal's poem "The Nation's Eye," originally published in his book *Bang-i Dara* [*The Sound of the Caravan Bell*].
[82] Mir, *Iqbal* 32.
[83] Mir, *Tulip* 138.
[84] Mir, *Tulip* 138.

nation. Iqbal's original purpose in developing his concept of *khudi*, Mir says, was to reinvigorate the world's Muslims—not just Muslims in India—who, at the time (early twentieth century), "were politically weak, economically backward, and socially disintegrated."[85] "To Iqbal," Mir continues, "this general decadence of the Muslims was due to the fact that they had forgotten who they were, were ashamed to take pride in their glorious tradition, suffered from a crisis of self-confidence, lacked self-esteem, and had despaired of building a bright future for themselves—in a word, had allowed their *khudi* to waste away."[86] "The survival of a nation," for Iqbal, according to Mir, "no less than individuals, depends on *khudi*."[87] The question is what happens to a nation that has allowed its *khudi* to "waste away"—is it no longer a nation? Has the human nation, which Iqbal seems to ultimately dream of, lost its *khudi* by virtue of the fact that humans are not united? The answer is likely no. It is doubtful that Iqbal would have considered an individual who had failed to fully develop his *khudi*—whatever that might mean—to have abdicated his claim to personhood, thus a nation that fails to develop its *khudi* cannot, by this fact alone, be said to no longer exist.

Iqbal wanted to help Muslims in India find their *khudi*, and he advocated the creation of a Muslim state within India to facilitate this—not a state in the conventional sense, but rather a designated place within India where Muslims would be free to order their lives according to their culture and beliefs. Iqbal seems to have thought mostly in apolitical terms. He also wanted all of humanity to find its *khudi*, for humanity as a whole to realize its potential as a nation. In a sense, he may have sought to facilitate this by

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[85] Mir, *Iqbal* 33.
[86] Mir, *Iqbal* 33–4.
[87] Mir, *Iqbal* 34.

encouraging communities—like the Muslims in India—to develop their own *khudi* to the fullest extent, such that they would be better able to engage with one another and so help give rise to the universal community—the human nation—that he ultimately dreamed of. If humans are the individuals who compose localized nations or communities and societies (Iqbal seems to use the terms almost synonymously), and these multiple, differentiated communities are a fact of life, then it stands to reason that these may be the most important 'individuals', from Iqbal's perspective, that compose the human nation.

Since for humanity as a group to find its *khudi* would require that humans collectively recognize that they all belong to the same nation, Iqbal deplored "geographical nationalities," as we see in the second epigraph above. In this way, Iqbal's political theology transcends modern notions of territorial statehood. Recognizing that humans have always organized themselves in more localized communities, however, he sought to designate a place in India for the Muslims to develop as a community to the fullest extent possible, and in this way be able to more fully participate in the larger Indian nation and, eventually, the human nation. Thus, when Iqbal called for a Muslim state in India, he did not mean a modern territorial state based on some conception of geographic nationalism, but rather a secure place within India where Muslims could be free to develop as a community.

So that we can be clear about what Iqbal meant by 'nation' and 'state', let us examine Iqbal's seminal speech once more. First, he castigates Europe for its "mistaken separation of spiritual and temporal," which he claims resulted in the privatization of religion, the displacement of the "universal ethics of Jesus" by "national systems of ethics and polity," and thus bequeathed to Europe "a set of mutually ill-adjusted states

dominated by interests not human but national."[88] Iqbal thus implies that nationalism, on some level, is dehumanizing. He clearly hoped to forestall such a fate for Islam. "Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam, as Christianity has already met in Europe?"[89] Iqbal asks his audience. Immediately, we sense that Iqbal has something different in mind when he speaks of the Muslims of India as a nation and calls for the creation of a Muslim state within India, but exactly what is this difference?

"India is Asia in miniature," Iqbal declares. "Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the east and part with nations in the middle and west of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India, it will bring peace and mutual good-will to this ancient land."[90] Unfortunately, Iqbal questions whether this will be possible anytime soon. For this to be possible, he argues, the right of each cultural or communal group in India "to free development according to its own cultural traditions" must be protected. If "the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian home-lands is recognised as the basis of a permanent communal settlement," Iqbal believes, "he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India."[91] Standing in the way of all this is what he refers to as "narrow communalism."

"There are communalisms and communalisms," Iqbal explains. "A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities," he writes, "is low

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[88] Iqbal, *Speeches* 5.
[89] Iqbal, *Speeches* 7.
[90] Iqbal, *Speeches* 9.
[91] Iqbal, *Speeches* 10.

and ignoble."[92] Iqbal's stated objective is to elevate the Muslims of India, to ennoble them as a community. Unfortunately, he fears, low, ignoble, narrow forms of communalism threaten to preclude the "full and free development" of the Muslims of India. Thus, while Iqbal's ultimate objective appears to be the reunification of the world in a single human family under God, and his secondary objective is to unite the various communities of India, his tertiary—but seemingly most practicable—objective is to strengthen the Muslims of India as a nation, meaning essentially a cultural community, by creating a place within India where they can develop and thrive as a community. When Iqbal characterizes the Muslims of India as a nation, he does so not do so to justify the creation of another modern territorial state. Iqbal is highly critical of nationalism, certainly modern territorial nationalism, and longs for the day when humanity will think and live as one. Until that day comes, he is willing to countenance separate places for distinct communities—nations—to develop freely according to their culture and ways of thinking, but with the understanding that this is meant to foster trust and harmony among different communities, not animosity and low, ignoble communalism and certainly not conflict of the kind he witnessed between the "mutually ill-adjusted states" of Europe.

Iqbal, Barbara Metcalf writes, "challenged the most fundamental premise of modern political life: the nation state." Though he "is often assumed to be a supporter of religiously-based nationalism," she continues, "he deplored the divisions of modern nations."[93] Nevertheless, she writes, he eventually

> came to favour political autonomy for religiously homogeneous populations. In a
> place freed of colonialism and freed of nationalist and class divisions, the spirit

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[92] Iqbal, *Speeches* 10.
[93] Barbara Metcalf, "Imagining Muslim futures: debates over state and society at the end of the Raj," *Historical Research* 80.208 (May 2007): 292.

of Islam, Iqbal believed, could allow a society of creative individuals again to flourish in a system that would serve Muslims and non-Muslims both. ... That the seed Iqbal watered would grow into the virulently nationalist state of Pakistan is surely one of the great ironies of twentieth-century history.[94]

The divisiveness caused by the modern state system and territorial nationalism that Iqbal observed foreshadowed some of the problems Pakistan has faced since its birth. The principle of high communalism and the message of universal brotherhood that he preached have been distorted by the creation of Pakistan as a modern territorial state ostensibly justified by Islamic ideology. In fact, Iqbal's political theology and the Islamic ideology used to justify Pakistan are, as will be discussed in later chapters, incompatible with the concept of the modern state and with territorial nationalism.

This chapter has shown how Iqbal's understanding of nationhood differs in some fundamental ways from Western understandings of this concept. We also saw how Iqbal likely envisioned a Muslim homeland in the Indian subcontinent and how the reality of the modern territorial state of Pakistan was not ultimately what he had hoped for. Iqbal was either misunderstood, willfully ignored, or articulated a vision that the modern state system and political exigencies in India during the 1940s made impossible to realize. This latter explanation is likely the most accurate, as the following two chapters seek to demonstrate. Chapter 3 presents a broad history of the Indian subcontinent up to partition, with special emphasis on the rise of the Muslim League and the movement for Pakistan in the first half of the twentieth century. Chapter 4 then considers how Pakistan's supporters initially conceived of Pakistan and how and why the reality of Pakistan as a modern territorial state let so many of them down.

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[94] Metcalf, "Imagining" 293.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Birth of Two Nations

At a certain point, the creation of Pakistan as a modern territorial state became inevitable, but it was still an accident. Just prior to partition, Pakistan came to be seen as a geopolitical container to safeguard the Indian subcontinent's Muslims from what its proponents claimed would be certain Hindu domination following independence from the British. In other words, it was negatively conceived, the product of the fear of Hindu domination of the subcontinent's Muslims, not the idea that India's Muslims positively required their own, separate state in any other sense or for any other reason. Already we see shades of the "low and ignoble" communalism Iqbal warned against. Unfortunately, beyond this simplistic formula of Pakistan as a geographic container, very little thought was given to how, precisely, Pakistan would function as a modern state—who would rule how, where, whom, for how long, and on what basis. It seems the 'why' for Pakistan was the only thing discussed and debated seriously prior to its creation—and even this was understood only in very basic terms. The debate focused myopically on whether India consisted of one, two, or more nations and whether these nations could coexist in the same polity. Part of the reason for this may have been that Pakistan's supporters did not originally envision it as a modern territorial state at all, but as something else. As we saw in the previous chapter, Iqbal's call for a Muslim state within India was nothing like a call for a modern territorial state, but rather a kind of place within India for Muslims to order their lives according to the principles of Islam. Chapter 4 is devoted to an extensive discussion of such issues. This chapter, meanwhile, charts the history of geopolitical organization in the subcontinent since 3000 BC and the factors that contributed to the rise

of the Pakistan movement. From this broad survey, we may be able to see more clearly why Iqbal's vision for the Muslims of India was never realized.

It is difficult to know for sure how Pakistan's chief proponents, or the masses who supported the call for Pakistan, conceived of it in the years immediately leading up to partition, apart from the simplistic notion that it would be some kind of panacea for the ills of the subcontinent's Muslims, or, only slightly less ambiguously, a geographic territory demarcated by recognized borders. Before we discuss the creation of the Pakistani state itself, however, and the problem of the nature and identity of Pakistan as a state, we must take a long view of the political history of the Indian subcontinent, and especially the history, nature and evolution of geopolitical organization in the subcontinent.[95] This is important because this thesis rests on the claim that the concept of the modern territorial state was foreign to the subcontinent prior to the advent of British imperialism. Moreover, a related claim is that the British effectively constructed India, which in turn became the modern states of Pakistan and the Republic of India, and to a certain extent constructed Hinduism as a single religious tradition and subsequently one of the two nations of the two-nations theory. Thus, we must understand how this process occurred, because this process is what ultimately limited the demand for Pakistan to a demand for a modern territorial state, having banished all other forms of geopolitical organization from the subcontinent. We must also trace the rise of communal consciousness in the subcontinent and the role it may or may not have played in the creation of Pakistan. Finally, it will be helpful to see how the political drama played out in the years leading up to partition. Thus, in the second half of this chapter, I focus on the

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[95] The question of whether 'India' can be accurately or at least usefully said to constitute a single geopolitical unit prior to 1947 bears on the discussion to follow.

rise of the Muslim League and its foundational role in the creation of Pakistan.

Ayesha Jalal was one of the first to explicitly suggest that the creation of Pakistan may have been an accident, or at least unintentional; that Jinnah especially, despite all the rhetoric about India consisting of two separate, distinct, irreconcilable nations, never intended for the subcontinent to be partitioned. Indeed, as late as 1946, the Muslim League, under Jinnah, supported the Cabinet Mission Plan, which envisioned a loose federation in an independent, united India. The Congress Party ultimately rejected the plan, however, with its leader, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), claiming the right to unilaterally alter the terms of the plan after the fact.[96] The Muslim League, after hearing this, rejected the plan as well. It was only after the failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan that Jinnah and the Muslim League pressed in earnest for the partition of the subcontinent and the creation of a separate, Muslim state called Pakistan. It seems the reason they did this was simply because there appeared to be no other way of resolving the differences that had developed between India's Muslim and Hindu populations (discussed below). The British agreed and thus, on 18 July 1947, the Crown assented to the Indian Independence Act, which declared, as per the Mountbatten Plan of 3 June, that the subcontinent would be partitioned and independence would be granted simultaneously to two separate dominions—Pakistan and India. Less than a month later, it became a reality. Both Congress and the Muslim League had agreed to this, though it does not seem to have been what either party actually wanted. The League held off for quite some time before formally calling for the complete partition of the subcontinent and the creation of two absolutely separate and distinct sovereign states, since the League's main concern

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[96] See Shahid Javed Burki, "Cabinet Mission Plan, 1946," *Historical Dictionary of Pakistan*, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2006) 122; Jalal, *Sole Spokesman* Chapter 5, 174–207.

was the protection of Muslims from Hindu domination, however this might be achieved. The Congress, meanwhile, never wanted partition, insisting that a Congress-dominated India would be secular and afford equal rights to all citizens, irrespective of religion. It was eventually forced to acquiesce in the reality of partition, however.

When the British "established dominion over India," Jalal writes, "the political map of the subcontinent did not reflect the religious affiliations of its peoples. But by the time of the British withdrawal, rivalries between Hindus and Muslims had come to dominate Indian politics."[97] Pakistan came into being as a result of these rivalries; it was thought, at least by most members of the Muslim League, that they would only get worse in a united, independent, Hindu-dominated India. Presumably, had these rivalries not manifested themselves in the ways they did, or had they never existed, or had Congress and the League been able to work together to resolve them, Pakistan would have been a non-issue and the political map of the subcontinent would look quite different today. In this sense, no one chose Pakistan—the situation in India at the time chose it.

In the words of former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Muhammad Munir, who lived through many of these events, "Never had recorded history witnessed the barbarity, the bestiality, the degradation of man to the level of beasts, the displacement of persons from their homes and the difficulty of finding new homes for themselves, as on partition, and the hatred it gave rise to between the two Nations who were both claimants to old civilisations."[98] "History has not known a fratricidal war of such dimensions," Gopal Das Khosla recounts, "in which human hatred and bestial passions were degraded to the levels witnessed during this dark epoch when religious frenzy ... stalked through cities, towns

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[97] Jalal, *Sole Spokesman* 1.
[98] Munir, *Jinnah to Zia* 17.

and countryside, taking a toll of half a million innocent lives. ... To be a Hindu, Sikh or a Muslim became a crime punishable by death."[99] "Yet for over a thousand years," Khosla writes, "the various communities had lived together in peace and amity."[100] So what happened? Where did these two nations—Muslim and Hindu—come from and how was Pakistan supposed to solve the 'communal problem' their existence in the same polity was said to create? And if Pakistan was supposed to solve this so-called communal problem, why did its creation engender so much violence and animosity?

To understand how, why, when and where Pakistan came about, we must know something about the political history of the subcontinent and relations among members of different faith communities in the subcontinent as they developed over time. First is the matter of geography. What are we talking about when we say the *Indian* subcontinent? What is, or was, India, prior to the creation of Pakistan? Prior to British imperialism? Prior to Islamic colonialism? What about the Hindus? What are they and where did they come from?

Stretching 2400 kilometers from Kashmir to Assam, the Himalayas, the world's largest mountain system, divide what is now called the Indian subcontinent from the rest of Asia. This vast series of mountain ranges is the source of the subcontinent's two major rivers, the Ganges (or Ganga, after the goddess of the same name), and what is now called the Indus River (from *sindhu*, Sanskrit for 'river', by a circuitous etymological route detailed below). The Harappan Culture or Indus Valley Civilization—the first known civilization to develop in the subcontinent, "in the sense of an organized system of

[99] Gopal Das Khosla, "Stern Reckoning: A Survey of the Events Leading Up To and Following the Partition of India," *The Partition Omnibus* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002) 3; See also Jalal, *Sole Spokesman*.
[100] Khosla, "Stern" 3.

government over a comparatively large area"[101]—flourished in the Indus River valleys and plains between approximately 3000 and 1600 BC.[102] Beginning around 1500 BC, groups of Indo-Europeans calling themselves Aryans (noble ones) began migrating from the northwest (Persia) into the Indus River region, bringing with them their own religious beliefs and the Sanskrit language.[103] With the arrival of the Aryans and the introduction of Sanskrit to the region, the indigenous inhabitants began referring to the subcontinent's two major rivers by the Sanskrit names the Aryans ascribed to them: the Ganga River and the Sindhu River (*sindhu* means river or stream in Sanskrit, though unless it refers specifically to another river, it almost always refers to what we now know as the Indus River, the longest river in the subcontinent).

The Aryans composed sacred hymns called *Vedas (Veda)*, meaning knowledge. The *Rigveda* is the earliest known collection of these hymns. The Vedas are the foundation of a system of religious, cultural and philosophical practices, attitudes and beliefs that were widely adopted by the indigenous inhabitants of the subcontinent and that would later be known as Hinduism. The term 'Hinduism' is derived from the Persian word *Hindu*, referring originally to the Sindhu River and then also to the inhabitants of the immediate area and eventually the inhabitants of the entire subcontinent.[104] The Persians, who first laid claim to parts of the subcontinent around 519 BC apparently had

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[101] A. L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India: A Survey of the Culture of the Indian Sub-Continent Before the Coming of the Muslims* (New York: Grove Press, 1959) 14–15.

[102] Romila Thapar, *A History of India*, vol. 1 (Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books, 1966) 24.

[103] Theodore M. Ludwig, *The Sacred Paths: Understanding the Religions of the World* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1989) 252.

[104] For an interesting discussion of the word 'Hindu' and how it came to represent the system of beliefs and cultural practices inspired by the Vedas that eventually became known as Hinduism, see David N. Lorenzen, "Who Invented Hinduism?" *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41.4 (2000): 630–59.

difficulty pronouncing the initial *s* in Sindhu and thus called the Sindhu River the Hindu River. From this, they got Hind, Hindush, and finally Hindustan, which they used to refer to the entire subcontinent.[105] Thus, as far as the Persians were concerned, all the indigenous inhabitants of the subcontinent were Hindus. This was not because the Persians thought these people adhered to a single philosophy or religion known as Hinduism, but because they lived, or were assumed to live, in proximity to what the Persians called the Hindu River, a corruption of the Sanskrit name for the river. The Greeks subsequently dropped the initial *h*, leaving us with Indus, from which we get, in English, via Latin, India.

The original inhabitants of these lands never referred to the region as a whole either as the Sindhu region or the Hindu region, much less Hind, Hindush, Hindustan, the Indus region or India, and they certainly did not refer to themselves as Hindus or Indians. These were all foreign labels. The ancient inhabitants of the subcontinent knew it either as *Jambudvipa*, the continent of the *jambu* (rose-apple) tree, or *Bharatavarsa*, meaning land of the sons of Bharata (Bharat), a legendary emperor.[106] This nomenclature derives from Vedic philosophy. The inhabitants of this land did not therefore consider themselves *Jambudvipians* or *Bharatavarsians*, however. The Aryans considered themselves just that—Aryans, or noble ones. Other inhabitants likely identified most closely with their individual tribes, villages, communities or castes.[107] At any rate, there was no sense of Indian or Hindu nationalism at this time because there was no such thing as India or

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[105] Basham, *Wonder* 47.
[106] Basham, *Wonder* 1, 488-89.
[107] Hereditary classes in societies influenced by Vedic teachings, distinguishing among degrees of ritual purity and social status. A full discussion of the concept of 'caste' is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Hinduism at this time. The concept of a reified, sovereign state, moreover, would have been utterly foreign to these early inhabitants of the subcontinent.

Ancient India, or the subcontinent that would later be known as India—parts of which eventually went on to become the modern Republic of India, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the People's Republic of Bangladesh—was not a single political entity and was not even known as 'India' by its original inhabitants. At that time, there was no such thing as 'India', except in the imaginations of foreigners who insisted on imagining the entire subcontinent as a single region, a single geopolitical entity. A number of perpetually competing tribes and kingdoms were scattered throughout the subcontinent. Many, though certainly not all, of these tribes and kingdoms adhered to some variant of Vedic philosophy, which by now had permeated the cultures of many of the otherwise distinct civilizations throughout the subcontinent. Despite the influence of Vedic philosophy, however, the region remained heavily divided culturally, linguistically and politically. Moreover, differences in the way Vedic traditions were adopted by different societies throughout the subcontinent precluded a single understanding of what it meant to follow these teachings. It is worth noting the irony here that the modern Republic of India takes its English name from a corruption of the Sanskrit name for a river that no longer flows through its territory, the Indus River now being confined to Tibet, Pakistan and the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Buddhist Mauryan dynasty established the first empire in the subcontinent in the fourth century BC, wresting control from most of the subcontinent's various northern kingdoms.[108] Incidentally, a distinction is sometimes made between Hind, or India,

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[108] Hussain, *Pakistan* 16.

referring to the northern half of the subcontinent, and Decca, or the Deccan Plateau, referring to the southern half of the subcontinent. The Mauryan Empire was concentrated in the north and it is likely the two halves of the subcontinent were not considered a single political whole at the time. A political map of South Asia I found in a late nineteenth century German atlas depicts the subcontinent as it was conceived in the 1300s. In it, the subcontinent consists of two distinct units: 'Hindustan' and 'Dekkan'.

The Mauryan period is sometimes described as the first experiment in imperial government in India.[109] With the disintegration of the Mauryan Empire in the second century BC, the subcontinent became divided once more into a number of competing, autonomous political communities and perpetually warring kingdoms. From the fourth to the sixth century AD, the Gupta dynasty attempted to duplicate the success of the Mauryas, with mixed results at best. Then, with a series of successive invasions by the Huns, a band of Central Asian nomads, in the fifth century AD, the empire began to unravel. The period of 500 to 900 AD saw the political ascendancy of various kingdoms in the southern parts of the subcontinent.[110] This period also marked the "penetration of northern culture into the south," resulting "in some of the patterns, ideas and institutions of the north being assimilated, whereas others were rejected or modified."[111] People throughout the subcontinent were getting to know each other better. Nevertheless, cultural norms clearly differed throughout the subcontinent and the subcontinent remained heavily divided politically. There was still no clear sense of 'Indian' identity. This is important because one of the arguments some advocates of partition made was

[109] Thapar, *History* 91.
[110] Thapar, *History* 167–8.
[111] Thapar, *History* 184.

that India was never a cohesive whole and thus there was no reason for it to remain a single political entity after the British left. At least for a time in India's history, they would certainly have been correct.

In 711 AD, Muhammad bin Qasim, a Syrian general, in what appears to have been the first successful Muslim Arab military incursion in part of the subcontinent, captured Sindh and Punjab and incorporated them into the Umayyad Caliphate, though his rule was short lived and his efforts to further expand his territory were frustrated by other competing kingdoms. Between 800 and 1200 AD, the subcontinent became even more fragmented than before. The political situation had become truly chaotic by this point, creating a political void the Arabs would soon be more than happy to fill. Like the British some eight centuries later, the Muslim Arabs first came to the subcontinent in significant numbers as traders and, to a lesser extent, missionaries—especially Sufi mystics. The first Arab traders settled mostly on the Malabar Coast along the southwestern edge of the subcontinent beginning early in the eighth century. They got along reasonably well with the indigenous people and were free to acquire property and practice their religion.[112] Soon, however, Muslim Arab armies began invading and capturing various parts of the subcontinent, bringing with them foreign religious teachings and political ideas.

In the early eleventh century, Mahmud, ruler of the Ghaznavid Empire or Sultanate, an Islamic dynasty originally of Turkish origin based in Ghazni, a city in central Afghanistan, sought to expand Ghazni's political influence in South Asia by

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[112] Thapar, *History* 172.

launching a series of raids into the northern regions of the subcontinent.[113] These raids

brought untold wealth to Ghazni and established Mahmud as the ruler of key areas in the

northern reaches of the subcontinent, such as Lahore and a number of surrounding areas

in the Punjab.[114] Then, in 1017, Mahmud marched north and overthrew the ruling

Mamum Dynasty in Khwarizm, in the modern day territory of Khiva in Uzbekistan. This

is important to our story because one of the prisoners of war Mahmud captured in

Khawarism and took back to Ghazni with him was Abu Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad

al-Biruni. It is unclear what al-Biruni's precise relationship was with Mahmud's court.

Nevertheless, it is he who wrote the first complete history of the Indian subcontinent and

its people—*Kitab al-Hind*, or Book of Hind (India). Al-Biruni calls the inhabitants of the

subcontinent Hindus and argues that they are different in virtually every respect from

other peoples—notably Muslims. Their language, customs, religion, philosophy and so

on are said to be totally foreign, making peaceful coexistence between them and any

other people impossible. 'Hinduism', as such, is not mentioned by al-Biruni, however. He

does not use 'Hindu' as a religious category either. Rather, he observes the native

inhabitants of the subcontinent and concludes that they have a set of cultural practices,

distinct attitudes and beliefs that clearly distinguish them from all outsiders. Religion, for

al-Biruni, is but one of the things that makes Hindus different and precludes peaceful

coexistence between Hindus and non-Hindus.[115] In some ways, al-Biruni's thoughts on

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[113] Ray says sixteen, Hussain says seventeen. Krishna Das Ray, *India: A Journey Through the Ages* (New York: Vantage Press, 1995) 106; Hussain, *Pakistan* 17.
[114] Hussain, *Pakistan* 17.
[115] Abu Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Biruni, *Alberuni's India: An Account of the Religion, Philosophy, Literature, Geography, Chronology, Astronomy, Customs, Laws and Astrology of India About A.D. 1030*, trans. Edward C. Sachau (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1910). Digital edition available from Columbia University E-books, 9 July 2008 <http://

the Vedic religious traditions, and the culture of the natives of India more generally, foreshadow the two-nations theory.

"By the middle of the twelfth century," Hussain writes, "the Ghaznavids came under severe challenge from Turkic generals belonging to the mountainous country of Ghor [also spelled Ghur] in western Afghanistan. Ala-ud-Din Husain of the Shansabani dynasty of Ghor burned Ghazni in 1152."[116] The Shansabani dynasty of the Ghuri Empire was a Persian Muslim dynasty originally based in Khorasan, a region encompassing parts of modern day Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In around 1185, General Muizzuddin bin Sam (Muhammad[117]), governor of Ghur, conquered the city of Lahore in Punjab and many other Ghaznavid possessions.[118] Muizzuddin's forces decimated the Ghaznavid Empire in the subcontinent, replacing it with the Ghuri Kingdom and establishing "what was to essentially become an Indian Sultanate."[119]

Muizzuddin left his Indian possessions in the care of one of his generals, Qutb-ud-din Aibak, who soon proclaimed himself the first Sultan of Delhi, inaugurating what came to be known as the Delhi Sultanate at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The Delhi Sultanate lasted until the early sixteenth century, when it was absorbed by the Mughal Empire. This entire period marks the political and military ascendancy of various, often competing, Islamic forces in the subcontinent, though Muslims remained a minority in the subcontinent. This was just the beginning of what could be described as

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www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/digital/collections/cul/texts/ldpd_5949073_001/ldpd_5949073_001.pdf>.

[116] al-Biruni, *India*.

[117] Some authors call him Muhammad of Ghur or Ghor.

[118] Thapar, *History* 236.

[119] M. Athar Ali, *Mughal India: Studies in Polity, Ideas, Society, and Culture* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006) 18.

the era of Islamic colonialism, and expansion in the subcontinent.[120] Still, there was no

identifiable sense of 'Indian' consciousness.

The Mughal Empire was founded by the successors of Timur (Tamerlane), the

Mongol ruler of Samarkand, a city in eastern Uzbekistan, from 1336 to 1405. From 1519

to 1526, Babur, the first Mughal emperor, annexed Surat on the northwest coast and

Bajaur in the Kunar Valley, secured the area between Jhelum and Chenab, conquered

Sialkot, Muhammad Iqbal's birthplace, in northeast Punjab, annexed the whole of

Punjab, including Lahore and finally, in 1525, conquered Delhi.[121] "[B]etween the early

sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries," John F. Richards writes, "the Mughals

conquered and ruled a dynamic, centralizing state. By 1690 the Mughal emperor was the

acknowledged ruler over nearly the entire subcontinent."[122] While the Mughals did

indeed rule the "bulk of northern India, from Afghanistan to Bengal and as far south as

the Deccan plateau," it is important to note that "several independent Hindu kingdoms

remained in the southern part" of the subcontinent.[123] The Portuguese, it should also be

noted, invaded parts of the subcontinent around the same time the Mughals did. They

established a small colony based in Goa on the southwest coast that endured throughout

the Mughal and British periods and, in some form, up to 1961.[124] What is significant here

is that Mughal rule was far from total. India was not conceived as a single, abstract

political unit. Rather, there were simply large parts of the subcontinent that the Mughals

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[120] See Sita Ram Goel, *The Story of Islamic Imperialism in India* (New Delhi: Voice of India, 1994).

[121] Ray, *India* 114.

[122] John F. Richards, "Early Modern India and World History," *Journal of World History* 8.2 (Fall 2007): 206.

[123] Craig Baxter, et al, *Government and Politics in South Asia*, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002) 6.

[124] Ray, *India* 162–67.

happened to rule, though people continued to identify most strongly with their local communities and the Mughal state, such that it was, was not a major factor in people's lives. This is important because it is clearly different from the form of geopolitical organization the British later adopted in the subcontinent.

A number of the subcontinent's indigenous people converted to Islam during the pre-Mughal and Mughal Muslim periods, though it appears forced conversions were rare. For one thing, non-Muslims in certain regions were initially subject to a special tax (*jizzya*) and, if they converted to Islam, this often meant a loss of revenue for the government. At any rate, the Mughal Emperor Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar (r. 1556–1605) ended the *jizzya* tax on non-Muslims and simultaneously issued an edict forbidding forcible conversions. Furthermore, he married a number of indigenous, non-Muslim wives, giving the impression of a wise, tolerant ruler.[125]

The Muslim invaders and rulers, both prior to and during Mughal rule, relied heavily on foreign expertise, relegating most of the indigenous population—Muslim or not—to lower-level government posts. For instance, in Emperor Akbar's administration according to T. L. Sharma, over 75 per cent of government officials were Muslims of foreign origin.[126] "Such exaggerated importance was attached to non-Indian descent during the Mughal period," Sharma writes, "that if Muslim aspirants for high government office did not have a foreign ancestor, they sometimes invented a fictitious one to improve their chances."[127] Sharma suggests that this privileging of foreign expertise in

[125] William Dalrymple, *The Last Mughal: The Fall of a Dynasty: Delhi, 1857* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007) 5.
[126] T. L. Sharma, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in All-India Politics 1913–1925* (Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corporation, 1987) 2.
[127] Sharma, *Hindu-Muslim* 5.

government was, in addition to ongoing Muslim missionary activity, a factor in growing animosity between Muslims—whether foreign or indigenous converts—and the indigenous population at large, which by this time seemed to be coalescing into some kind of as-yet ill-defined Hindu or indigenous Indian community, with the concomitant development of a self-conscious indigenous Indian or Hindu national identity (indigenes who converted to Islam seem to have found themselves in a sort of identity netherworld). Thus, we see the birth of one of the two nations of the two-nations theory.

Then, early in the eighteenth century, the Mughal Empire began to disintegrate. As Ahmed writes, "a succession of incompetent or corrupt rulers hastened the decline of the Mughal Empire. Mughal commanders sent from Delhi in the early eighteenth century to bring important provinces like Bengal, Avadh and Hyderabad into line broke away and established a rule which their successors would claim as their own."[128] The division of Mughal territory in the subcontinent into provinces provided, with some modifications, the basis for British administration of the subcontinent.[129]

With a number of provinces breaking away, the establishment of new, competing kingdoms throughout the subcontinent, and facing an indigenous, non-Muslim backlash for a variety of reasons, the Mughals, according to Sharma, appealed to religion—"the only thing they had in common with Indian Muslims."[130] This only exacerbated communal divisions in the subcontinent, however, reifying religious identities. In the process, it seems the sense of Indian, if not Hindu, identity among indigenous non-Muslims was strengthened (there is debate over when and for what reasons people in the

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[128] Ahmed, *Jinnah* 37.
[129] Baxter, *Government* 6.
[130] Sharma, *Hindu-Muslim* 7.

subcontinent who lived according to Vedic principles began to refer to themselves as Hindus on account of their religious beliefs and practices and not simply the fact that they were native to what the Persians called 'Hindustan', meaning 'place of the Hindus'[131]—this is important for our study but, unfortunately, we will not likely be able to answer the question definitively. The best we can hope for is to elucidate the political implications of the question). Some of the first recorded communal riots between Muslims and Hindus in the subcontinent occurred in 1809 at the tail end of the Mughal Empire. In that year, according the Ahmed, "some fifty mosques were destroyed and several hundred people killed in communal riots." "Hindus and Muslims," he concludes, "were beginning to view the world from different, increasingly opposed perspectives."[132]

In the end, the Mughal strategy of appealing to religion failed, as the subcontinent was overrun by European trading companies vying for natural resources and exotic goods beginning in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Mughal rule broke down and the provinces of the Mughal Empire began to take charge of their own affairs. As will be discussed below, provincial obstinacy in the face of religious appeals would similarly prove a formidable obstacle to the Muslim League's efforts to unite the subcontinent's Muslims under a single banner in the 1930s and 1940s. With the gradual collapse of the Mughal Empire, various competing kingdoms emerged and the subcontinent was plunged into chaos once more. While the Mughal Empire did not technically come to an end until 1858, and until then the British operated, "at least *de*

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[131] See Richard King, "Orientalism and the Modern Myth of 'Hinduism'," *Numen* 46.2 (1999): 146–85; Brian K. Pennington, "Constructing Colonial Dharma: A Chronicle of Emergent Hinduism, 1830–1831," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 69.3 (September 2001): 577–603.
[132] Ahmed, *Jinnah* 38.

jure, under the aegis of a grant of power from the emperor,"[133] the end was nigh for the Mughal Empire by the late 1700s.

Incidentally, the ease with which various European trading companies and powers were able to enter and operate within the subcontinent, and the relatively rapid disintegration of the Mughal Empire, suggest that Mughal rule, as previously noted, while perhaps almost universal throughout the subcontinent, was anything but total. The British East India Company ultimately prevailed over the other trading companies in the late eighteenth century, effectively ruling most of the subcontinent, whether directly or indirectly, until the British assumed direct rule in 1858, following the infamous Indian Mutiny of 1857. The body of Bahadur Shah II, the last Mughal emperor, was unceremoniously deposited in an unmarked grave "at the back of a walled prison enclosure" in November 1862.[134]

The British recognized that what they now referred to as British India, the British Raj (from Hindi for 'reign'), or simply India, was home to an eclectic range of religious communities, notably Hindus (or at least people who followed some variant of Vedic philosophy and who were not of any other identifiable faith) and Muslims. To solidify their rule and forestall any rebellion, the British sought to exploit the differences they observed among the indigenous population in a policy of divide and rule. By granting political concessions and government positions sometimes on the basis of religious confession, the British sought to pit one community against another, ensuring that they would always come out on top. It worked very well for a while.

If we unpack British imperial strategy in India, we see that two things were going

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[133] Baxter, *Government* 6.
[134] Dalrymple, *Last Mughal* 3–4.

on. On one hand, the British, in consolidating their rule throughout the subcontinent—whether direct or indirect through a network of so-called princely states[135]—were making a statement about the nature of political organization in the subcontinent, namely that the subcontinent was a single geopolitical entity called India (or British India), much like a European nation-state like France, or Britain itself—not simply an agglomeration of conterminous territories whose heterogeneous populations they had managed to subdue militarily and therefore dominate and manage under a single political structure. In other words, the British, more successfully than the Mughals before them, actively cultivated the sense that India was a single political unit. On the other hand, however, the British insisted on exacerbating communal divisions that would, under other circumstances, cause the breakdown and breakup of any European nation-state. The irony of British imperial rule in India is that it sought to construct a state—a single geopolitical entity called India—using strategies and policies that, under other circumstances, would have resulted in the complete disintegration of most modern nation-states. Perhaps this has something to do with why the subcontinent broke apart after the British left—the British had effectively engineered it that way, consciously or not.

From the late nineteenth century onward, the history of the Indian subcontinent is the story of various, sometimes united and sometimes conflicting efforts on the part of the indigenous population to either expel the British or at least have a greater say in the administration of the country. It is also the story of how religion and politics became inextricably linked during this process, and how differences and animosities among

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[135] The subcontinent, under the British, was divided up into 8 to 10 major provinces that were administered directly either by a Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, a handful of minor provinces administered by a Chief Commissioner, and hundreds of smaller, semi-autonomous princely states, which were essentially small kingdoms that fell under limited British jurisdiction.

various religious communities in India colored and influenced the movement for freedom. Two organizations in particular concern us here: the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. Ultimately, the Muslim League is of more concern to us, since it was the leading force behind the creation of Pakistan, though it is impossible to intelligently discuss one group without at least mentioning the other.

In 1885, Allan Octavian Hume, a retired member of the Indian Civil Service and a famous ornithologist, founded the Indian National Congress in Bombay (now Mumbai). Its initial aim was officially "the consolidation of the union between England and India, by securing the modification of such conditions as may be unjust or injurious to the latter country."[136] The impetus for Hume, a British civilian, to establish such an organization was, K. D. Ray explains, his feeling that something had to be done to accommodate the growing spirit of nationalism in the country while ensuring loyalty to the British Crown.[137] Thus, Ray argues, the National Congress Party, as the organization is also known, was established to ensure necessary political reforms, but with the proviso that its members remain absolutely loyal to Britain. This did not last very long.

Congress was not officially meant to be a mouthpiece for Hindu interests in India, though that is what it effectively became. From the very beginning, Muslims made up a small minority of the organization's membership. Soon after its creation, Congress began campaigning for limited democracy in India, resulting in the Government of India Act of 1909, also known as the Indian Councils Act of 1909[138] but commonly known as the Morley-Minto reforms (after John Morley, the Secretary of State for India and Gilbert

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[136] Burki, *Historical Dictionary*, "Indian National Congress" 243–4.
[137] Ray, *India* 208.
[138] *Indian Councils Act of 1909*, available from *Project South Asia*, 10 July 2008 <http: //projectsouthasia.sdstate.edu/docs/history/primarydocs/Political_History/ABKeithDoc037.htm>.

John Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound, 4th Earl of Minto, Viceroy and Governor-General of India). "The Act brought Indians into the viceroy's executive council and in similar bodies aiding provincial governors. The Act also provided for the election of Indians to the legislative councils at both the central and provincial levels."[139]

Britain had experimented with a variety of administrative schemes in India prior to the Morley-Minto reforms. Initially, the governor-general, or viceroy, who represented the British monarch in India, had a central executive council (a cabinet) made up entirely of British citizens who were appointed to various positions and who, collectively and under the direction of the viceroy, constituted the central government of British India. The Bombay and Madras provinces, meanwhile, were governed by governors and the other provinces were governed by lieutenant governors—all British citizens appointed by the Crown. The governors and lieutenant governors of the various provinces also had their own executive councils, whose members they would appoint and who were again entirely British. The Indian Councils Act of 1861 added a legislative council—whose members would be appointed, not elected—to the viceroy's central executive council "and to each of the heads of the provinces."[140] Under the Act, the members of the executive councils at both the central and provincial levels, who would also be members of the new legislative councils, would continue to be entirely British. The Act allowed, however, for a limited number of members to be appointed to the legislative councils who were not employed by the British Raj—'non-officials'—"and some of those appointed were Indians."[141] As Craig Baxter et al point out, "This development was not a

[139] Burki, *Historical Dictionary*, "Government of India Act of 1909" 215.
[140] Baxter, *Government* 9.
[141] Baxter, *Government* 9.

great advance, but it did permit the voices of very carefully selected Indians to be heard at the central and provincial levels."[142]

The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 "greatly expanded Indian participation in the governance of India,"[143] though they still fell short of many of the Indians' demands. Significantly, they allowed for an Indian to be added to the viceroy's executive council and for the election ("by a severely restricted electorate that qualified for the privilege principally through tax paying or educational attainment"[144]) of twenty-seven and the appointment of five Indian 'non-official' members on the viceroy's 68-member legislative council. The reforms also allowed for the election and appointment of 'non-official' Indian members to the provincial legislative councils and the appointment of Indians to the provincial executive councils as well. Ten years later, the Government of India Act of 1919[145] (the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms) saw the creation of two central legislative houses—the Council of State and the Central Legislative Assembly. While the Act allowed Indians somewhat greater participation in managing their affairs—elected Indian representatives constituted a majority in both houses—the viceroy retained final authority.

Such concessions failed to satisfy Congress' leaders for long, however. Starting in the 1920s, under Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948), the party began demanding 'dominion status' within the British Empire—along the lines of former colonies such as Canada and Australia. This eventually led to the adoption of the

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[142] Baxter, *Government* 9.
[143] Baxter, *Government* 10.
[144] Baxter, *Government* 10.
[145] *Government of India Act, 1919, Project South Asia,* 10 July 2008 <http://projectsouthasia.sdstate.edu/docs/history/primarydocs/Political_History/ABKeithDoc050.htm>.

Government of India Act of 1935, the last pre-independence constitution of British India, "which expanded participation in the legislative councils at the provincial and central levels."[146] By this time, the *swaraj* or 'freedom' movement, spearheaded by Congress, was in full swing and the political situation in India was becoming more volatile. In the elections of 1936–37, Congress trounced the All-India Muslim League, which Muhammad Ali Jinnah had only recently assumed leadership of, forming governments in eight of the eleven provinces. The Muslim League would soon rise to prominence again, however.

The All-India Muslim League began as the Muhammedan Educational Conference, an interest group formed in 1906 by the Muslim intelligentsia of Aligarh. Aligarh has been the administrative headquarters of a larger district of the same name situated in the north of the subcontinent in the Doab region between the Ganga (Ganges) and Yamuna rivers since at least the sixteenth century (the city and the district were known as Kol prior to the eighteenth century, though the origins of the name Kol are obscure—Aligarh is the name of a fort built there in the sixteenth century).[147] Today, Aligarh is the ninth most populous city in the Indian province of Uttar Pradesh, a northern province bordering Nepal.[148] At the time the Muhammedan Educational Conference was formed, Uttar Pradesh was known as the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Muslims were in a minority in the United Provinces (13.4 per cent of the population in 1886), making them acutely aware of their diminished influence and

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[146] Burki, *Historical Dictionary*, "Indian National Congress" 244.

[147] "History of Aligarh," *AligarhDirectory.com*, 9 July 2008 <http://www.aligarhdirectory.com/history.php>.

[148] "India: Uttar Pradesh," *City Population*, 9 July 2008 <http://www.citypopulation.de/India-UttarPradesh.html>

status.[149] This may partly explain why the movement that would ultimately give rise to the creation of Pakistan started here and not in a Muslim-majority province such as Punjab or Bengal—they had all the more reason to fight to be heard.

Aligarh was the intellectual birthplace of what came to be known as the Aligarh Movement and, eventually, the Pakistan Movement. In 1875, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, a leading Muslim intellectual in Aligarh and founder of the Aligarh Movement, established, with British support, the Muhammedan Anglo-Oriental College (now Aligarh Muslim University)—the crowning achievement of the Aligarh Movement at the time. Khan, who descended "from a prominent family at the Mughal court in Delhi"[150] and had been a jurist for the British East India Company prior to 1857, sought to reinvigorate a Muslim community he worried had become lazy and decadent. The school, Christophe Jaffrelot writes, "provided the basis for the mobilization of a community spirit, which in turn developed, in the early years of the twentieth century, a political character quite separate from the Indian National Congress."[151] The Aligarh Movement was not initially hostile to British rule, which partly explains why the British were so eager to support it in its early years—it was always nice to have indigenous support.

The Muhammedan Educational Conference, the brainchild of the intelligentsia of Aligarh, was formed in response to the British decision in 1906 to create legislative councils in the provinces, a decision taken partly in response to the demand of the Indian National Congress for the 'Indianization' of the bureaucracy and greater democratic representation. Members of the Aligarh Movement were concerned that, since Muslims

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[149] Christophe, Jaffrelot, "Islamic Identity and Ethnic Tensions," *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot, trans. Gillian Beaumont (London: Anthem Press, 2002) 10–11.
[150] Jaffrelot, "Islamic Identity" 10.
[151] Jaffrelot, "Islamic Identity" 10.

were a minority in the United Provinces, they would never be adequately represented in these new councils. The Conference (and later the Muslim League) advocated separate electorates for the new legislative councils. This would mean that a number of seats would be reserved for Muslims and that only Muslims could vote for those candidates. The fear was that Muslims would be unable to elect any of their own representatives in a province where they were in a minority if there was only a single or 'joint' electorate. The British, possibly recognizing the opportunity this presented them with to balance the Muslims against the Hindus and thus continue their policy of divide and rule, conceded to the Educational Conference's demands (the Conference having since morphed into the All-India Muslim League) and included provisions for separate electorates in the Government of India Act of 1909. Congress was not impressed. For one thing, Muslims were not limited to voting in their electorate for Muslim candidates; they could vote for whomever they wished. Furthermore, not only could Muslims vote in the general electorate, they could also field candidates in it. Thus, Muslims could conceivably "control additional seats on the provincial councils."[152] The issue of separate electorates would prove a continual bone of contention between Congress and the League.

The Muhammedan Educational Conference, with the support of the *nawab*[153] of Bengal, Viqar ul-Mulk, became the All-India Muslim League on 30 December 1906.[154] In the beginning, the League's main objective, Shahid Javed Burki writes, "was to get the British to accept that the political interests of the Muslim community did not always

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[152] G. R. Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India: A Study of Controversy, Conflict, and Communal Movements in Northern India 1923–1928* (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1975) 126.
[153] Muslim notable; title originally applied to governors and viceroys of provinces in the Mughal Empire and formally applied in British India to the rulers of Muslim princely states.
[154] Burki, *Historical Dictionary*, "Muslim League (1906–1958)" 361–3.

coincide with those of the majority Hindu community. The Hindu leadership was anxious to get the British to leave India; the League, on the other hand, wanted the British to prolong their stay, if only to protect the minorities."[155] Initially, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who would eventually prove key to the League's ultimate success, had no patience for what he considered its divisive, sectarian stance and did not support the idea of separate electorates for Muslims. He was a member of the Indian National Congress and, at least in the beginning, was considered a champion of Hindu-Muslim unity against the British. He abhorred 'communal' politics and advocated Muslim-Hindu cooperation toward a peaceful transition from British to Indian rule.

Jinnah, like so many other politicians and public figures in India at the time (Gandhi, Iqbal, Nehru, and so on), was a British-educated barrister. He was born in the port city of Karachi on the northwest coast in December 1876, a year before Muhammad Iqbal. Jinnah's ancestors were Persian and, Ahmed suggests, their foreign origins were an asset to them "in a Muslim society conscious of underlining its non-Indian origins"[156] (recall our earlier discussion about how India's Muslim rulers often privileged foreigners). On his return to India in 1896, after completing his studies in law at Lincoln's Inn, London, he set up a legal practice in Bombay. He was the only Muslim lawyer in Bombay at the time.[157] He also joined the Indian National Congress and soon acquired a reputation as an "arrogant nationalist."[158] On 25 January 1910, Jinnah was appointed to the Legislative Council of India in Delhi. Throughout this period he remained an active member of Congress.

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[155] Burki, *Historical Dictionary*, "Muslim League (1906–1958)" 361–3.
[156] Ahmed, *Jinnah* 3.
[157] Ahmed, *Jinnah* 4.
[158] Ahmed, *Jinnah* 5.

While he did eventually join the Muslim League in 1913, he remained a member of Congress as well until 1920. Jinnah's biggest hope during this period was for the Muslims and Hindus to be able to work together to oust the British. This was the desire of a new faction in the Muslim League composed mostly of western-educated professionals, like Jinnah, which came to be called the 'Young Party'. Members of the 'Young Party' questioned the wisdom of the 'Old Party' policy of collaboration with the British and antagonism toward the Congress Party. Around the time Jinnah joined the League, members of the 'Young Party' "succeeded in taking control of the League, modified its creed, and moved toward establishing a relationship with the Indian National Congress."[159] To this end, Jinnah helped broker the Lucknow Pact of December 1916 between Congress and the League.[160] The parties pledged to cooperate in pressuring the British to give Indians more authority to run their own country, with the eventual goal of full independence. This marked a significant shift in the League's position, which up until then had focused myopically on protecting Muslim interests and uplifting the Muslim community in India, goals the party's old guard thought to achieve through collaboration with the British.

League-Congress relations gradually broke down, however, with the end of the First World War in 1918, the launch of the Khilafat Movement shortly thereafter, and Gandhi's assumption of the leadership of the Congress party in the early 1920s. The Ottoman Empire in Turkey had been defeated and pro-Western forces in Turkey were threatening the institution of the caliph (*khilafah*). Mehmed V, the 35th and last Ottoman

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[159] Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim* 126.
[160] *Lucknow Pact, December 1916, Project South Asia*, 10 July 2008 <http: //projectsouthasia.sdstate.edu/docs/history/primarydocs/Political_History/ABKeithDoc040.htm>

Sultan, also held the title of *khilafah*—the supreme temporal religious authority for all Sunni Muslims, in theory if not always in practice. Many Indian Muslims rallied to support the *khilafah*, to whom they had historically looked with reverence as the leader of the universal community of Muslims—*ummah*—to which they belonged. Gandhi, seeing an opportunity to channel the energies of members of the Khilafat Movement, who were opposed to the British on account of Britain being one of the war's primary victors, endorsed the movement and its aims and brought some of its members into the Congress Party. This rankled a number of Congress members and caused a split in the party between the Khilafat Movement's supporters and detractors. At the same time, Gandhi announced a new strategy for winning independence from the British: non-cooperation and civil disobedience, whereby Indians were urged not to cooperate with British rule in India, but also not to violently resist the British oppression such disobedience was bound to elicit. He appealed to religious sentiments to get people to support his plan, framing the struggle for independence, at least for Hindus, as a religious duty. This especially, Jinnah felt, would exacerbate communal tensions and destroy relations among Muslims and Hindus. He "denounced Gandhi for causing schism and split 'not only amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Hindus and Muslims and Muslims."[161] Shortly thereafter, in 1924, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the new Republic of Turkey, abolished the caliphate. Gandhi's allies in the Khilafat Movement found themselves in disarray and, for a variety reasons, relations between Congress and the League—and consequently, Hindus and Muslims—soured.

Jinnah spent most of the 1920s in political hibernation and the League was

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[161] Jalal, *Sole Spokesman* 8.

essentially defunct during this period. The 1920s also saw some of the worst communal

fighting and riots in Indian history up to that point. The consensus in the literature is that,

as Christophe Jaffrelot puts it, "the 1920s saw the crystallization of mutual opposition

between Hindus and Muslims. Outbreaks of violence between the two communities

became more frequent, particularly in the north of India."[162] "From 1923 through 1928,"

G. R. Thursby reports,

> there were 112 riots which the Government of India classified as serious
> *communal* disorders. They were responsible for the loss of approximately 450
> lives and major injuries to about 5000 persons. The distribution of the riots was
> remarkably wide. They occurred nearly any place where Hindus and Muslims
> lived in proximity.[163]

These and other communal riots, both prior to and especially after this period, played a

decisive role in the creation of Pakistan. Ultimately, as we shall see, Pakistan was not

created because Muslims in the subcontinent, who were in a minority, simply desired

their own territory. It was created because Muslims, largely as a result of their experience

during the communal riots that flared up with greater consistency beginning in the 1920s,

feared for their safety in what they worried would end up being a Hindu-dominated

independent India. If the British could not effectively protect them from what was

perceived as Hindu aggression during the 1920s and 1930s, how much worse would their

situation be following independence?

A number of things must be said about the nature and causes of these riots. First,

they are commonly described as communal riots, meaning riots between members of

distinct religious communities. While it is conceivable that riots that, superficially, appear

to be caused by religious differences, may have underlying political, economic or other

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[162] Jaffrelot, "Islamic Identity" 11.
[163] Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim* 72.

social causes, certain criteria, I argue, set communal conflicts apart from other types of public disturbances. For a conflict to be considered communal, it must be demonstrated that individual parties to the conflict participated at least in part because members of another faith community had offended their religious sensibilities or those of their coreligionists, or because they felt threatened by members of another faith community on account of their identity as members of a different faith community. In other words, the dominant narrative of the conflict must posit one of two things: either parties to the conflict participated primarily because they felt doing so would serve to protect the religious community to which they belonged, and consequently their religious sensibilities, to the extent these are tied to membership in a particular community, or because they thought participating might help redress wrongs committed against either the participant or members of the participant's community, such as discrimination in hiring or the provision of public goods—wrongs committed by a member of an identifiable religious community against a victim belonging to another religious community and committed primarily due to the victim's membership in a particular religious community (for example, a business refusing to serve a given potential customer solely because of his or her religious confession). For comparison, a conflict between social justice activists who happen to be Muslim and a mining company whose owners happen to be Hindu would not be considered a communal conflict, even if the Muslim social justice activists were inspired to act by religious teachings and even if the Hindu owners were inspired to defend their business interests by Hindu teachings.

But how then to determine membership in a religious community and the political significance of membership in a given religious community? Note that this question is

not asking what the political salience of religion, as a nebulous concept, is, but rather what the political significance of membership in a particular religious community is. Certainly, one's confession of faith, one's active participation in the life of a particular religious community, marks one as a member of that community. Yet members of religious communities can also be members of any number of other organizations, and presumably if the discrimination one faced as a member of a particular religious community was bad enough, one could relinquish his or her membership in one community and opt for membership in another that might afford him or her greater material, if not spiritual, benefits. How, then, can it be determined if people participating in a given public disturbance, riot or conflict are doing so as members of a particular religious community, as members of another organization, or for their own private, non-religious reasons (economic, political, social and so on)? Probably the easiest way to determine this is to see if participants in a given conflict are not only willing to perpetrate violence in the name of the religious community to which they belong, but are also willing to risk bodily injury and death in defense of their religious community. If a person is willing to both commit violence and risk bodily injury and death in the belief that he or she is somehow defending the religious community to which he or she belongs, then it is fair to say that that religious community takes priority, in the mind and heart of the person, over that person's physical existence. Membership in that community could thus easily be said to constitute that person's dominant identity, because he or she is willing to die for it. When a person is willing to take such risks in the belief that they are defending the faith to which they adhere, it is fair to say that their actions, because they risk leaving the individual in a worse physical condition than before he or she acted, are motivated

primarily by their membership in a particular religious community or, alternatively, their faith. Many of the disturbances, riots and conflicts in British India between Muslims and Hindus meet these criteria and can thus easily be labeled communal.

Most communal riots in India between Hindus and Muslims started because members of one religious community, in the process of practicing their faith, offended the religious sensibilities of members of another religious community. The occasional coincidence of various Muslim and Hindu religious festivals was a chief instigating factor in this. In a number of instances, the issue was Hindu processions featuring music passing by mosques during congregational prayers or during special religious celebrations. Worshippers at the mosques would begin verbally attacking Hindus and the violence would escalate from there. "In Calcutta in July 1926, for example," Thursby writes, "the solemnity of Muharram [annual commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussayn in Shia Islam on the tenth day of the month of Muharram in the Islamic calendar] was broken by Rath Jatra and Raj Rajeshwari processions of Hindus, and disturbances followed."[164] "At least 31 of the serious riots of the 1923–1928 era," Thursby continues, "were occasioned by the playing of music near a mosque."[165] On other occasions, the public sacrificial slaughter of cows by Muslims deeply offended Hindu religious sensibilities and sparked violence. Violence led to more violence as mutual distrust grew between Muslims and Hindus. Muslim and Hindu neighbors would sometimes refuse to have anything to do with one another and Muslims and Hindus, it seems, endeavored to patronize only those businesses operated by members of their respective religious communities. Compounding the problem, a number of Muslim and Hindu reform or

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[164] Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim* 74.
[165] Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim* 75.

revivalist organizations were especially active during this time. Two Hindu groups in particular, the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Mahasabha, are particularly noteworthy.

"The Calcutta riots of April-May and July 1926 which took more than 140 lives began," Thursby reports, "when a drummer in an Arya Samaj procession persisted in playing his instrument before a mosque at time of prayer."[166] A Hindu scholar named Swami Dayanand Saraswati (1824–1883) founded the Arya Samaj (Arayan Society, or Society of Nobles) in Bombay on 10 April 1875.[167] The Arya Samaj had two overarching aims when it first began, goals it continues to promote today: "transforming Hinduism into an Aryan religion" and "destroying commitment to false beliefs."[168]

The Arya Samaj is often described as a revivalist organization, in the sense of it 'reviving' old traditions. Perhaps it would be better, as E. Luther Copeland does, to call it a 'neo-Hindu' reform movement, as it not so much revived existing Hindu traditions, as offered a completely new interpretation of them in light of foreign influences and modern ways of thinking.[169] For instance, as Thursby points out, some of the Arya Samaj's beliefs are closer to Islam, in form if not content, than traditional Hinduism. For example, the Arya Samaj belief that there is and has only ever been one true religion (embodied in the Vedas) mirrors the Muslim belief that there has only ever been one true religion (Islam), which existed even prior to the revelation the Prophet Muhammad received. Also, the Arya Samaj belief in a single intelligent, omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient

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[166] Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim* 75.

[167] Francis Robinson, "Religious revival in modern times," *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives*, ed. Francis Robinson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 346.

[168] Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim* 10.

[169] E. Luther Copeland, "Neo-Hinduism and Secularism," *Journal of Church and State* 9 (1967): 200–10.

and merciful God who defies human description is almost identical to the Muslim belief in the absolute unicity of God (though the Arya Samaj has argued that the God described in the Qur'an is unworthy of worship).

In 1919, the Hindu Mahasabha (Hindu Assembly) was formed. It aimed to counter both the Muslim League and the perceived secularism of the National Congress by actively defending Hindu interests, whether political or religious.[170] It has been characterized as "an enlarged and more comprehensive edition of the Arya Samaj."[171] The Hindu Mahasabha and the Arya Samaj spearheaded two public campaigns in the early twentieth century that had a profound effect on relations between Muslims and Hindus in British India. The first was the *shuddhi* or conversion or reversion campaign, launched by Swami Shraddhanand of the Arya Samaj. It aimed to convert people, especially Muslims, to Hinduism. The original idea was that it would give former Hindus who had converted to another religion the opportunity to revert to Hinduism. In practice, however, it seems the *shuddhi* campaign also aimed at winning new converts to the faith. The Arya Samaj developed a special public ritual whereby a person could convert—or revert—to Hinduism by declaring their faith in the Arya Samaj's creed and its unique interpretation of Vedic philosophy. The process naturally involved renouncing one's former faith, which clearly had implications for a person's relationship with his or her family and friends. While most of the conversions seem to have been voluntary, there was clearly some amount of coercion in other cases.

This was not simply missionary activity, however, with the intent of saving souls.

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[170] Ayesha Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850* (New York: Routledge, 2000) 245, n. 167.
[171] Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim* 7.

Hinduism, as we have seen, is not a single, identifiable religious tradition in the same way Islam might be (at least at its most fundamental level, if not always in practice). As Francis Robinson writes, "There is no organized Hindu church, no recognized leader or leaders of Hinduism, no agreed set of scriptures and no shared doctrines. Thus to speak of Hinduism as a single religion is misleading."[172] Because of the fluid, ambiguous nature of Hinduism as a religion, there was no tradition of Hindu missionary activity[173]—or even any idea of what this might look like—until the advent of the Arya Samaj. What the Arya Samaj were primarily concerned with, it seems, was providing a way for Muslims and others who may have been Hindu at one time (or whose ancestors may have been Hindu at one time) to revert to Hinduism—an option that did not exist in Hinduism prior to that, since, not being a missionary tradition, there was no consistent way of conceiving of someone 'becoming' Hindu after having decided to 'be' something else. As people converted to Hinduism from Islam and other faiths, however, this naturally created division in a society where the professing of one's faith was usually a very public affair. Furthermore, the Arya Samaj's missionary activities naturally brought the group into direct conflict with Muslim groups that, because Islam has always been a missionary religion, had made it their mission to encourage people to adopt Islam as their way of life.

The second campaign launched by the Arya Samaj, with the support of the Hindu Mahasabha, was the *sangathan* movement, which aimed "to create a militant image and a new meaning of 'Hindu'."[174] The primary goal of this initiative was to train and embolden Hindus to defend their community. A variety of Muslim organizations and

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[172] Robinson, "Hinduism" 332.
[173] This is the conventional view. For a dissenting voice, see Arvind Sharma, "Ancient Hinduism as a Missionary Religion," *Numen* 39.2 (December 1992): 175–92.
[174] Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim* 7.

movements countered the *shuddhi* and *sangathan* programs with their own initiatives. In an effort to counter the *sangathan* movement, Saifuddin Kitchlew launched the *tanzim* movement in 1924.[175] The intent was to urge Muslims to participate more enthusiastically in the life of their community by, among other things, attending prayer more regularly and defending the interests Muslims in India. Owing to a lack of support, however, the movement did not last for very long. The Tablighi Jamaat (the Society or Party of Preaching or Call, as in calling someone to become Muslim) is probably the most significant Muslim grassroots organization to effectively counter the efforts of the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Mahasabha. A Sufi scholar named Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (1885–1944) founded Tablighi in Mewat near Delhi in 1926 and it remains active throughout the world today. For instance, Tablighi has an international network of teachers who give lectures on Islam throughout the world and the group regularly organizes large public gatherings. "The emergence of Tablighi Jamaat," Mumtaz Ahmad writes, was "a direct response to the rise of such aggressive proselytizing movements as the Shuddhi (Purification) and Sangathan (Consolidation)."[176] Tablighi's primary goal was, and remains, the spiritual uplift of the Muslim community, both in India and worldwide. To that end, and specifically in response to Hindu missionary activities in the last 1920, Tablighi sent people into various communities to educate Muslims about their religion and generally help strengthen Muslims in their faith so as to forestall conversions to Hinduism and to strengthen the Muslim community as a whole in the face of what was perceived as a Hindu onslaught.

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[175] Thursby, *Hindu-Muslim* 171.

[176] Mumtaz Ahmad, "Tablighi Jamaat," *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 4, ed. John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press) 165.

While the dynamics of relations between Muslims and Hindus in British India are certainly more complex than this, the foregoing should give some indication of the nature and extent of the issue and some knowledge of some of the key players and their activities. It is important to see how the development of relations between Hindus and Muslims in India progressed because they played a decisive role in the creation of Pakistan.

In November 1927, the British government dispatched seven members of parliament to India to investigate possibilities for new constitutional reforms. The Simon Commission, as this expedition was known, after its chairman, John Simon, met with opposition in India because not a single Indian was part of it and it was seen as just one more tool of the British imperialists to continue to deny Indians their freedom. In an effort to influence the Commission, Jinnah tried once more to "forge a common front between the League and the Congress." Once again, he failed, owing to divided factions within the Congress and the difficulty of bringing them on board, and the challenge of getting the Muslim majority provinces to support him. "The Congress," Jalal writes, "was committed to a strong unitary centre, while the Muslim provinces wanted a weak federal structure in which the provinces and not the centre would be the real bearers of power ... Unfortunately for Jinnah, the Congress dismissed his formula for a Hindu-Muslim settlement." [177] Jinnah, meanwhile, had no patience for provincial politics and intrigues; he wanted to strengthen the Muslim League's voice at the political centre, for fear Congress would otherwise end up dominating a strong centre, spelling ruin for the country's Muslims. Having failed to orchestrate a rapprochement between Congress and

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[177] Jalal, *Sole Spokesman* 10–11.

the League, Jinnah went to London to practice law.

In 1934, Jinnah returned to India at the request of Liaquat Ali Khan, a prominent member of the Muslim League from the United Provinces and a future prime minister of Pakistan, to help breathe new life into the League. This would prove to be a daunting task, however. "The League's popular appeal," Anita Inder Singh explains, "was negligible" at this time.[178] The moment of truth came during the 1937 elections, the first to be held under the newly minted constitution of British India, the Government of India Act of 1935. Unfortunately for Jinnah, the League fared miserably in these elections, capturing no more than five per cent of the Muslim vote, while the Congress successfully formed ministries in eight of eleven provinces. The main reason for the League's failure in these elections was its inability to organize effectively in Muslim majority provinces like Punjab and Bengal, or at all in Sind. Moreover, even in provinces like the United Provinces where Muslims were in a minority and where the League had traditionally enjoyed greater support, politicians were reluctant to lend their support to the League for a variety of reasons. "Ever since separate representation had been granted in 1909," Jalal writes, "Muslim politicians had little incentive to organize real parties, or indeed even to join parties, as a way of consolidating their hold over local constituencies." The League, therefore, "had little to offer Muslim politicians in the provinces."[179]

Of the provinces in which the League did organize to contest the elections, Punjab proved the "most elusive."[180] There, Fazl-i-Husain's Unionist alliance enjoyed widespread support among Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, making the League more or less

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[178] Anita Inder Singh, "The Origins of the Partition of India 1936–1947," *The Partition Omnibus* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002) 3.
[179] Jalal, *Sole Spokesman* 19–20.
[180] Jalal, *Sole Spokesman* 21.

irrelevant. In Sind, meanwhile, voters went to the polls without any League presence, "and this was a province where nearly seventy-two per cent of the population was Muslim."[181] It seems provincial interests took precedence over Jinnah's fear mongering about Hindu domination at the political centre if the League did not win a mandate to counter the Congress Party. Jinnah was a resilient politician, however, and it was only a matter of time before the League would make a startling comeback.

At first, Jinnah's attempts to gain popular support for the Muslim League after the elections failed spectacularly. His main tactic was to relentlessly accuse Congress ministries in the provinces of discrimination against Muslims. While there may have been some truth to some of these allegations, and while they certainly alienated Muslims from Congress, they did not have the desired effect of bringing the Muslims of India under the League's banner. Then, the Second World War broke out.

In 1942, at the height of the war, Britain dispatched Stafford Cripps, a minister in Prime Minister Winston Churchhill's war cabinet, to India with a mission to secure Indian support for the British war effort. Seeking to bring India's political leaders in both the Congress and the League onside as quickly as possible, he brought with him a draft declaration that "envisaged the granting of Dominion status to India, leaving the Dominion free to remain in or to secede from the Commonwealth."[182] Following elections to provincial legislatures after the war, Singh writes, the "Lower Houses would then act as a single electoral college and elect the constitution-making body by proportional representation. The constitution framed by it would be accepted by the British subject to the right of any province that was unwilling to accept the new

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[181] Jalal, *Sole Spokesman* 28.
[182] Singh, "Origins" 76.

constitution to secede from the Union." The British government, Cripps promised, would be willing to recognize any seceding provinces as separate dominions.[183] Thus the British were willing to countenance the partition of the subcontinent, and in effect the creation of Pakistan, even prior to formally relinquishing power. Furthermore, Cripps assured Jinnah and the Muslim League that, should less than 60 per cent of a given provincial legislature vote in favour of accession, the minority would have the right to call for a plebiscite to decide the issue. Thus the Cripps declaration went a long way toward satisfying the demand for a homeland for India's Muslims that had been voiced in the Muslim League's Lahore Resolution two years previously, and even allowed for the possibility that Pakistan might be created by a "simple majority vote in a plebiscite."[184] The plan did not encourage a rapprochement between the League and Congress, however, necessary to assure the British of Indian support for the war effort.

The British recognized the Muslim League as a leading Muslim organization in India at the time—even though it was difficult to gauge its actual popular support at this time—which is why they sought to win both Congress' and the League's support at once. In his speech to the Lahore session of the Muslim League in March 1940, Jinnah remarked that it was only after the outbreak of war that Britain "realised that the Muslim League was a power." Jinnah, astonishingly, attributes this apparently sudden realization to the League's name—the All-India Muslim League. "I want you to realise the value, the importance, the significance of organising ourselves," he stressed to his audience.[185] Then, on 13 July 1942, Congress launched the 'Quit India' movement, with a resolution

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[183] Singh, "Origins" 76.
[184] Singh, "Origins" 76.
[185] Jinnah, *Muslim League* 13.

that stated in no uncertain terms that Britain must grant India independence immediately. Jinnah argued that all Congress was trying to do was establish a 'Hindu Raj' in place of the British Raj. The Quit India resolution set off a flurry of agitations, communal and otherwise, leading eventually to massive civil disobedience, riots, public disturbances and so on. The British responded by throwing a number of Congress' most prominent leaders, including Gandhi and Nehru, in jail. The Muslim League made significant popular gains while Congress members were engaged in the Quit India movement and its leaders were in jail. The League's membership ballooned, likely as a result of Jinnah winning Muslims over with his claim that Congress aimed at nothing less than total Hindu domination of the entire subcontinent, even though Nehru insisted this was not true.

With the end of the war, Clement Attlee's Labour government sought to negotiate British withdrawal from India and the granting of full independence to what King George called his "Indian peoples."[186] The first task was to ascertain who best represented Indian opinion, to determine whom to hand power over to. Thus, from December 1945 to March 1946, a series of staggered general elections were held across the country. 41 million Indians, or about 10 per cent of the population, were eligible to vote. These were mostly affluent, educated Indians and landlords. "The purpose of the election was two fold," Khan writes: "to form provincial governments ... and so draw Indian politicians into the business of running the everyday functions of government ... and to create a central body that would start designing the future constitutional form of a free India."[187] What was meant as an election to determine the future shape of India as an independent state,

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[186] King George VI quoted in Khan, *Great Partition* 30.
[187] Khan, *Great Partition* 31.

however, Khan remarks, quickly turned into a plebiscite on the question of Pakistan.[188]

The League struggled to "build a Muslim consensus around the Pakistan demand and to win the strongest possible hand in the constitutional negotiations with the British," while the Congress sought to convince voters that it enjoyed near-universal support and "that the population was, therefore, anti-Pakistan."[189] The exaggerated, polarizing language used during the campaign might have been laughable, had the stakes not been so high. In one example, Congress leader Jawaharlal Nehru declared in front of a crowd estimated at 50,000 people, that in independent India, "everybody would be provided with sufficient food, education and all the facilities including a house to live," whereas Pakistan, he claimed, meant "slavery forever."[190] The Muslim League, meanwhile, continuously insisted that a vote for any other party would amount to a vote for the destruction of Islam itself in the subcontinent.

"Different Muslims hailed the League for their own localized, diverse and sometimes contradictory reasons," Khan writes. Sindhi nationalists, some authors suggest, may have seen in Pakistan the eventual possibility of an independent Sind. A number of Muslim scholars, meanwhile, rejected Pakistan because they "saw within it the seeds of the delimitation of Islam: the scope and project of Islam would, they felt, be boxed in within artificial national limits."[191]

Pakistan would not be easy, either, and it certainly did not enjoy universal support among Muslims. Punjab, for instance, contained two divisions, Ambala and Jullundur,

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[188] Khan, *Great Partition* 32.
[189] Khan, *Great Partition* 33.
[190] Jawaharlal Nehru quoted in Khan, *Great Partition* 33.
[191] Khan, *Great Partition* 35.

"in which not a single district had a Muslim majority."[192] "To force an undivided Punjab into Pakistan would bring Hindus and Sikhs into 'open rebellion'," Jalal writes, "So Pakistan necessarily would involve the partition of the Punjab. This 'would be a disaster'; 'if the Punjabis were faced with the alternatives of an Indian Union which included real safeguards for Muslims, or Pakistan with the partition of the province, they would', the Governor predicted, 'choose the former'."[193] In the end, they got the latter. Despite stiff opposition in some quarters, the Muslims of India overwhelmingly supported the League in the elections of 1945–46 and, consequently, Pakistan, even if they were a little unclear about exactly what Pakistan would look like or what it would be.

By the summer of 1946, however, with the failure of Congress and the League to reach agreement on the Cabinet Mission Plan, Jinnah became increasingly worried that neither the British nor Congress were taking the League's call for the creation of autonomous Muslim states in the subcontinent, as per the Lahore Resolution, seriously. So, at a meeting of Muslim League legislators in New Delhi on 27 July 1946, Jinnah and the legislators clarified their demand. The demand was no longer for the establishment of multiple, autonomous Muslim states, but for one thing only: Pakistan. To drive the point home, Jinnah called for a day of 'direct action', which Muslims throughout the country observed on 16 August 1946. Muslim businesses ground to a halt and Muslims refused to work. For a brief period, Jinnah had achieved a certain amount of Muslim unity of thought and action throughout the subcontinent. Soon, however, riots broke out and scores of people were killed or injured. Jinnah appealed for calm but to no avail and Congress and the British condemned the Day of Action.

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[192] Jalal, *Sole Spokesman* 133
[193] Jalal, *Sole Spokesman* 133

Iqbal's dream of the peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Hindus in a united India, with a view to the eventual erasure of national and communal divisions everywhere, may have simply been utopian, though in a practical sense it was not realized because Jinnah was forced by the Muslim League's weak showing in the 1936–37 elections, largely a result of the League's failure to gain the support of the Muslim-majority provinces, to adopt more polarizing, less nuanced religious language in the 1945–46 elections. In a sense, the League's rhetoric during this period degenerated into what Iqbal might call "low and ignoble" communalism. This exacerbated a volatile communal situation, with communal riots being a common occurrence throughout the country at this point. Having succeeded in the 1945–46 elections by running on a religious, pro-Pakistan, explicitly Islamic and, more to the point, anti-Hindu platform, it became politically untenable for Jinnah and the League to back down or offer any meaningful compromise with Congress. The combination of lack of trust between Congress and the League and Jinnah's desire for political survival at, it seems, almost any cost, led to underhanded tactics on both sides that exacerbated communal tensions, creating a deadly cycle of mistrust and recrimination between Muslims and Hindus. Pakistan at this crucial point seemed all but a foregone conclusion. With the failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan, Pakistan became a reality. Still, the violence persisted for several months after the creation of Pakistan, and there was an uneasy sense that no one really knew what Pakistan was or what it was ultimately supposed to be.

This chapter has shown how India did not exist as a single geopolitical entity at least until the Mughal period, and even then not to the same extent as under British rule. We saw how Hindu identity was constructed over time by interactions between the

indigenous inhabitants of the subcontinent—first the Persians, then the Greeks, the Muslims, and finally the British. We saw how relations between Muslims and Hindus developed during the British period and how they gave rise, or were at least instrumental, to the Pakistan Movement. Finally, we saw how the call for Pakistan was never clearly defined and why Iqbal's vision for the Muslims of India was not realized. In the next chapter, we examine how people may have originally conceived of Pakistan and the factors that ultimately frustrated their dreams and made Pakistan what it is today.

CHAPTER FIVE

A Space for Everyone and a Home for None

Originally, Pakistan consisted of two discontiguous geographic units over 1500 kilometers apart on opposite sides of the Indian subcontinent—physically larger, mountainous, wealthier and less populous West Pakistan, and low lying, poorer, more densely populated East Pakistan (the former British Indian province of East Bengal). Outside observers criticized this design as illogical and impractical. Many of those who had opposed the creation of Pakistan thought the new state would collapse within a few years and be absorbed by India. As Glenn V. Stephenson points out, Pakistan, with its eastern and western wings, "violated the principle of contiguity and introduced on the changing map of Asia a political spatial pattern unique in our time."[194] Pakistan's supporters, however, did not see this as an obstacle to nationhood, but rather, as Stephenson puts it, "a test of Muslim nationalism in which they were sure to triumph."[195] While the naysayers were wrong for the most part—Pakistan has survived in some form to the present day—in 1971, East Pakistan became Bangladesh.

Pakistan was meant to be a homeland—*watan* in Arabic, Persian and Urdu—for the Muslims of South Asia, who were defined, at least by Jinnah and the Muslim League, as a either a *quam* (community) or part of the larger Islamic nation (*ummah*). It ended up being a space where no one felt at home. Given the unprecedented violence of partition, however, it was not a simple matter to move back to India, in which Pakistan's new citizens would at any rate have been considered foreigners. After the initial excitement of

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[194] Glenn V. Stephenson, "Pakistan: Discontiguity and the Majority Problem," *Geographical Review* 58.2 (April 1968): 195.
[195] Stephenson, "Pakistan" 198.

independence from the British and the creation of Pakistan, just as people and families began to recover from the brutal violence of partition, massive confusion set in among ordinary Pakistanis and Indians, as well as the ruling elites of these two new states, about what the nature of Pakistan, as a state, would, should, or even could be. Was this not supposed to be an Islamic state of some kind? It became clear that not much prior thought had been given to how Pakistan would actually function as a state. Jalal, for one, argues that this was because the call for Pakistan was simply a ploy by Jinnah and the Muslim League to gain political support in India. For Jalal, the demand for 'Pakistan' was always exceedingly vague. "Jinnah avoided giving the demand a precise definition," she writes, "leaving the League's followers to make of it what they wished. A host of conflicting shapes and forms, most of them vague, were given to what remained little more than a catch-all, an undefined slogan."[196] Maybe, but that does not mean, as Jalal seems to assume, that people understood the call for Pakistan as a call for a modern territorial state. What did people really have in mind when they called for the creation of Pakistan? We may never know for sure, but there are strong indications it was not a modern state they had envisioned, at least as this concept is typically understood in the West. Pakistan was imagined as a *watan*, a homeland, as distinct from a *dawlat* (state) or *Islami dawlat* (Islamic state).[197] We might also translate *watan* as 'a place', as opposed to 'a space', a

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[196] Jalal, *Sole Spokesman* 4.

[197] Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty* 10–12, throughout. Ahmed explains that the Arabic terms *dawlat*, *riyasah*, and *hukumah*, usually translated as state, leadership, and government respectively, "do not exactly connote the concept of the modern state." "As a matter of fact," he continues, "in Islamic terminology, there is no term to describe appropriately, the state as a corporate person unifying in itself territory, community, government, and sovereignty." Be that as it may, distinguishing between the concepts of *watan*, here translated as either 'homeland' or 'place', and *dawlat*, as 'state' and 'territorial space', is sufficient for our discussion. See Ahmed, *Pakistan* 184–85.

crucial distinction, as this chapter illustrates, to understanding how people likely imagined Pakistan, and why the emergence of Pakistan as a modern territorial state engendered such confusion and eventually led to such inner tension and conflict.

Iqbal, as we saw in Chapter 2, was clearly not thinking of a modern territorial state when, in his speech to the Muslim League in 1930, he called for the amalgamation of the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan into a single state for Muslims, even though this speech is typically cited as the clearest articulation of the rationale behind the demand for Pakistan prior to the Lahore Resolution. Rather, Iqbal, despite his use of the world "state," dreamed only of a place within India where Muslims could order their lives according to the values and principles of Islam. His goal was to unite the Muslims of India, or at least Northwest India. To accomplish this, he called for the creation of a place, as distinct from a neutral space, in those regions of Northwest India where Muslims were already in a majority. This place would nonetheless remain an integral part of India. This place would uplift India's Muslims, help them overcome their differences, and strengthen them as a single, cohesive community—a *quam*. The point was not for Muslims to secede from India, but for them to be given space to cultivate their own sense of place within India. In fact, as we saw earlier, Iqbal said this would "intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling" toward India, that "possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of India, the North-West India Muslims [would] prove the best defenders of India."[198]

Establishing this place for Muslims within India would first require the identification of a specific space in India for this new place to develop. The region where

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[198] Iqbal, *Speeches* 12.

Muslims were a majority seemed logical. Iqbal hoped that Islam, as a "social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal," and as a "people-building force," would take root in this space, thus making all Muslims feel at home there. Note that Iqbal was not simply saying that Muslims, as a nation, needed their own geographic *space*, but rather that Muslims, as a community within India, needed their own *place* within India, though he did not use precisely this language. Iqbal held no illusions about the unity of Muslims in India at the time he spoke, however. Muslims, he conceded, were divided along a number of different lines. His mission was to uplift and unite Muslims. He thought the best way to do this would be to create a place for Muslims in India where they would feel at home and be free to develop their culture to the fullest extent. In turn, this would ennoble Muslims, helping them relate to members of other communities within India from a place of confidence and strength, thus honoring the higher aspects of communal feeling, as discussed in Chapter 2. Such an arrangement, Iqbal felt, would "eventually solve the problem of India as well as Asia."[199]

Indians, and indeed many Europeans prior to the advent of the modern state, traditionally conceived of geopolitical spatial organization in terms of places, not spaces. In early modern Europe, just as in India, the state remained remote to the "the mass of those living in the state territory," who "were merely populations to be counted and taxed within the territory."[200] While this is perhaps an oversimplification, it does seem that people derived a sense of meaning and belonging not so much from the state as an abstract political entity, but from the social relations they formed with one another in a given place—meaning a physical space filled with moral content. Iqbal's call for a

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[199] Iqbal, *Speeches* 12.
[200] Taylor, "Places, Spaces" 14.

separate Muslim place—a *watan* or homeland—within India would likely have resonated with at least some people in India who still thought in terms of cultivating a sense of place instead of simply securing space. While it is impossible to know for certain why a majority of Muslims in India supported the call for Pakistan so passionately beginning in the 1940s, it is reasonable to assume that many people, like Iqbal, did not conceive of Pakistan as a modern territorial state in the conventional sense, but rather as a *watan* or homeland in the way such concepts were traditionally understood.

Even when the concept of statehood was explicitly referred to in relation to the demand for Pakistan, it seems those referring to it did not understand it in the way it has come to be understood under the dominant discourse of the global state system, as discussed below. For instance, as I have already said, calls for Pakistan were commonly equated with calls for a Muslim homeland, which suggests a place rather than a simple space. Furthermore, the author of one pamphlet that was published and distributed a year prior to partition states that "The object should be to divide India not into political units which should either be in complete isolation from one another or in subordination to each other or to a common centre, but into states which should function in harmony or neighbourly co-operation."[201] It is likely that people thought such "states" could "function in harmony" with each other only because they did not conceive of them simply as geographic containers but also imagined that they would be imbued with a sense of place. The modern state system completely ignores the concept of place, however, as we shall see, making the call for the creation of a separate place, as distinct from a space, politically unintelligible. Thus, the demand for Pakistan was confined to a

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[201] Kazi Said-ud-Din Ahmad, "The Communal Pattern in India," *Case for Pakistan* 17–30.

demand for the creation of a separate, sovereign space—a modern, territorial state. In the end, Pakistan failed to live up to people's expectations that it would also be a special place where Muslims and others could feel at home.

The story of Pakistan is the story of the modern state system and Pakistan's elite architects failing the people who so desperately wanted to call Pakistan home. Pakistan, at most, has so far served only as a geographic container in which a number of mutually ill-adjusted communities dominated by parochial interests exist. This was not Iqbal's vision for Pakistan, as we have seen. In fact, recall from Chapter 2 that it is precisely what he says happened in Europe when Europe's statesmen forced people to accept the privatization of religion as an unquestionable dogma, and, I would argue, the corresponding desacralization and rationalization of the world, resulting in national systems of ethics and polity displacing the universal ethics of Jesus. In a similar fashion, the modern state system, which privileges the concept of neutral geographic space divided up into territorially contiguous, hermetically sealed containers of states, displaced the traditional place-based mode of sociopolitical organization in the subcontinent. This made it difficult for Indian Muslims to call simultaneously for independence from the British and the protection of Muslims within India through the creation of a separate Muslim place within the subcontinent without also calling for the creation of a modern territorial state. This is neither what Pakistan's leading intellectual architects, most notably Iqbal, nor the masses who supported the call for Pakistan, seem to have wanted.

To better understand the concept of place, we must understand what is meant by space, which requires that we understand the human practice of labeling things. This is because spaces are labeled by dominant actors while places are perpetually defined and

redefined through the interactions of all those in a given space. Space acquires its identity through labeling, while place acquires its meaning—its moral content—through experience and perspective. We also have to discuss the concept of space first because places require spaces to exist.

Humans have a tendency to label things, even those we do not fully understand. We quantify things whenever we think we can. By labeling and quantifying things, we take possession of them—always intellectually, sometimes physically. Labeling something is like putting it in an intellectual box; we assume the power to confer or deny meaning and identity to it. For example, as we saw in the previous chapter, people came to see and describe themselves as Hindus, Hindus in turn came to be seen as members of a single community, and Hinduism came to be known, or at least treated for all intents and purposes, as a single religious tradition, and thus the community of Hindus came to be seen as an explicitly religious community, at least partly because outsiders labeled certain people as Hindus, treated them collectively as Hindus, and labeled their philosophical and spiritual outlook, beliefs and practices as an identifiable religious tradition called Hinduism. While this does not mean those outsiders thereby literally possessed the physical bodies of these people called Hindus, in important respects this label helped determine the content of the personal identities of people known, at least to outsiders, as Hindus. This is not to deprive such people of agency, only to highlight the effect labels can have on a person's self-identification and thus the power people can assume over other people by labeling them. In a related example, as the third Aga Khan remarks in his memoirs, the fiction of a United India was purely a "result of British

conquest."[202] The British, as we saw in Chapter 3, labeled India as a single political whole, and it was therefore so. This constant labeling and quantifying lends an element of certainty to an otherwise unpredictable life, but it can also have far-reaching, unpredictable effects, as we shall see.

First out of a desire to discover new lands, acquire natural resources and wealth, and spread the Christian faith, and later influenced by Enlightenment rationalism and the notion of the neutrality of space that came with the desacralization of the world through modern science, Western explorers and scholars set out over five hundred years ago to label, quantify, map, and thus possess the entire world. Today, as a result of this European enterprise, humans have claimed every square centimeter of land on earth, through the concept of the modern, sovereign, territorial state—a concept of geopolitical spatial organization that evolved in Europe over centuries and was then brought to, or imposed on, the rest of the world through European colonialism and imperialism. Today, whether or not humans live in every part of a given territory, the world as we know it through our system of labels consists entirely of things called states, except parts of Antarctica, which humans have claimed by other means.

States are most readily identified on maps. They appear as neat, pictorial representations of supposedly neutral spaces—geographic containers—on earth. They have borders that are clearly drawn and names—labels—that allow us to quickly identify them and situate them in relation to each other. Such cartographic depictions of states surely do not capture the essence of the states they represent. For now, however, it is sufficient to recognize that most people see a bunch of individual states when they look at

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[202] Aga Khan III, *The Memoirs of Aga Khan: World Enough and Time* (London: Cassell, 1954) 297.

a map of the world and, apart from any actual experience or knowledge of or prejudice about those states on the part of the person looking at the map, they represent entirely neutral spaces. A quick glance at a political map of the world will also confirm that there are no gray areas between today's states; there is absolutely no part of the earth's dry land that is not either in and of itself considered a state or claimed by a state as part of its territory. There are certainly disputed territories, parts of which may be claimed by multiple states or at least one state and one other actor, and there may be designated autonomous regions within states, but there is no territory on earth that is not ultimately claimed by some state. Except in the case of disputed territories and autonomous regions, where the situation is more complicated, the overriding principle of international law is that states are sovereign geopolitical entities, meaning that what goes on within their borders is entirely the prerogative of the individual states themselves and no state has the right to interfere in the 'internal' affairs of another state (hold onto this idea that states are not necessarily the same things as the borders used to represent them on a map, as this will be important for our discussion on theories of the state later in this chapter). States are thus conceived, in part, as very nearly hermetically sealed geographic and geopolitical containers. But that is clearly not all, or even what, they are, as we shall see.

There are great benefits to this system of global geopolitical organization. As I remarked at the beginning of this chapter, labels help us make sense of things. States, acting as single, presumably rational units (however 'rational' may be defined), and relating to each other as such, lend an element of predictability, however artificial or minimal, to global politics. Furthermore, all people on earth are theoretically entitled to be, and most people are, legal citizens of at least one state, with all the attendant benefits,

responsibilities, and limitations of citizenship. Citizenship, which relies on the concept of the state, facilitates the quick political and legal identification—labeling—and organization of most, if not all, people in the world.

States, as individual geographic units—spaces—either succeed or fail (which can mean all manner of things), but regardless of whether they succeed or fail, they continue to exist. How could it be otherwise, when it is now assumed to be impossible for any square centimeter of land on earth not to be part of 'state space', and when the borders of a given state are not determined by that state alone but are always either the product of a high-stakes balancing act with all of its neighbor states, or imposed on the state by a former colonial or imperial power or some other dominant power? Once these borders are fixed, however, they are, in practice, recognized by most other states. Failed states put the lie to the placid, neutral spaces states occupy on our maps. Like Jean Baudrillard's inversion of Jorge Luis Borges' fable of the mapmakers who drew a map that was as large as the territory it represented and which disintegrated when the actual territory fell into ruin, today, as Baudrillard puts it, it is "the map that precedes the territory."[203] Even as the actual territory falls into ruin, we take the pristine map to be more real than reality. In this Baudrillardian sense, the use of the concept of failed states (as opposed to corrupt governments, or simply lands in chaos) suggests a stubborn insistence that, no matter how meaningless the labels we apply to spaces may be, they are always more real than reality itself. Labels make sense of an otherwise senseless world. Let us now consider how this applies to Pakistan.

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[203] Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacres et simulation* (Paris: Galilée, 1995) 10. Author's translation. Ultimately, Baudrillard discounts the fable and his inversion of it for his own philosophical reasons. This does not concern us here.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are parts of the territory of the state of Pakistan, whose borders are drawn with such precision on your favorite map, which the central government of Pakistan cannot enforce its writ in. These regions are nonetheless considered part of the Pakistani state; the Pakistani state has simply failed to exert control over them. But what, exactly, has the Pakistani state failed to exert total control over? The Pakistani state? That would be nonsensical. What about territory *belonging* to the Pakistani state? But then in what sense does territory the Pakistani government or regime cannot effectively govern *belong* to the Pakistani state? It seems the only way it can is through the system of cartographic labeling we have developed and which we subsequently force every square centimeter of the earth's dry land to conform to! And therein lies the fundamental flaw with this system of understanding the geopolitical organization of the world in terms of reified states, at least insofar as states are considered geographic containers or spaces drawn on a map. This system forces every piece of land on earth to be part of a state, even if the situation on the ground renders such an understanding meaningless. In some sense, perhaps it would be better to talk about the system of territorial states failing people as opposed to 'failed states', as such, though this discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. Matters are not helped by the fact that we do not yet have a clear conception of what a state actually is—arguably the most important political concept in the world today. Yet we know one thing for certain, if only because we have convinced ourselves of this: the world is made up of nothing but states.

Before we proceed to our discussion of theories of the modern state in relation to the creation of Pakistan, we have to finish our discussion of the distinction between the concepts of space and place. Space, as we saw, is a neutral container. Traditionally, as we

also saw, people in the Indian subcontinent derived meaning, identity and a sense of belonging largely from the social networks in the places—the communities—they lived in, not the broader geographic territory or spaces in which those communities were situated (whether the Sindhu River area, Hind, Decca, or India; whether territory ruled by the Mughals, the British, or some other dynasty). This was probably true for most traditional societies, and may well still be true in many societies throughout the world. But what does this mean? How is a place different from a space? The essential difference is that a space is a physical container, like an empty room or a territory demarcated by borders on a map. To the extent people in this space cohere, are intimately connected to each other through bonds of trust, shared cultural attitudes, familial relations, and so on, it is transformed into a place. Places, John A. Agnew writes, "are made out of human practices."[204] "Place," he continues, "refers to discrete if 'elastic' areas in which settings for the constitution of social relations are located and with which people can identify."[205] People become attached to places, not spaces. Places are often localized, though some people may experience the entire world as a place. To the extent a number of similar individual places are "interconnected and contiguous," Agnew writes, "one can refer to a 'region' of places ... In that situation the sense of place can be *projected* onto the region or a 'nation' and give rise to regionalism or nationalism. The sense of place need not be restricted to the scale of the locality."[206] This is what Taylor means by the transformation of space into place in the modern nation-state, as we shall see in the following section. Ultimately, the distinction between place and space is subjective, but this does not mean

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[204] John A. Agnew, *Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987) 2.
[205] Agnew, *Place* 28.
[206] Agnew, *Place* 28.

it is unimportant.

"Muslim identities in India," David Gilmartin writes, "were almost always embedded in a range of particular social and political orders."[207] In other words, they were place-dependent. "If Islam shaped notions of legitimate moral order," Gilmartin continues, "it did so in relation to local configurations of power and community, configurations in which distinctions of status, hierarchy, and interest among Muslims were critical, and in which Hindus and Muslims were sometimes intimately joined."[208] Places, not spaces, sustain the "local configurations of power and community" that are necessary for social cohesion and for a person to acquire a sense of belonging in a given space, thus making that space a true place for that person. Paradoxically, however, as we saw in the introduction, these very same "local configurations of power and community" that create a sense of place are the product of a shared attitude among a space's inhabitants that that space constitutes their mutual home, and thus that it is more than an abstract space, a mere container, but rather a place.

The world of 1947 was very different from the world of the early 1600s when the British East India Company made its first forays into the Indian subcontinent. In the seventeenth century, humans had not yet succeeded in so thoroughly assuming dominion over the entire earth and all its non-human contents as they had by the middle of the twentieth century. In the 1600s, different peoples in different parts of the world employed all manner of concepts to organize their communities and understand their place within them. Vast areas were uninhabited and consequently remained unclaimed. Today, the concept of *terra nullus*, used in the past to justify claiming supposedly vacant, unclaimed

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[207] Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan" 1073.
[208] Gilmartin, "Partition, Pakistan" 1073.

territory on behalf of a particular political power, is, for practical political purposes, meaningless. At the beginning of the twentieth century, one concept alone emerged as the dominant way of conceiving of the geopolitical organization of the world—the modern state system. While this may be changing in the twenty-first century as a consequence of globalization, the modern state system remains for now the most common way of perceiving global political organization, and in 1947 it was practically the only way.

"States impose spaces on places," Peter J. Taylor writes.[209] "The places being collected together or divided by the boundaries drawn by state élites are locations in which material life is reproduced in the everyday routined [sic] behaviour."[210] While spaces, Taylor continues,

> are the outcome of top-down political processes[,] places can be the site for bottom-up opposition. But the world is not this simple; the political processes do not stop there. Although initially imposed, boundaries can themselves become familiar, become embedded in society and have their own effects on the reproduction of material life. In this way what were spaces are converted into places. The most important such space–place conversion ... is the nation-state. ... By combining state and nation in nation-state, sovereign territory has been merged with sacred homeland to convert a space into the place. ... Modern states are so powerful because they have become constructed as places out of spaces.[211]

Taylor describes the process whereby the space occupied by a state is transformed into a place as a process of "filling the container"; he reverses the nation–state equation. It is not the filling of a space with members of a single nation that creates the nation-state. Rather, the networks that form under the aegis of a single state in a demarcated territory—networks that may or may not be derived from a number of the criteria that people have attempted to use to identify a nation, such as religion or culture—transform a state into a nation-state. The "state-as-place"—the nation-state—Taylor argues, is an

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[209] Taylor, "Places, Spaces" 14.
[210] Taylor, "Places, Spaces" 14.
[211] Taylor, "Places, Spaces" 14.

"enabling state," where people are able to form bonds that last and where they are free to develop in community with others. Yet, Taylor warns, "a container can also act as a cage." Attempts by states to impose a unified sense of place on the mass of territory they claim as theirs often come at the "expense of existing subnational places."[212] It seems that Pakistan, for too many of its inhabitants, is more cage-like than place-like, more disabling than enabling. Consequently, Pakistan has not succeeded in becoming a place, remaining instead a space in which a number of "subnational places" exist in perpetual tension with or outright hostility toward one another.

"Pakistan's future," Teresita C. Shaffer argues, depends on the state's ability "to hold its own against the double menace of violent extremism and institutional atrophy."[213] But what is the Pakistani state, exactly? Is it synonymous with the government?[214] The military? Borders on a map? The dominant legal system?[215] The people who administer the dominant legal system or represent the government? Specific political institutions? Territory the government claims, even though it cannot effectively

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[212] Taylor, "Places, Spaces" 14.

[213] Teresita C. Shaffer, "Pakistan: Transition to What?" *Survival* 50.1 (2008): 9.

[214] Conflating 'state' and 'government' is highly problematic, as we shall see. For instance, the Holy See, which is the government of the Roman Catholic Church, but not Vatican City State, the sovereign enclave in Italy that serves as the temporal seat of both the Holy See and the Church, is a United Nations Nonmember State Permanent Observer. As such, the UN has conferred the status of 'state'—and the Holy See has presumably claimed this status for itself—on a governing body that does not depend on geographic territory for its existence. In the absence of Vatican City State or any other politically independent (sovereign) geographic and thus temporal seat, the Holy See would continue to exist and, because its status as a state observer in the UN is not predicated on its enjoyment of a politically independent, temporal home, would, ceteris paribus, still be considered a state. I discuss these and related issues at length in an as yet unpublished paper ("The Catholic Fact: Examining the Status and Role of the Holy See in the United Nations and International Affairs as a Means of Reevaluating the Place of Nongovernmental Organizations in the International System").

[215] Certain regions of Pakistani territory, notably parts of the tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan, are generally considered ungovernable—meaning that the central Pakistani government's writ is essentially meaningless in these regions. These regions are not necessarily therefore lawless, however. Rather, indigenous, tribal legal systems prevail in these regions.

govern parts of it and even though other states claim some of it as theirs? Some combination of these things? Since this thesis claims that Pakistan was not originally intended to be a modern state in the conventional sense, yet ended up becoming one, we ought to know what Pakistan did, in fact, become. What is a state?

Francis Fukuyama claims somewhat implausibly that the "state is an ancient human institution dating back some 10,000 years."[216] This is only true in the loosest sense of the word. Indeed, Fukuyama at least implicitly makes a distinction between 'states' and 'modern states', though he does not spend any time explaining the difference and soon ends up referring to 'modern states' simply as 'states'. 'Modern states' are, Fukuyama acknowledges, a new phenomenon—they have not been with us for time immemorial. As he writes, "They did not exist at all in large parts of the world like sub-Saharan Africa before European colonialism."[217] Fukuyama adopts Max Weber's definition of statehood. According to Weber, a state is "a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory."[218] Based on this, according to Fukuyama, "The essence of stateness is ... *enforcement*: the ultimate ability to send someone with a uniform and a gun to force people to comply with the state's laws."[219]

If we unpack Weber's definition and Fukuyama's paraphrase, we see that it identifies *what* Weber, and presumably Fukuyama, consider a state to be (a human community); *where* a state can—indeed, must—be realized (within a given territory);

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[216] Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004) 1.
[217] Fukuyama, *State-Building* 2.
[218] Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), quoted in Fukuyama, *State-Building* 6.
[219] Fukuyama, *State-Building* 6.

what a human community, acting as a state, must *do* to exert its will as a state within a given territory (use physical force to get people to comply with its wishes—people who are presumably separate and apart from the community of people that constitutes the state but who nonetheless live in the territory governed by the community of people that constitutes the state); and *why* this use of physical force does not simply mark the community of people claiming to be a state as a group of violent, psychopathic thugs (they are the only ones within the territory that can *legitimately* resort to violence for political ends—presumably the uniform in Fukuyama's paraphrase symbolizes this legitimacy). Thus, a state is not simply territory or lines on a map. A state is not a set of institutions. A state is not just the military, though the military may either be part of or a tool of the state. A state, in essence, is a group of people who govern a given territory.

But if a state is a group of people who govern a given territory, does that mean 'state' is synonymous with 'government'? It would appear so. But then what happens when these people die? Does the new group of people who take over constitute a new state? And what if, for whatever reason, the borders of the territory this group of people govern change? Does this make any difference? Finally, what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate force? If the use of force by the group of people who constitute the state comes to be deemed illegitimate (who deems it illegitimate is, of course, another important question), does the state thereby no longer exist? If yes, what should we call the new, non-state entity? What is its (new) place in the world? If no, what is the meaning of the proviso that the force exercised by the state be legitimate? Weber's is evidently a problematic definition of statehood. But can we do better?

International lawyers and legal scholars continue to wrestle with the definition of

statehood.[220] "In fact," Thomas D. Grant claims, "international legal sources provide no satisfactory definition of 'state'."[221] The problem, Grant argues, is due partly to the fact that "'state' is a term, the content of which depends a great deal on context. Use of the term is historically contingent, with criteria for statehood varying over time. Accordingly, codifying statehood has proven fraught with difficulty."[222] Be that as it may, we live in a world of states. International relations scholarship—nomenclatural concerns aside— focuses largely on relations among states. With states being the dominant global actors today, it behooves us to know what they are—and what they are not.

The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933 contains the most commonly cited, authoritative legal definition of 'state'. According to Article 1 of the Convention, a state, as a legal person in international law, "*should* possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states."[223] Two questions immediately arise: what, exactly, possesses these characteristics and is consequently labeled a state (besides 'the state' itself, in which case the definition would amount to a tautology), and what does "should" mean? A close reading of this definition suggests that a state is most likely *a given, defined territory* (not a human community, as in Weber's definition). It could also be "a permanent population" or a "government," but both of these things occupy space and thus need at least some territory to call their own. This

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[220] Thomas D. Grant, "Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents." *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 37.2 (1999): 403–57.

[221] Grant, "Defining Statehood" 408.

[222] Grant, "Defining Statehood" 408.

[223] *Convention on Rights and Duties of States (inter-American)*, signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, 26 December 1933, 26 June 2008 <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/interam/intam03. htm>. Article 1. Emphasis added.

territory, in turn, "should" possess a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (though presumably it is not the territory itself that has this capacity, but more likely the government). Thus a state is not simply territory, though a state cannot exist, one assumes, in the absence of territory. For a given territory to be a state, by this definition, it presumably must possess at least one of the other criteria mentioned: a permanent population, a government, or the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Whether or not a given territory must possess all of these things is unclear, however. For one thing, Article 3 of the Convention stipulates that the "political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states."[224] Thus presumably a state's existence does not depend, after all, on its ability to enter into relations with other states, since this would require recognition by other states. Yet the definition given in Article 1 does not refer to a state's *ability*, but rather its *capacity* to enter into such relations. Might it be conceivable for a state to possess the *capacity* to enter into such relations yet, for a number of possible reasons, lack the *ability* to realize this capacity? Maybe, though such a discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Some elements of the Montevideo definition are easily accepted. States are almost universally understood to be confined to, or have some specific relationship with, a given geographic territory. More problematic is the Convention's insistence on the state possessing a government and the requirement that a state have the capacity to enter into relations with other states. What makes a government? What makes for a state's capacity to enter into relations with other states? Some critics, Grant points out, argue that

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[224] *Convention on Rights and Duties of States (inter-American).*

capacity is a consequence of, not a criterion for, statehood.[225] Others contend that territory is not essential to statehood once a state has been firmly established. Referring to civil strife in Somalia, Grant argues that it "appears to be the case that once an entity has established itself in international society as a state, it does not lose statehood by losing its territory or effective control over that territory."[226] Recall our earlier discussion of how, once a state's borders are drawn, we normally insist on it continued existence, regardless of the situation on the ground. Without providing an exhaustive list of criticisms of the Montevideo Convention's definition of statehood, there are clearly a number of problems with this definition as well. Does anyone know what a state, in fact, is?

David Copp tackles the question of state legitimacy and, in the process, the definition of the state, head on. First, he defines the state as "the system of animated institutions that govern the territory and its residents and enforce the legal system and carry out the programs of government. A state corresponds to the legal system that is in force in a territory."[227] Here, a state is a system, not a community. It is a system of "animated institutions," which accounts for the human element in statehood. An animated institution, Copp explains, "is an institution or system of offices and roles together with the people who occupy these offices and roles during the times they do so. An animated institution is a flesh-and-blood thing with which we could have a disagreement or to which we could feel a sense of loyalty."[228] Deconstructing Copp's definition, a state is not a community of people, as with Weber, though people are a necessary ingredient in any state. Neither is a state simply a given territory, nor is the state synonymous with the

[225] Grant, "Defining Statehood" 434.
[226] Grant, "Defining Statehood" 435.
[227] Copp, "Idea of a Legitimate State" 7–8.
[228] Copp, "Idea of a Legitimate State" 6–7.

government of a given territory. A state is a legal system administered and enforced by people through a set of established institutions that, even though the people who animate them may change, themselves remain more or less the same.

After defining statehood in this way, Copp wants to know what makes a state legitimate. This is an important question in the context of our discussion about Pakistan, since some people, especially those who argue Pakistan was supposed to be an Islamic state, argue that Pakistan is illegitimate because it has failed to live up to at least their expectations. Of course, in a world of states, what does it matter if a state is illegitimate? Would it not be still a state? "Imagine," Copp asks us,

> that a drug-smuggling cartel organizes a coup and overthrows the democratically elected government of Exemplar. It establishes a dictatorship under a new constitution with the leading members of the cartel in the key political positions. ... The cartel has created a rogue state, and we want to say that this state is not 'legitimate'. What would we mean by this and why would we want to say it?[229]

The desire to declare the drug-cartel's actions illegitimate obviously stems from a normative position that might does not make right. Yet why, exactly, does the evident ability of the cartel to overthrow and replace the state not give them this right? Answering this requires a theory of state legitimacy.

Legitimacy, for Copp, is a property of states, which are distinguished both from the territories and the people they govern.[230] By legitimacy, Copp means a state's right to rule. This right, for Copp, is a *"bundle* of Holfeldian rights,"[231] after Wesley Newcomb Holfeld, including the right to command persons, the right to control territory, and the right to noninterference. Copp concludes that the legitimacy of a state consists

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[229] Copp, "Idea of a Legitimate State" 3.
[230] Copp, "Idea of a Legitimate State" 10.
[231] Copp, "Idea of a Legitimate State" 18. Original emphasis.

in its having roughly the following cluster of Holfeldian 'advantages': (1) a sphere within which it has a privilege to enact and enforce laws applying to the residents of its territory; (2) a power to put people residing in its territory under a *pro tanto* [to a reasonable extent] duty to do something simply by enacting a law that requires them to do that thing, provided that the law falls within its sphere of privilege and is otherwise morally innocent; (3) a privilege to control access to its territory by people who are not residents and have no moral claim to live or travel there; (4) a claim against other states that they not interfere with its governing its territory; (5) an immunity to having any of these rights extinguished by any action of any other state or person.[232]

A state is legitimate to the extent it enjoys these rights or advantages, which in turn, according to Copp, require that a state behave in a manner that benefits the society as a whole.[233] This is based on Copp's 'society-centered theory of moral justification', which postulates that (a) we live, and indeed need to live, in societies; (b) shared standards among members of society facilitate better cooperation and coordination; and (c) such standards and corresponding moral judgments are justified to the extent they "actually function as well as can be and make things go well in society."[234] Copp justifies the state and presumes that all currently existing states, no matter how unjust, are at least legitimate, on the basis of this theory.[235] For Copp, "a society that is organized into a state, or that is at least included in a state, will tend to do better at satisfying its basic needs than it otherwise could expect to do. ... To think that societies could do better at meeting their needs in the absence of states, one would have to think that societies could do better in the absence of law."[236] Thus, Copp concludes there are no illegitimate states, merely unjust ones! Yet Copp makes an assumption here that is not true for all states, certainly not Pakistan.

[232] Copp, "Idea of a Legitimate State" 27–8.
[233] Copp, "Idea of a Legitimate State" 40.
[234] Copp, "Idea of a Legitimate State" 36–7.
[235] Copp, "Idea of a Legitimate State" 43.
[236] Copp, "Idea of a Legitimate State" 39.

Copp assumes that all people living within the borders of a given state constitute a single society, presumably by virtue of the fact that they live under the jurisdiction of a single state. But what is a 'society'? Is it the same as a 'community'? A 'nation'? Copp is unclear on this, but it is important. In fact, Copp appears to be assuming that all states—which according to him are legitimate because it is only through states that societies come to be organized and that societies, in the absence of states, would be worse off—have successfully made the transition, perhaps simply by virtue of their existence, from space to place, as outlined above. Pakistan, and no doubt many other states as well, have not yet made this transition. Pakistan, as mentioned earlier, lacks social cohesion and consists not of a single society that can be easily identified, but rather a hodgepodge of different, mutually ill-adjusted societies and communities (though in certain areas and among certain people evidence can be found for a superficial sense of what might be called Pakistani society). Is Copp really saying that the reified state of Pakistan is really the best arrangement for the people and communities that exist within this territory? Probably not, though unfortunately, because he assumes that all states are legitimate, he does not push his argument further and ask the next logical questions: what does it mean for a state to be illegitimate and what are the consequences of state illegitimacy? Certainly, part of the answer is that a sense of illegitimacy will most likely lead to people within, and perhaps without, a state to attempt to legitimize the state, lest it break apart. In the next chapter, we examine how various actors, grappling with the legacy of partition and the creation of Pakistan as a rather ambiguous state, have sought, usually unsuccessfully, to legitimize the Pakistani state and thus bring some semblance of order and, dare we say, 'placeness', to this troubled land.

CHAPTER SIX

An Empty Land Has No Shadow

"Since the country's inception," Haqqani writes, "Pakistan's leaders have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan's identity."[237] "More than half a century after its creation," Jaffrelot asserts, "Pakistan is still searching for its identity, as if Partition, instead of solving the problem of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, had generated new ones."[238] The Pakistani government, Jalal argues, has, since partition, attempted "an improbable array of conjuring tricks, and some somersaults on the tightrope of historical memory as well,"[239] in an as yet unsuccessful effort to cultivate a coherent, shared sense of national community in Pakistan, or what she calls a "collective ethos as a nation-state."[240] Pakistan, I have been arguing, was forced to be something most of its supporters and its leading advocates did not envision at first—a modern territorial state—even if they sometimes used the language of statehood to refer to it. It was only after it became apparent that calls for an autonomous Muslim homeland within India, as distinct from a modern territorial state, were politically unintelligible in a world of states that the demand for Pakistan morphed into a demand for a modern state. Since then, Pakistan's rulers, in an effort to legitimate their rule, have struggled to define what Pakistan is—hence Pakistan's search for identity. But what does this mean, exactly?

Pakistan may be an ideological state whose ideology has failed, as Bahl puts it,

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[237] Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005) 2.
[238] Jaffrelot, "Nationalism without a Nation: Pakistan Searching for its Identity," *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* 7
[239] Ayesha Jalal, "Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27.1 (February 1995): 74.
[240] Jalal, "Conjuring Pakistan" 87.

but without a unifying ideology, what is its purpose? What is Pakistan, besides a container, a space? This is what is meant by Pakistan's search for identity. The inability to coherently answer these questions has led to recurrent bouts of instability and violence throughout Pakistan's short history as the country's various rulers and a seemingly endless supply of internal and external opposition groups have vied to either cultivate a sense of place, and consequently national unity, within Pakistan's borders, or, in the case of not a few pan-Islamist organizations, displace the foreign notion of the territorial state in the subcontinent entirely.[241] Gallons of ink have already been spilled discussing the issues at stake. One thing is clear: when it comes to Pakistan, the state cannot be taken for granted, as many analyses seem to. This chapter highlights how and why successive Pakistani governments, and especially the military, have attempted to use Islamic ideology to hold the country together and legitimate their rule. It relates such policies to the challenges Pakistan faced at its birth and the nature of its creation as a modern territorial state. Finally, it discusses the consequences of such policies and the types of criticisms and responses they have exposed the government to and considers why, given the nature of Pakistan's creation, ideology remains such a prominent concern in the discourse on Pakistani politics.

Since Pakistan's inception, its rulers, whether civilian or military, have attempted to cultivate a sense of national community, and consequently of place, within Pakistan's borders, from the top down, and thereby legitimate their rule by appealing to the notions

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[241] For the vision a prominent global Islamic organization has for Pakistan, see *Pakistan: New Leadership, New System*, Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain – The Liberation Party, 20 December 2007. 1 August 2008 <http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/pdfs/PakistanNewLeadershipNewSystem_final version.pdf>. See also the website for the political party Jamaat-i Islami, 30 July 2008 <http://www.jamaat.org>.

of homeland that originally inspired people to support Pakistan. To this end, they have all sought, in one way or another, to square the non-territorial Muslim nationalism said to have justified, if not necessitated, the creation of Pakistan, with the concept of the modern territorial state. They have done so because no other ideology or argument was ever consistently used to justify the creation of Pakistan and because of the fear that, in the absence of a unifying ideology, Pakistan will remain fragmented and the authority structure—in the sense of who possesses the authority, not simply the ability, to rule, and how and through what institutions they wield that authority—in the country will remain unstable—that Pakistan will remain a neutral container of mutually ill-adjusted communities whose differences are all but impossible to manage, as discussed in the previous chapter. So far, this strategy has failed; Pakistan remains fragmented and the authority structure remains unstable. Moreover, the country continues to be mired in poverty and has recently been described by one commentator as "the most dangerous country in the world today."[242]

Most of Pakistan's rulers have asserted that they will rule Pakistan according to Islamic principles and that Pakistan is, after all, a Muslim country. For example, the 1949 Objectives Resolution, adopted during Liaquat Ali Khan's tenure as prime minister from 1947 to 1951, affirmed that "sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah" and established that Pakistan would be a state "Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, *as enunciated by Islam*" would "be fully observed."[243] In November 1953, Pakistan was officially declared an 'Islamic Republic'.

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[242] Bruce Riedel, "Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science* 618 (July 2008): 31.
[243] Quoted in Haqqani, *Pakistan* 16. Emphasis added.

Then, in 1965, President Ayub Khan, Lawrence Ziring writes, characterized Pakistan in a speech as "an ideological state founded and nourished on Islamic tenets."[244] Also under Ayub Khan, the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology (later the Council of Islamic Ideology) was established for the purpose of advising the central and provincial governments on "means of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam" and to ensure that no law is "repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah."[245] Many have affirmed that the sole basis for Pakistan's existence is the need for a Muslim homeland in South Asia and that the two-nations theory remains true. For instance, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's prime minister from 1971 to 1977, stated in 1969, referring to Kashmir, that, "If a Muslim majority [meaning a Muslim majority state] can remain a party of India, the raison d'etre [sic] of Pakistan collapses"[246] (the fact that more Muslims live in neighboring India than nearly the total population of Pakistan, combined with Bhutto's statement, suggests there is no reason for Pakistan to exist, and yet it does). A number have made concessions, however symbolic, to Islamist[247] political parties, such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's decision as prime minister to declare members of the Ahmadi sect, who claim to be Muslims, a non-Muslim

[244] Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958–1969* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1971) 28.
[245] *Pakistan Constitution, 1962*, Part X, Islamic Institutions, Chapter 1: Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology, 30 July 2008 <http://www.cii.gov.pk/docs/con1962.pdf>.
[246] Zulfikar Ali Bhuto, *The Myth of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) 180, quoted in Bahl, *Jinnah to Jihad* 41.
[247] 'Islamism', and the corresponding 'Islamist', is used in a neutral, descriptive sense in this thesis. It means a political ideology informed by Islam, as distinct from Islam itself. For an illuminating discussion of the concept of 'Islamism', see Mehdi Mozaffari, "What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8.1 (March 2007): 17–33.

minority.[248] Also under Bhutto, who promulgated Pakistan's third constitution in 1973, Islam was declared the state religion of Pakistan—perhaps a strange move for someone often described as a secularist, but presumably one he felt necessary to appease the Islamist opposition parties, whose de facto support he relied on in part to legitimate his rule. Some, notably Zia ul-Haqq, have enacted legislation ostensibly derived from Islamic teachings and certainly designed to prove the ruler's Islamic credentials, such as the 1979 Hudood Ordinance or the 1980 Zakat and Ushr Ordinance. Ironically, monies collected through the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (a 2.5 per cent tax deducted directly from the savings accounts and investment holdings of Sunni Muslims) support religious organizations that can be highly critical of the Pakistani government and, in some instances, are as critical of the very notion of the modern, sovereign, territorial state.

Not every ruler has felt the same pressure or been as keen to emphasize the role of Islam in creating a sense of national unity in Pakistan. For instance, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and later his daughter, Benazir Bhutto, attempted to win popular support and bring Pakistanis together through socialist policies (or what he called 'Islamic Socialism') or other policies designed to increase the material wellbeing of ordinary Pakistanis. Such promises amounted to little, however, with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto being deposed and then executed and Benazir Bhutto being accused of corruption, all while millions of Pakistanis continued to live in poverty. Pervez Musharraf, who assumed the presidency in a military coup d'état in 1999, sought to legitimate his rule not by appealing to religious sentiments

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[248] Relations between Ahmadis, who deny the mainstream Islamic doctrine that Muhammad was the final prophet but who nonetheless consider themselves Muslim, and (other) Muslims, have always been tense. Violent riots against the Ahmadi movement began in Pakistan in the early 1950s and sporadic violence against Ahmadis has occurred since. For more information on Ahmadis in Pakistan, see Antonio R. Gualtieri, *Conscience and Coercion: Ahmadi Muslims and Orthodoxy in Pakistan* (Montreal, QC: Guernica, 1989).

but to the more immediate need, at least according to him, for order and stability in the country (of course the army, of which he was chief at the time, is reported to be heavily influenced by Islamist thinking, and at any rate the military has almost always framed its takeovers, at least at first, as attempts to restore order. This is discussed in more detail below). Despite this, Musharraf was ultimately forced, however grudgingly, to make a deal, albeit short-lived, with the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) or United Council of Action, a six-member coalition of Islamic parties, in exchange for their support in passing the 17th amendment to the constitution in 2003, retroactively legalizing Musharraf's coup, among other things. Musharraf, recognizing the importance of Islam to Pakistan and also in response to the perception of growing Islamic militancy in Pakistan, championed a concept he called 'enlightened moderation'. This was apparently his effort to uplift Muslims the world over and counter Islamic extremism and militancy.[249] It may also have been his way of paying lip service to the Islamic ideology upon which Pakistan was ostensibly based while seeking to diffuse the threat posed by more militant strands of Islamic thinking. While many, especially in the West, lauded Musharraf for this, a number of Islamic parties in Pakistan, notably the Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic Party), the most prominent Islamic party in Pakistan,[250] criticized Musharraf for being naïve and pandering to the West. So far, it seems Musharraf's doctrine of enlightened moderation has amounted to little.

Despite the differences in the approaches taken by Pakistan's leaders to legitimate

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[249] Pervez Musharraf, "A Plea for Enlightened Moderation," *Washington Post* 1 June 2004, 30 July 2008 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5081-2004May31.html>.
[250] For information on the Jamaat-i-Islami, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: the Jamaat-i Islami of Pakistan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994); Abdul Rashid Moten, *Revolution to Revolution: Jama'at-e-Islami in the Politics of Pakistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2003).

their rule, they have all acknowledged the centrality of Islam in Pakistan's creation. More than that, "All the rulers except Jinnah and Liaquat," Abdul Rashid Moten argues, have used Islam both "to legitimize their authority and to avoid electoral politics and accountability." Indeed, Pakistan's experience with democracy has been shaky at best, as we saw in Chapter 1. From the beginning, religious elites were co-opted by the state's rulers (as distinct from the state itself), Moten contends, in an attempt to "build a consensus from above."[251] This does seem to be more or less what happened, as discussed in more detail below. Pakistanis are certainly some of the most observant Muslims in the world, with some of the highest rates of regular mosque attendance and daily prayer.[252] Appeals to Islam, however, have so far proven insufficient in strengthening Pakistan's national identity and creating a sense of shared, national community in Pakistan. Ethnic, regional and linguistic divisions persist, to say nothing of religious differences among Muslim sects. Many times the attempt to square Islamic nationalism, which is ultimately non-territorial, with the modern territorial state in Pakistan, has simply resulted in more problems. But then why, precisely, have such efforts been made to make the Islamic ideology that gave rise to Pakistan compatible with the concept of the modern territorial state? Why, for that matter, is it so important for us to know what Pakistan is? Is it not clear enough that it is a state? No, it is not clear at all, as this thesis attempts to show. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the initial creation of Pakistan continue to affect it profoundly.

Adding to the confusion over the basis for Pakistan's existence as a state, Jinnah, in a speech he gave on 11 August 1947 to Pakistan's Constituent Assembly as the

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[251] Moten, *Revolution to Revolution* 56.
[252] *World Values Survey*. 30 July 2008 <www.worldvaluessurvey.org>.

dominion's first governor general, declared that, in Pakistan, "religion or caste or creed" would have "nothing to do with the business of the state."[253] Jinnah, who had justified the creation of Pakistan on the basis of the two-nations theory and who had extolled Islam as the force that would bind Pakistanis together, now told Pakistanis they were, or at least would be, "equal citizens of one state" irrespective of religion. "[I]n course of time," he said, in the most controversial words he would ever utter, "Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State."[254]

The debate over whether or not Jinnah conceived of Pakistan as a secular state, whatever that might mean, is alive and well today. 'Secularists' and 'Islamists' in Pakistan, with few exceptions, both look to Jinnah's vision for Pakistan to frame their arguments. They each see something different in Jinnah, however. Many secularists, like Muhammad Munir, claim that Jinnah was at best a non-observant Muslim steeped in Western secularism who wanted Pakistan to be a secular state where Muslims and non-Muslims alike would be free to practice their religion in private and without interference from the state. In other words, in the lead-up to the creation of Pakistan, he exploited religion for crass political ends—nothing more. A number of Islamists, on the other hand, argue that Jinnah was, in fact, a devout Muslim who wanted to create a truly Islamic state. Islamists of this ilk (there are those who think Jinnah was a fraud) often draw a sharp distinction between an Islamic state and a theocracy. While Jinnah clearly

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[253] Quoted in Haqqani, *Pakistan* 12.
[254] Quoted in Haqqani, *Pakistan* 12–13.

expressed his opposition to theocracy and the rule of "priests with a divine mission,"[255] many Islamists argue that a truly Islamic state is premised on the rule of God, not 'priests' (or *ulama*—religious scholars), and thus a true Islamic state would not be a theocracy. Saleena Karim argues as much in her critique of Muhammad Munir's secularist account of Jinnah's position on the relationship between Islam and Pakistan.[256] I suspect that the truth about Jinnah's intentions lies somewhere between the secularist and Islamist position. While an exhaustive discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to see how such issues continue to be discussed and have at least some political relevance more than sixty years after Pakistan's creation.

So what was Pakistan? What has it become? How have successive attempts to define Pakistan affected the nature of Pakistani politics and the challenges Pakistan faces? To begin with, the new Pakistani state was marked by a "virtual absence of state power."[257] Recall from Chapter 3 that the Muslim League was better organized in Muslim minority provinces in British India, which became part of the new Republic of India, than in the Muslim majority provinces that became part of Pakistan. Unlike the Congress, which enjoyed mass support among non-Muslim Indians, the League was an elitist party and its leaders had put little effort into strengthening it as a mass-based political organization that could successfully represent the people of Pakistan.[258] Moreover, "it did not inherit a preexisting colonial state apparatus, as did the Congress Party" in India. "Local landlords and spiritual leaders," Oscar Verkaaik writes,

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[255] From a radio broadcast in February 1948. Quoted in Karim, *Secular Jinnah* 108.
[256] Karim, *Secular Jinnah*. Cf. Munir, *Jinnah to Zia*.
[257] Oscar Verkaaik, *Migrants and Militants: Fun and Urban Violence in Pakistan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 23–24.
[258] Bahl, *Jinnah to Jihad* 64.

filled the vacuum caused by the virtual absence of state power, and they had a poor and sometimes hostile working relationship with the Muslim League and the central bureaucracy, both of which were dominated by the urban migrant population. The center therefore had difficulty establishing authority over the provinces. In addition to this, military disputes with India over Kashmir threatened the center from without. Under these circumstances, the military—mainly dominated by Punjabis and to a lesser extent Pakhtun—managed to gain the upper hand over the political leadership that was largely Muhajir [immigrants from territories now claimed by the new Republic of India, as opposed to people already living in territories now claimed by Pakistan].[259]

As the foregoing suggests, not only was the authority structure weak to non-existent in Pakistan upon its inception, the Muslim League lacked the resources and mass support to administer a modern state and had to rely on landlords and spiritual leaders, and eventually the military (which consisted of 36 per cent of the former Indian Army under the British), for both material and ideological support. Building a robust authority structure would be complicated to say the least and to date the job is far from complete. Compounding the problem was the fact that Islam had clearly not had the unifying effect Pakistan's leading proponents had hoped for; Pakistan remained heavily divided along ethnic, linguistic, political, and even religious lines. That the country was initially split in two between West and East Pakistan did not help matters, as this exacerbated ethnic rivalries between the more numerous but poorer Bengalis in the East and Punjabis, especially, in the West. "West Pakistani elites," Bahl writes, including Punjabis and muhajirs or immigrants from other parts of the subcontinent, who "dominated the government of Pakistan and the military, opposed democracy because democracy would lead to a state dominated by Bengalis, who were a majority of the population."[260] Given the tense, uncertain political situation, Pakistan's rulers quickly learned to rely on the

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[259] Verkaaik, *Migrants* 23–24.
[260] Bahl, *Jinnah to Jihad* 65.

Punjabi-dominated military—"the foremost unelected institution of the nation"[261]—to maintain order, thus boosting the military's "power, prestige and confidence."[262] The military further benefited from American support in light of the Cold War. Thus, the military came to see itself as the nation's protector. Furthermore, the muhajirs, who had immigrated to Pakistan and settled mostly in urban areas and who were often wealthier and better educated than the local population, assumed leading roles in Pakistan's fledgling bureaucracy, fostering resentment among the local population. Pakistan was a mess and the military, as its preeminent defender, projected an image of cool professionalism. To properly defend Pakistan, however, the military, and of course the country's rulers, needed to be clear about what Pakistan was. Thus began the quest for Pakistan. This quest—necessitated by the ambiguous construction of Pakistan—has been going on ever since and has had some devastating consequences.

The ongoing dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is crucial to our story. Just prior to independence, British India consisted of 13 provinces, ruled directly by Britain, and 562 semi-autonomous princely states. Upon or shortly after partition, all but one of these princely states acceded to either Pakistan or the Republic of India, on the basis of geography and the religion of the majority of the state's population. That territory is the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The dispute between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir, which has persisted since 1947, is central to Pakistan's quest for identity—meaning the quest of Pakistan's rulers and military elites to define Pakistan in such a way as to legitimate their rule and position themselves as Pakistan's protectors

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[261] Ian Talbot, "The Punjabization of Pakistan: Myth or Reality?" *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?* 51.
[262] Bahl, *Jinnah to Jihad* 65.

and, to some extent, protectors of Muslims throughout South Asia. It has so far resulted in as many as four wars (some might quibble about what constitutes a war, but this does not concern us here), been directly implicated in the rise of extremist violence throughout South Asia, necessitated billions of dollars in defense spending by both sides, and cost thousands of lives. Despite arguments to the contrary, Bahl convincingly argues that this territory is of little strategic value to Pakistan. The ongoing conflict over Jammu and Kashmir, he contends, is directly linked to Pakistan's quest for identity, which I argue is linked to the perceived need for Pakistan's rulers to establish and legitimate their authority over what they have always hoped would be a more of less unified Pakistan—which has proven impossible so far.[263] In this way, many of the challenges Pakistan faces today—like the conflict over Kashmir—are a legacy of the nature of the creation of Pakistan as a state.

The majority of people in Jammu and Kashmir are Muslim. Jammu and Kashmir is often referred to simply as Kashmir, because while the territory is considered a single political entity, it can be divided into two distinct regions: Muslim-majority Kashmir bordering Pakistan and Hindu-majority Jammu bordering India. At first, the Hindu *maharaja* (Indian prince) of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, wanted to remain independent. The British, however, would not allow this; the state had to join either India or Pakistan—there could be no independent Kashmiri state. Then, in October 1947, Pashtun tribesman, trained and supported by Pakistani military officers, invaded Kashmir. "Religious scholars," Haqqani reports, "were invited by the government to issue fatwas (Islamic religious opinions issued by a mufti or jurisconsult) declaring the

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[263] Bahl, *Jinnah to Jihad* throughout.

tribesmen's foray into Kashmir as a jihad."[264] Presumably this was a result of the Islamic

rhetoric used to justify the creation of Pakistan and represented the exploitation of this

ideology by the government and especially the military to legitimate their rule.

Otherwise, why would it have been necessary to provide a religious justification for

invading Kashmir? For that matter, how else could it have worked so well? Only the

Islamic ideology used to justify the creation of Pakistan could have allowed the military

to convince religious leaders that Kashmir's incorporation into the new Pakistani state

was necessary to protect Muslims, thus allowing them to declare that fighting in Kashmir

was religiously justified as a legitimate form of jihad.[265]

In response to the Pakistani invasion, the *maharaja* requested Indian military

assistance, which he received in exchange for agreeing to the accession of Jammu and

Kashmir to India. India subsequently secured the capital, Srinagar, the Kashmir valley,

and most parts of Jammu and the predominantly Buddhist Ladakh region. Pakistan

gained control over the rest—approximately one third of the territory, known as the Azad

or Free Kashmir and Northern Areas. In response to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal

Nehru's claim of 'Pakistani aggression' in Kashmir, the United Nations Security Council

adopted resolution 39 in January 1948, establishing the UN Commission for India and

Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and mediate the dispute. Three months later, it adopted

resolution 47, enlarging the UNCIP's membership, recommending the use of observers to

stop the fighting, and advocating a plebiscite to decide the fate of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Karachi Agreement of July 1949, signed by India and Pakistan, established a

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[264] Haqqani, *Pakistan* 29.
[265] For an interesting introduction to just war theory in Islam, see John Kelsay, *Arguing the Just War in Islam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

ceasefire line but failed to definitively resolve the dispute. Tensions escalated along the ceasefire line throughout the 1950s and, in 1965, Pakistan launched a full-scale war against India over Jammu and Kashmir. Two wars and regular skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani forces across the ceasefire line, now called the line of control,[266] have occurred since then, and a plebiscite has yet to be held.

From the beginning, Pakistan's rulers have struggled to maintain control over the extent of Pakistani territory—efforts that have frequently involved various schemes to better define Pakistan and reassert the basis for Pakistan's existence. Bahl, for one, argues that much of Pakistan's foreign and domestic policy, especially its seemingly wrongheaded policy on Kashmir, can be explained by this incessant quest for identity. Pakistan's Punjabi-dominated military, as the most organized force in the country, has, since partition, taken a leading, if unwelcome role in defining and then protecting Pakistan's identity as a bastion for Islam in the subcontinent. To this end, it has fostered close ties with religious leaders and exploited Islam in support of its Kashmir policy, among other initiatives. Such tactics are deemed necessary because, given the Islamic ideology and the two nation theory that were used to justify the call for Pakistan, there is no other basis for Pakistan's existence than the need for a Muslim homeland in South Asia. As such, there is no basis for political authority consistent with the ideology used to justify the creation of Pakistan except Islam. Yet this has created more problems than it has solved.

Because Muslims in the subcontinent, and indeed everywhere, are divided among themselves along a number of different lines, claims that Pakistan is, or should be, an

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[266] After the Simla Agreement was signed in 1972 by India and Pakistan following the 1971 war that saw the creation of Bangladesh.

Islamic state, which have almost always been intended to unite Muslims as Pakistanis, have served more to divide Pakistanis as Muslims. This is because they have naturally given rise to seemingly irresolvable questions about what Islam is and what one must do to qualify as a Muslim—and, crucially, who gets to determine such things. Islam may not ultimately be a fragile basis for fostering human community—indeed, the appeal of the concept of the non-territorial Muslim *ummah* or nation has proven remarkably resilient— but it has certainly proven a difficult ideology to square with the concept of the modern territorial state, as Pakistan's successive rulers have found out the hard way.

"[T]he most striking fact about Pakistan," Jalal observes, "is how it failed to satisfy the interests of the very Muslims who are supposed to have demanded its creation."[267] Unlike Jalal, however, who argues this is because Pakistan was poorly conceived, I argue that it is because the modern state system, Pakistan's elite advocates in the Muslim League, and those, like Sindhi nationalists, who seem to have supported Pakistan for their own duplicitous reasons, as mentioned in Chapter 3, all conspired to frustrate the hopes and dreams of the masses who hoped Pakistan would give them a safe place to call home. Compounding the problem, successive attempts by Pakistan's rulers to legitimize their rule by appealing to religious sentiments and using an ideology that is incompatible with the notion of the modern territorial state have backfired. The confusion over the reason for its creation in the first place, the ways Pakistan's leaders have attempted to unify the state and legitimate their rule, and the ensuing debates over the role of Islam in Pakistan have stayed with this troubled country ever since.

Pakistan was certainly the product of an unusual brand of non-territorial religious

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[267] Jalal, *Sole Spokesman* 2.

nationalism. Saleem M. M. Qureshi suggests it

> is perhaps the only uni-dimensional nationalism based on religion alone, disregarding the factors of geography and local tradition, for members of this group had neither occupied the territory claimed in their name nor possessed a common political framework in the past (nor even uniform customs and traditions). Barring the urban elites, the overwhelmingly rural Muslim masses did not share common characteristics of race, language or culture. The one characteristic they had in common was dislike of Hindu domination.[268]

This has presented distinct challenges to nation building in the context of the territorial state that Pakistan has become. While the crises and challenges Pakistan has faced over the years (endemic corruption, poverty, illiteracy, extremist violence, military coups, lack of social cohesion, and so on) are not the exclusive product of the confusion that attended and the religious rhetoric that was used to justify the creation the state to begin with, many of them can be traced to the various efforts Pakistan's rulers have made to legitimize their rule and unify the country—efforts influenced, if not dictated, by the ideology used to justify the creation of Pakistan. This is because, given the way the creation of Pakistan was justified on the basis of the two-nations theory and Islamic ideology, coupled with the disconnect between Pakistan as a territorial state, or space, versus Pakistan as a Muslim homeland, or place, and the challenges this posed to Pakistan's integrity as a state, the tools available to Pakistan's rulers to legitimate their rule and establish a stable authority structure were limited.

The only consistent theme in the long road to partition was Islam and the need for a separate Muslim homeland in the subcontinent. Thus, Pakistan's rulers, who needed to legitimate their rule, relied on the ideology that gave rise to Pakistan in the first place. This has proved disastrous, however, as it has opened successive Pakistani governments

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[268] Saleem M. M. Qureshi, "Pakistani Nationalism Reconsidered," *Pacific Affairs* 45.4 (Winter 1972–73): 556–57.

to criticism from within and without and destabilized the state, making it a haven for violent elements in society that do not respect the state, do not think the state is legitimate, and in some cases, do not accept the modern state system as a legitimate mode of geopolitical organization—a critique buried within the very Islamic ideology that was used to justify the creation of Pakistan in the first place and one that resonates with the history of geopolitical and social organization in the subcontinent prior to British imperialism. Furthermore, such appeals to religion have done about as much to unite Muslims in Pakistan as they did to unite Muslims in British India—which is to say not much.

The two most prominent alternative explanations for the crises Pakistan has faced over the years are in fact not entirely incompatible with the theory advanced in this thesis. The first is that government corruption has always existed in Pakistan as a result of weak institutions and that Pakistan needs to develop better institutions to rout out corruption. The second is that Pakistan is insufficiently democratic and that promoting democracy in Pakistan, if not the panacea for all its ills, will at least do a lot to promote peace and stability and ultimately prosperity in the country. The argument for democracy also posits that Pakistanis will consider a democratic regime more legitimate and thus the authority structure will be more robust. These explanations focus, respectively, on how corruption negatively affects a country and how strong institutions help reduce corruption, and how non-representative political institutions and an undemocratic regime can breed conflict and foster instability. This thesis addresses the related questions of why democracy has not yet taken root in Pakistan and why corruption has been endemic in Pakistan so far.

As Feisal Khan writes in the conclusion to his study of corruption in Pakistan,

"The fundamental question is why did Pakistan's institutions fail?"[269] The fundamental answer, I argue, is that, because Pakistan's supporters probably did not conceive of Pakistan at first as a modern territorial state, upon its creation there was not only massive confusion as to how Pakistan would function as a state—something common to a lot of new states—but also confusion about why Pakistan should even exist as a state at all. In the absence of state power, Pakistan's leaders, to justify and legitimate their rule, relied on the Islamic ideology and the two-nations theory that were most consistently used to justify the call for Pakistan—a call that initially aimed simply to unite the Muslims of South Asia and provide them sanctuary within the subcontinent. This ideology, as it turned out, was incompatible with the concept of the modern territorial state, at least so far as the state is considered a mere container—a space. In the process, Pakistan's rulers opened themselves to criticisms—sometimes horrifically violent—from secularists and Islamists alike, further dividing, rather than uniting, the country. Subsequent attempts to build democratic or other institutions not legitimated by appeals to religion have faltered because the government, which itself is responsible for building these institutions, has no universally recognized authority to do so due to the fact that there is ultimately still no consensus on why Pakistan should exist—on what Pakistan ultimately represents. That an elected body governs a particular space does not, in and of itself, create a sense of place within that space, and without a sense of place, a state will lack social cohesion and order will frequently break down. Until there is consensus on why Pakistan should exist, and therefore be ruled, as a single state at all, there is little hope of democracy taking root in any meaningful way in Pakistan.

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[269] Khan, "Corruption" 241.

Certainly, Pakistan faces many other challenges that are not the direct result of either the ambiguity surrounding its creation or the rhetoric used to justify its existence. Yet as this thesis has attempted to show, the Pakistani state itself cannot be taken for granted, as scholars are often apt to do. The policy implications of this analysis, as discussed in more detail in the conclusion, are sobering to say the least. For instance, no amount of institution building or democratization will help in the long run in the absence of a solid basis for Pakistan's existence, which is essential to developing a reliable authority structure. This authority structure is absolutely essential because otherwise, the question will always arise—and the answers will always be unsatisfactory—of who exactly is 'building' these institutions. Because of the nature of the creation of Pakistan and the extent to which its rulers have exploited religion, democracy alone, howsoever defined, or the material wellbeing and security of Pakistan's inhabitants, is insufficient for cultivating a sense of national identity, community and social cohesion in Pakistan.

Albert von Chamisso's novel about a man who lost his shadow, Gellner suspects, is an allegory about a person's need for nationality. The man without a shadow, Gellner suggests, might easily refer to a man without a nation, a difficult position to be in, it would seem, in our modern age. "A man without a nation," Gellner writes, "defies the recognized categories and provokes revulsion."[270] In a similar vein, it seems almost impossible for scholars today to conceive of a state without a purpose and what the possible consequences of such a situation might be. States simply are, it is assumed. As this thesis has endeavored to show with respect to Pakistan specifically, however, states never simply are and the state cannot be taken for granted. Pakistan is a leading candidate

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[270] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* 6.

for a state without a purpose, or at least a state the purpose of which is disputed or in doubt. As we have seen from our discussion, this is due to a variety of factors and has certainly had a profound effect on the people within Pakistan's borders and on the larger region and the world in general. Pakistan, as the title of this chapter suggests and as this thesis has hopefully shown, is still a physical space more than a meaningful place and, consequently, it is the land with no shadow.

This chapter has shown how successive Pakistani governments, and especially the military, have attempted to use Islamic ideology to forge a coherent identity for Pakistan, to hold the country together and thus legitimate their rule. They have largely failed in this, as we have seen throughout this thesis. Given the nature of Pakistan's creation, ideology remains a prominent concern in the discourse on Pakistani politics because, without some ideological basis, it is feared there would be no reason for Pakistan to exist, and yet somehow it does. If there is one theoretical lesson to be learned from all this, it is that scholars cannot take the state for granted and that when we talk about nations and states, we have to be clear about what we are talking about: states, nations, a given people, a specific territory, the regime or government, and so on. In Pakistan's case, making these distinctions, as should be clear from the foregoing, is imperative.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

"The description of the Muslims of British India as a nation," Juergen Kleiner writes, "had been a useful slogan during the fight for a separate state, but not a correct description of a group of people that was conscious of its identity and willing to maintain its unity. Nationalism had been used as an ideology, but it did not bring about a nation."[271] As I have attempted to demonstrate in this thesis, Pakistan was not originally conceived as a modern territorial state but rather as a Muslim homeland in the Indian subcontinent. The point of Pakistan was to unite Muslims, thereby strengthening them as a community—a nation. Iqbal, Jinnah and others in the Muslim League and related organizations were well aware that Muslims were divided among themselves—that was precisely the problem. Iqbal especially sought to unite Muslims, to remind them that they were all members of the universal *ummah*, the Islamic nation and, according to Islamic theology, the natural 'nation' of all humankind. Jinnah wanted to unite Muslims as well, though there is some debate over whether this was a genuine desire to further the cause of Islam or a ploy to gain political support. In the event, the state was an afterthought—a foreign concept thrust upon those who had supported the call for Pakistan as a homeland. In a world made up entirely of states, how could Pakistan be anything but a state? Geopolitical and social organization in the South Asia had not always been conceived like this—indeed, the concept of the modern state was very much a foreign import—but in the end, this mode of thinking and organization prevailed.

The Islamic ideology used to justify the call for Pakistan, as this thesis has also

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[271] Kleiner, "Pakistan" 15.

attempted to show, is incompatible with the concept of the modern territorial state, yet without this ideology, all things being equal, it would seem Pakistan should never have been born. Pakistan was thus a stillborn state. Its rulers have had little success reviving it to date, though not for want of trying.

The stability and the reliability of the authority structure of any state is a function of the state structure, which is influenced by the modern state system. The inner cohesion of the state structure depends on the appropriate match between place and space. There can be no cohesion if people do not consider the space a state occupies or claims to also be a place. Pakistan remains a mere container, a space, and thus the required match between place and space has not been achieved and, therefore, Pakistan is unstable and unreliable as a state actor and will remain so until and unless this defect in its political architecture can be fixed. The onus is on Pakistanis to do this. This will require not only a consensus on what the Pakistani state is and ought to be, but also a consensus on how this should be decided. This is a tall order indeed.

Despite the problems associated with the nature of the creation of Pakistan, the condition of Muslims in Pakistan does appear to be better than the condition of Muslims in neighboring India. While this thesis has not discussed the difference between the condition of Muslims in India as compared with that of Muslims in Pakistan, it might be reasonable to conclude that, to the extent—and only to the extent—that the impoverished condition of Muslims in India is the result of discrimination against them as a religious minority, Pakistan, as a state, has satisfied one demand that was voiced on behalf of India's Muslims leading up to partition: that they be free of Hindu dominance. Of course, the condition of some groups, like the Ahamdis, may well be worse in Pakistan as a result

of discrimination they face from (other) Muslims. Such negative freedom, however, which is akin to the ignoble communalism Iqbal lamented, is insufficient for a community to thrive, and since the transformation of Pakistani space into Pakistani place has not yet been fully achieved, Pakistan remains a fractured state in which individual communities may thrive but almost always at the expense of a larger national thriving. As a result of a lack of positive consensus on why Pakistan should exist, apart from it not being India and therefore presumably protecting Muslims from Hindu domination, Pakistan remains internally unstable. In this context, I take unstable to mean susceptible to violent conflict on a recurring basis, unstable political regimes that lack legitimacy and that are prone to corruption, and a multitude a secession movements threatening to break the country apart. Since this thesis is not ultimately an in-depth study of corruption and political violence in Pakistan, exhaustive statistics on these issues have not been presented. It is clear from a number of studies, however, that corruption continues to be rampant in Pakistan, that the regime, if not the state, has rarely, if ever, enjoyed widespread, popular legitimacy, and that politically motivated violence is a common occurrence in Pakistan and, by some accounts, is getting much worse.

The issue is not simply the legitimacy or stability of a given regime in Pakistan, however, but rather the stability and coherency of Pakistan as a state. This thesis has attempted to show how the instability of successive Pakistani regimes is a product of the incoherency, and thus instability, of the notion of Pakistan as a modern territorial state. Yet regardless, Pakistan exists as a state. If it did not, what difference would this make? This is an important question, since part of the problem with Pakistan, I argue, is related to the insistence that it continue to exist as a single political entity—a single state. By

forcing a number of ill-adjusted communities to attempt to forge some kind of national unity, are the problems of this region not exacerbated and perhaps new ones created? This thesis argues as much. Yet were the existence of Pakistan as a state—any kind of state—realistically threatened, what responses would we likely see? We may well witness celebrations in one corner of the country, perhaps from Sindhi nationalists, while we may see a greater level of cohesion among the various Islamic and Islamist groups in the country, who would undoubtedly be fearful of losing the territory they have presumably already one in the name, if not the practice, of Islam. Still, the region would be faced with similar challenges about how communities ought to be organized and still the same issue of marrying western concepts of statehood with other forms of political organization would likely arise.

The quest for the soul of Pakistan continues. Democratization and institution building may well bring great benefits to the people of Pakistan. Yet, as the foregoing analysis suggests, such initiatives will only work once there is consensus on what they are for—on what Pakistan is for. The constructed reality of statehood will be with us for some time. It is up to people to make this reality work for them. Right now, it is not working for Pakistanis.

Future research on Pakistan along these lines might consider the potential for and challenges of consensus building in Pakistan, as well as strategies for mending relations between India and Pakistan without compromising the basis for Pakistan's existence as a state. No workable solution to this problem has yet been suggested to my knowledge, but the future of South Asia may well depend on it.

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